

Events as remembered by (b) (5) for the day of 6/30/2013 on the Yarnell Hill incident

0630-Blue Ridge IHC departs Comfort Inn Camp Verde AZ

0730-Driving in we realize that the fire is much larger than the 100 acres that was relayed to us last night via dispatch and there are a few darker smokes starting to show on the fire.

0800-Blue Ridge IHC arrives at Yarnell hill ICP and Checks in and receives radio clone. We are told that the fire is being run on TAC 1 and TAC 5 is being used as the air to ground. Crew is told to stand by for an assignment.

0845-Blue Ridge IHC instructed to head to Yarnell FD station by incoming (b) (5). We are not given any type of a briefing and we are told that Roy Hall's state team is taking over the incident.

0905- Blue Ridge IHC arrives at Yarnell FD station and stages for an assignment currently the station is being used as a helibase and a troop shuttle is occurring with the IA resources being flown off the hill that had worked the fire through the night. Myself and (b) (5) talk with some of the individuals coming off the hill and (b) (5) the fire but then it just took off and burned over all there supplies (water, Gatorade, MREs, and Dolmars) that they had up there during the night. We are watching fire activity pick up while we are staged, this includes pockets of brush burning very actively. The north end of the fire is beginning to pick up significantly.

1000-Blue Ridge IHC is instructed via radio by (b) (5) to tie in with (b) (5) off of Lakewood and Manzanita rd. We are to tie in with him and get a DOZB off the crew to relieve him of DOZB duties so that he can return to structure group. Myself and (b) (5) head in first to assess road condition and parking for vehicles, I stage the crew just off the pavement in the area of the structures. (b) (5) and I drive in a little further and see Granite Mountains Buggies and I bring our Buggies up to there and then I have (b) (5) unload the ranger and drive it up to the Buggies and we leave the chase and trailer back at the structures. (b) (5) is our lookout down low and he has good eyes on the area. We continue on the improved 2 track and the 2 track is very rough and narrow and has 6 to 8 foot brush on either side we eventually see Granite Mountains Supt. and chase trucks and we continue on in our truck. At this time we contact (b) (5) on TAC 1 and then we need to switch to TAC 3 since there is an issue with the frequencies/tones, we discuss what they are doing and an overall plan. They currently have to burn out the upper 2 track from "The Saddle" to the southeast to stay ahead of the main fire since they cannot go direct at this time. We tie in with (b) (5) behind the dozer and he tells us what he has the Dozer doing. This involves improving access to the black via 2 tracks that run up the hill. He is first going to have him work the one to the north and then Granite mountain (b) (5) the

dozer could work up to the 2 track that they hiked in on that goes to "the Saddle". We are then told that the Dozer is not red carded and does not have a radio. I grab my extra radio and get it ready for the operator. We have (b) (5) and one other drive up in the ranger and then we brief (b) (5) that he is to function as a DOZB for the time being and I give him the radio to give to the operator. I tell him to work off TAC 3 since it is not being used right now and we know he has good comms with him on that channel. (b) (5) and I take the Ranger and the other crewmember is in the supt. truck.

1045- Blue Ridge IHC takes our first weather observations of the day

There are only SEATs on scene right now and (b) (5) contacts Air Attack and tells him that he would like them to pre-treat the green side of the upper 2 track that is leading from the saddle to the East. The next SEAT that comes in puts his load directly on the main black edge and then (b) (5) gets on the radio and tells air attack again what the plan is. Air Attack states that if they can get this next one to knock the heat out of one area they (being Granite Mountain) will be able to go direct on the fire's edge. (b) (5)

(b) (5) Shortly thereafter (b) (5) leaves and heads to the structures. Granite Mountain appears to start going direct on the main edge.

We scouted ahead for (b) (5) until we hit black and then turn around and passed on the intel. He continues until the black and I then have him improve on the way out until he hits an old piece of equipment and then I instruct him to push a bigger parking/turnaround area here. At this time I also sent the crewmember back down in the supt. truck to the crew (b) (5) and take the 2 track that was further to the east and was the route that Granite took to access the Black. This is very rough in the ranger and is not accessible via trucks. We then had (b) (5) try to improve as much of it as he can with the Dozer when the parking area is complete. We tie in the (b) (5) (b) (5) I notice that they have about 100 yard of line secured. We talk to them about the situation and comments are made about how neither crew received a briefing. We also discuss the issue about the radios. We gave them all the extra water and Gatorade that we had in the Ranger and told them what we saw from below and we all noticed that activity to the north was picking up. I remember making a comment about a finger in the bottom that was beginning to heat up and make its way east in the flats below the ridge/saddle. I also talk on the radio to (b) (5) about this and about the activity picking up to the north. (b) (5) radios and says that he can't push anymore so I send him back out to the main 2 track and have him improve that back to the Granite mountain trucks.

At this time it is also determined by OPS that (b) (5) would become (b) (5) and that (b) (6) was coming in. (b) (6) agreed to this.

(b) (5) arrived with some other individual and tied in with (b) (5) and it was relayed to us via our crew channel while we were still with Granite Mountain that (b) (5) was trying to reach (b) (5) on TAC 1 (we could not hear him well and we could

see his truck less than a mile away. (b) (5) said that (b) (5)
(b) (5)

finally gets in contact with (b) (5) and they spent quite a bit of time discussing break points and resources. (b) (5) also wants a face to face and (b) (5) says that this is not possible at this time due to access (b) (5)

(b) (5)
(b) (5)

Initially it was worked out that (b) (5) would start at "the saddle" run north along the eastern edge but there was no definitive break to the north. (b) (5) would also have Granite Mountain and Blue Ridge IHCs and the Dozer. (b) (5)

then he left and drove back down the road and tied in with our crew at the Buggies. We spoke with (b) (5) via our crew channel and TAC 1. This was about trying to tie in with him in a little while. We stay up in "the saddle" and "BS" and they ask if we could take their lookout down so he will have better eyes on the fire down low. We have an extra seat and agree to this. This crewmember was (b) (5)

1115 (b) (5) and myself along with (b) (5) head down the 2 track to drop the lookout off and tie in with (b) (5) We took him down the hill and dropped him near a small hill in the bottom near the junction and he knew that we could grab him if needed in the ranger or a truck.

There was then another conversation between the divisions and Air Attack about resources and division breaks and it sounded that the resources and divisions completely switched and DIVA was to the west and now DIVZ had the east flank and the resources. (b) (5)

the matter was still unresolved. We continued down the main 2 track to find (b) (5) and when we got to his truck (at granite mountains supt./chase trucks) we did not see him so we decided to scout a wash that ran to the north west from the trucks. We drove this out to the black and then determined that this would not work also. Activity was still increasing with longer flame lengths and more rapid rates of spread. More tankers were working the fire now and the type one ships were doing some work further north along a ridge and around structures closer to Peoples valley. When we returned to where (b) (5) truck was (b) (5) and the Dozer were staged there (b) (5)

(b) (5) We pass on what we know about Granite Mountain going direct and then what we saw during our recons.

We drive down and tie in with the crew and we try to re-clone our radios with some changes to the channels but this does not fix the situation.

Fire activity has picked up significantly and they are having lots of trouble on the north end of the fire and are running tankers and type 1 ships. (b) (5) that the focus will probably move towards structure protection quickly. The aircraft begin to start putting an indirect retardant line from the black towards the rocky nob just north of the structures by the youth camp.

(b) (5) calls and requests the dozer to put in a piece of line off the main 2 track to the north that will tie into a road call shrine by the youth camp. We drive down and tie in with him and get the info and then pass it on to (b) (5)

(b) (5) We then drive back out to 89 and then around on shrine towards the youth camp. I get a Lat long and pass it on to (b) (5) and there are some engines in the area. We also take note that there are still lots of People on the highway and in town. We drive up the highway and watch the fire behavior and there is a large wall of fire to our north moving towards the ICP, 89 and structures. Approximately 30-40 foot flame lengths. We discuss that it will probably be necessary to burn out 89 eventually. We hear lots of traffic about units up north burning around structures and having to use alternate escape route since some have been compromised.

(b) (5) finishes this assignment and they request him to go up north with the (b) (5) and we send him up that direction to tie in with (b) (5)

I get the crew to drive down the road and gear up to start prepping the dozer line towards the youth camp from the main 2 track to the north and east. I have 4 drivers led by (b) (5) bump the rigs around and head to the youth camp since this is a better place to put them and the guys will be working that direction and it is a down hill walk out to them if we need to leave in a hurry.

(b) (5) speaks with (b) (5) and it is decided that (b) (5) is going to tie in with (b) (5) in "the saddle" and he drives off.

Weather update about thunderstorm with high out flow winds. I did not hear anyone copy the weather on TAC. I called my squad leaders and asked if they copied and they all did

I get out of the ranger and tie in with the crew as they are hiking in I get the crew lined out and (b) (5) remains lookout from the dozer line, I continue hiking as the crew begins working, my intent was to get to high point on a rocky area to the north of the Dozer line/youth camp and see if there was a way to get fire around the structures and out to 89 off the dozer line. This was our current thinking at the time to bring fire down the original 2 track to the north and then herd it around the town and out to the highway. (b) (5) drives in on the 2 track and sees Granite Mountains (b) (5) out to the 2 track and tells him to get in since (b) (5) can see that fire will soon be at their location. (b) (5) and lets him know that we have the (b) (5) then calls me and asks for some drivers to bump back to grab their trucks and buggies because Granite Mountains trucks will be burned over very soon. (b) (5) also calls Granite Mountain and lets them know that we will move their trucks. I do an about face and hike through the crew that is now prepping the dozer line. I grab the last (b) (5) and send the (b) (5) up with the rest of the crew and (b) (5) plus myself and (b) (5) head to the main 2 track. (b) (5) is heading to the Granite trucks at this time too. I call the driver that is bumping the supt truck and have him turn around and meet us at the location where the crew unloaded. We tie in with

him quickly and head up the road. (b) (5) drops off the (b) (5) off at the trucks and comes back for me and grabs me and with the ranger and we head up to the supt and chase trucks. I instruct our guys to grab their buggies and wait until we get back to them I jump in their chase and the (b) (5) me and we pick up our guys in their buggies who fall into the convoy. I have the front and (b) (5) s bring up the rear. I then get conformation that our trucks are at the youth camp from (b) (5) At this time I jump on their crew radio and talk with (b) (5) about where we are taking the buggies and the situation down here. I explain about what we are doing and what the fire behavior is doing. (b) (5) (b) (5) I also reiterate that we are going to keep their (b) (5) with us until we tie in with them later, I explain that we will keep their rigs with us too because things are very dynamic now, and (b) (5) mentions that they are trying to come down off the hill. he mentions traveling through the black. I also get positive conformation that (b) (5) understands where the trucks will be parked because he can see the trucks driving out and I orient him to the rocky area north along the dozer line (end of shrine rd) that we are taking them to. (b) (5) (b) (5) (b) (5) We drive around to the youth camp and park their rigs with ours. We then get positive conformation that the area that the Granite Mountain trucks were just in was burned, from (b) (5) via the radio. I jump back in the ranger and (b) (5) and I drive back up via the dozer line to the main two track we pass (b) (5) and then we head west towards the fire to see exactly what the situation is. I have the drivers get geared up to assist the rest of the crew.

1615-outflows begin fire starts to increase ROS dramatically moving to the south very quickly and spotting. (b) (5) the thunderstorm has significant down drafts 20+ mph and these are dramatically increasing fire behavior, pushing things to the south. We continue to drive up the 2 track to see how much time we have. It becomes obvious that the current plan will not work. I call (b) (5) and tell him to disengage the crew and head to the trucks he does this. We flip around a head back down we drive past (b) (5) then the crew and head to the youth camp there are now quite a few engines in the area and pickups. We tell them that everyone needs to leave ASAP. One engine individual says there are more up the wash (b) (5) (b) (5) The crew is loaded up and I instruct them to head to the highway to a staging area (ranch house restaurant) and to wait there. We drive up the wash and find engine crews hiking out and we urge them to move as fast as they can. The crew arrives at the staging area. We all get back to the youth camp and get them all driving out and we bring up the rear. We drive out a ways and run into (b) (5) (b) (5) We give them the intel we have and then we all head out towards the highway. There are still people milling about in town. We decide to tie back in with the crew. So we head out to the highway and head south.

1640 (b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

1655-Radio traffic is overheard on A/G or TAC about Granite Mountain IHC needing to deploy shelters and they were in the process of cutting deployment site and trying to burn out around it. No other radio traffic is heard from Granite Mountain over TAC or A/G. we arrive at the Ranch House Restaurant staging area and I jump in Granite Mountain's chase rig and try to listen on their crew channel and all I hear is a keyed mic, I try to raise them but with no success. I tell (b) (5) to sit in the truck and monitor their crew channel for any traffic.

1700-The Ranch House Restaurant staging area is very hectic and then we begin to organize a task force of medics and pickup trucks along with all the medical supplies that we can get. We decide to run everything on TAC 1 and we have this all organized to respond if we can find access. (b) (5) is the contact running the medics. We have a total of 3 trucks and one ranger, with 5 paramedics and 3 EMTs with 3 drivers organized to head in. the evacuation begins of Yarnell. (b) (5)

(b) (5)

1710 (b) (5) and myself depart the staging area and try to find access we initially try to gain access via shrine rd. this is not possible due to propane tanks exploding/venting and a large wall of fire as well as trees across the road. Then we try via the Lakewood rd. We determine very quickly that it is too dangerous and we tie in with (b) (5) on an ATV on Lakewood rd and tell him to not let anyone back into the area this is also relayed to the crew and they try to find an LEO to halt access for anyone from 89. We try another route off Lakewood and when we are heading back to 89 after determining that this way is also too dangerous we see (b) (5) sending in engines to engage and we turn them around and send them back to 89. There were multiple propane tanks venting and exploding on both routes as well as multiple flame fronts impeding the way. During this time we are also noticing residents still in the area and we are urging them to leave.

1725-We then try to access again via shrine again and tie in with (b) (5) and (b) (5) and they have a Polaris razor and a ATV. We only have a few bottle of O2, one med bag and a backboard. We tell them about access and where we think the site may be. We drive up as far as we can on shrine and then sit there for a few minutes contemplating the situation. We all know that it is cold black beyond the first wall of heat and the propane tanks that are venting. I remember saying "Fuck it lets go for it" and then we all just go for it. There are multiple trees across the road and power lines are hanging very low too. We punch it and make it through we head up the Dozer line and the tie into the 2 track and take that until we make the left hand turn up the 2 track to were we think they might be. I transmit this over crew to (b) (5) at the staging area who relays this to the Medical group leader (which

has dismantled the Task force we had and builds something else altogether) I also relay the access that we took into the black and tell the resources to wait until we find them because it is so dangerous to get through the way we came. At this time we find out that (b) (5) is still with the crew and not (b) (5)

1750-All three vehicles head up to the upper 2-track junction and then we see that Ranger 5 is hovering over something down in the flats off the north. We all head down the hill until we determine that it is a old piece of heavy equipment that was seen early by (b) (5). This is the area where they would have been had they been traveling in the Black like we initially thought. (b) (5)
(b) (5)

1815- (b) (5) flies back up towards the saddle and is hovering (b) (5) (b) (5) and this is relayed via (b) (5) we all drive back up the hill and go right at the upper 2 track junction and drive as far as we can to "The Saddle". Then all 5 of us are heading that way on foot since ATV/UTV access is impossible. We cannot talk to (b) (5) directly and have to relay through (b) (5) (b) (5) has the Backboard and I have the Med kit and we are moving very quickly.

1820-I arrive at the location identified by (b) (5) and determine that this is not the site (last nights burned up gear) and communicate this to (b) (5) and the rest of the SAR group. This is then relayed to (b) (7)(F), (b) (5) leaves and continues the search.

1823 (b) (5) relays that (b) (5) and gives a Lat Long that I plug into my GPS we are near the saddle at this time. I get a rough idea of where the site is and I begin to run the ridge/2 track. (b) (5) follows while the others grab the vehicles and try to drive in that direction. I run the ridge as far as I can and then drop down a sub drainage towards the site that is visible from the ridge top.

1840-I am on scene of the incident with (b) (5) who was dropped off by the ship further to the SE and it is clear that there are no survivors. (b) (5)
(b) (5) leaves the scene and hikes to structure approximately 1/3 of a mile away to find vehicle access. Shortly thereafter (b) (5) arrive on scene. A few minutes after that (b) (5) arrives. (b) (5) then flags the scene.

1855-Everyone on scene hikes out to the structure to tie in with Granite IC, we tie in with Granite IC and then some other individuals from the team. I give (b) (5)
(b) (5)

2000-back at the ATVs. I speak with (b) (5) via phone (b) (5)
(b) (5)

2030- we tie back in with the crew (b) (5)
(b) (5) about what to do with the Granite
Rigs (b) (5)
(b) (5)

2200 (b) (5) and head into ICP and tie in with (b) (5)
(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5) I have the guys drive Granite mountains rigs to the Yarnell Fire Station and
leave them there. (b) (5)
(b) (5) We grab food for the guys and find a sleeping
spot and have a informal AAR/QA

This is what I have remember as of the night of 7/3/13. If there are any questions or
more needs to be elaborated on I can do so.

Sincerely,
(b) (5)

Date 6/30/13	Location Yarnell Hills Fire	Elevation Feet	Aspect N E S W
Exposure (Ridge/top, slope, etc.) Flats	Cover Type (As indicator of wind obstruction) Brush/Grass	Stand Density (As indicator of wind obstruction)	
		Wind	

Time (- ST)	Temperature (Degree F.)		Relative Humidity (Percent)	Speed (M.p.h.)	Direction (From)	Characteristics and Comments (See instructions on cover)
	Dry	Wet				
1100	97		19	4-6	S	PIG 100/70 (b) (5) noted buildup to far NE
1200	95		21/22	4-6	S	PIG 40/60 Growing buildup to NW
1300	97	42	20/1	4-6	S	PIG 90/60 Growing buildup NW
1400	98	41	20/0	4-6	S	PIG 90/60
1500	98	0	20/0	3-5	S	PIG 80/60 sig. cell buildup to N
1600	95	3	17/3	4-6	W	PIG 20/60 1015 dramatic shift from W → NE gust
1700	87	8	29/42	10-15	ENE	

0630 Left camp verde reroute to Yarnell Hills fire.

830 arrival at Peoples valley School

Received radio clone

No Briefing.

Instructed to stage at school

0900:

Instructed to travel to Yarnell Fire department

Staged at YFD

Fire activity increasing with notable flare ups on fires edge.

0930: Instructed to tie in with Structure group one. Inquiry about (b) (5)

1030: Traveled into Yarnell subdivision staged in meadow near fire.

Granite Mountain (b) (5) assigned as (b) (5)

Granite Mountain IHC (GMIHC) conducting burnout operations along fires edge near saddle off of two track road. (b) (5)

(b) (5)

Blueridge One requested me plus one to travel to fires edge. I was assigned (b) (5) (b) (5) county employee not IA qualified and did not have radio. Gave radio from BRIHC to operator (b) (5) Crew Member operated vehicle movement back to crew in meadow.

Air attack advises GMIHC that they are going to use SEATS to drop fire retardant onto burnout operation, so that the fire can be picked up with direct attack.

(b) (5) pushed line in north easterly direction opening up two track. (b) (5) (b) (5) Opened two track up on toe of the slope and created vehicle turn around near end of dozer line in drainage line construction could not proceed. Turned (b) (5) around to improve line back to "Y" intersection where historic dozer (rusty mining Equipment) was located. At this point flank where GMIHC was working was not active. Flank to north and east was intensifying and aggressively backing. I noticed build up to the North East and informed BRIHC (b) (5)

1100: Met (b) (5) and strike team "?" on Two Track / Dozer line.

I informed (b) (5) on are line construction and turnaround location and advised him that he probably didn't need to travel there because he could see everything from current vantage point. I informed him about GMIHC operations and who (b) (5) was and his location. (b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

1120: I was instructed to open up two track uphill towards GMIHC. I confirmed that (b) (5) was (b) (5) opened two track 1/3 distance to GMIHC. Terrain was steep extremely rocky route that necessitated construction downhill.

1300: I traveled with (b) (5) to stage near GMIHC command vehicles. BRIHC scouting possible Dozer line to Northeast. Div Z / Strike team arrived at vehicle location. They stated they really wanted to utilize dozer push to create black anchor point. (b) (5)

(b) (5)

1400: Mobilized (b) (5) to staging meadow where crew haul vehicles were located.

1430 (b) (5) informed me to take (b) (5) to abandoned two track North of Yarnell and open up route. (b) (5)

Tied in with structure group one. Opened road to northeast around subdivision and then improved back to start.

(b) (5) to improve dozer line and potential burnout operations.

Instructed to (b) (5) and move to HWY 89. Staged on HWY 89 with structure group one.

1600: BRIHC disengaging to safety zone.

BRIHC one informs Structure Group One They are pushing engines everyone out of subdivision.

(b) (5)

Structure group one assigns me and one other to locate possibility of dozer line to southwest of Yarnell.

Acquire ATV: travel into subdivision back to Dozer line. Multiple structures fully engulfed and multiple spot fires in subdivision.

Notify structure group one about fire and structures on corner of manzanita and lockwood. (b) (5)

(b) (5)

Started evacuations of subdivision.

Helitanker drops water near manzanita junction.

Inquiry about helitanker availability. Told there are other priorities (b) (5)

(b) (5)

Evacuations for next couple of hours.

7/1/13

(b) (5)

The crew gets to ICP at the Yarnell Elementary school. We stop in for a few minutes check-in, get a radio done, and are told to head over the Yarnell Fire Station. We are told that we are attached to the Structure Protection group and a division person named (b) (5). The overhead gets a little information from a guy named (b) (5) who says the fire was small and only a few smokes were showing on June 29th. He also informs us that a thunderstorm cell has been present the last few days in the same spot on which would be the NE side of the fire. We also have noticed fire activity pick up in this same area. A medium helicopter has been doing missions out of this fire station and we were told that we may fly up to top (or west flank) of fire. This does not happen, but instead we actually move our buggies down to (b) (5) (headed up by (b) (5) buggies. (b) (5) gets a (b) (5) assignment and starts bushing ground and improving the road that leads out to flats...The crew is told to hold tight, and (b) (5) tie in with (b) (5) and start looking at a plan. GMIHC had split squads looking to get a good anchor and working the east flank of the fire. Air attack starts to make heavy helicopter drops on the NE part of the fire.

(b) (5) is driving the road between our staged buggies and the flats (just below saddle where the fire is picking up) (b) (5). He eventually ties in with (b) (5) and (b) (5), (b) (5) frequency to get in contact with (b) (5) (b) (5) uses our crew break. This proves to be very difficult and even (b) (5) (b) (5) (b) (5) heads back down the dozer line towards Hwy 89. The crew doesn't see him again until later in the day....

The fire activity has now picked up in the saddle and also a large grey column heading in a NE direction towards Hwy 89. The crew continues to stage and notices that retardant and water drops are not very effective in the thick brush. And fire activity picks up, lies down, and continues this trend throughout the afternoon.

The crew gets closer to getting an actual assignment and in the early afternoon after structure protection is discussed, instead will prep a dozer line leading from just below the staged buggies and going to the drainage and the Boy Scout camp. Four drivers will move the riggs around to the Boy Scout camp, and a couple minutes later a few more drivers (for a total of six people) have all the vehicles in a staging area of this camp. This group will start prepping the dozer line back to rest of crew, plus they (b) (5) (b) (5) It isn't more than a few minutes and the entire crew is heading towards the buggies and disengaging from this prepping assignment. All the guys load up and head back to Hwy 89 and the Ranch House restaurant.

(b) (5) (b) (5) The winds have since switched to

out of the northwest and moving parallel to Hwy 89...The public and media are now everywhere and people are directed to head south on Hwy 89. The crew now prepares for a rescue/triage event and gets the ranger and chase truck loaded up with oxygen tanks, medical bags, and water. After the fire front continues south, (b) (5) eventually head into GMIHC's last known whereabouts and comes upon the scene and finds packs and shelters being deployed. (b) (5) (b) (5) and after moving to the north side of the fire (on Hwy 89), (b) (5) (b) (5) The crew remains in this location for a while, and eventually after dropping off all GMIHC's vehicles stays in ranch area (just NE of ICP) for the night. The crew (b) (5) beds down around midnight. We get up the next morning and get demobbed.

Signed in good health,

(b) (5)



15:55 crew begins hiking in

(b) (5)

07/01/13

(b) (5) Get assigned to bump vehicles to the tie-in point. 1600 (b) (5) calls over the Radio "who ever is driving sup. truck return to the unload spot and tie in with crew. (b) (5) returns (b) (5) park vehicles in neighborhood. Concerned public begins approaching vehicles demanding answers about evacuations and asking us why we are leaving. We respond there is no official evacuation in progress but we recommend you to be ready.

1610 vehicles arrive at shrine

AT 1610 the convoy of vehicles ~~arrive~~ arrive at shrine parking area. We hold until about 1630, then (b) (5) arrived with further instruction. Instructions where to drive down dirt road right in front of us and park vehicles with Granit MT (IHC) vehicles. 1640 Blue ride vehicles get parked alongside Granit MT's vehicles. (b) (5) and myself (b) (5) tie in with (b) (5) immediately after tying in with them we receive instructions to head in and tie in with the rest of our crew. We begin hiking in but only get about 40 yards from vehicles when we receive the order to RTO (Reverse too order) and head back to the tracks and prepare to bump out vehicles, including Granit MT's vehicles. 1650 everyone jumps in a vehicle and prepares to bump out. I'm in Granit MT's chase truck ready for the call to bump out. At this point fire is getting very close and is moving fast, the sky and all around us is dark and we can hear the fires fury. 1655 The rest of the crew arrives at the buggys and they load up quickly. As soon as they are all loaded up I get the call to bump out with urgency. I begin leading the convoy out. I report to (b) (5) for further instruction (over the radio) on ~~where~~ where to go after I hit the 89A. He tells me to turn right on 89A and a couple miles down the road on the left hand side is a big open area where everyone is to park, I copy back.


I look through my rear view mirror and see that
(b) (5) a Granit MT Hotshot who I had just met minutes
before was behind me in his Sup.'s truck. I could see
the (b) (5) (b) (5) 1705 we arrive
at place where we are supposed to park at and we can see
Evacuation efforts have began for public. I'm parked and
have my window down waiting for further instruction the
sky is still dark with smoke when all of a sudden a giant
wind gust out of the NW hits me, paper begin to fly
all over the truck (b) (5) (b) (5) (b) (5) (b) (5)

(b) (5) (b) (5) Then I hear circle up, circle up (b) (5)
(b) (5) is telling everyone to circle up. we circle up and
(b) (5)
(b) (5) (b) (5)

(b) (5) gives the order to round up all medical gear and
EMTs and informs EMTs to be ready to head in if necessary.
as we are gathering up medical equipment we begin to hear
load bangs, propane tanks were blowing up as the fire
roared through the houses. We circle back up (b) (5)

(b) (5) (b) (5) (b) (5) and
(b) (5) They inform us of what's going on and (b) (5)
they tell the EMTs to be ready. (b) (5) and (b) (5) take off in
the UTV loaded with medical gear and head in through
the burning neighbor hood where we continue to hear
propane tanks blow up (b) (5) (b) (5)
(b) (5) (b) (5)
(b) (5) (b) (5)

(b) (5)



(b) (5)

7/1/13

1527 @ waypoint 046 (34°13'54.2" 112°45'9.12") crew was ~~apparently~~ briefed by (b) (5) on situation (dozer line prep specs, Drivers moving vehicles, escape routes, safety zones and fire behavior.

Time Unknown { crew begins prep, drivers are moving vehicles
more drivers bump out to move Granite Mountain vehicles
crew notified on crew channel of weather update and fire behavior (storms and wind shift). escape routes to vehicles were reconfirmed

approx 1 hour into prep ((b) (5) cut about 1 tank), crew was told to disengage and head down dozer line to vehicles (b) (5) was behind us. we loaded up in vehicles and headed out shume rd to 89. South to parking area across from lakewood drive.

Time Unknown { Fire behavior was intense. (b) (5)
heard traffic (b) (5)
(b) (5)

1705 (phone record) told to call family and let them know I was safe

Time Unknown { ~~xxxxxx~~ (b) (5) and (b) (5) had the crew start gathering med equipment from resources in staging area. EMT's designated and pickup trucks loaded.

(b) (5)

7/1/13

1745 (b) (5) called on crew, I answered and received
noted w/ directions directions for SAR. (b) (5) copied direct and
relayed to SAR coordinators

Time
Unknown

we left staging area ~~at~~ because of fire behavior
and went N on 89. ~~parked~~ staged on side of road
→

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

7/6/13

~~W/4~~ - We began prepping dozer line w/ 4 SAW TEAMS. As we were hiking IN AN UPDATED WEATHER FORECAST CAME OVER -> WINDS INCREASING 25-30 w/ gusts to 40 out of the NW.

~~W/4~~ - (b) (5) was called back w/ (b) (5)

(b) (5) to move Granite Mountains Vehicles due to fire activity. (b) (5) Also had one crew rig.

We moved vehicles to the ~~end~~ OPPOSITE END of the DOZER line @ SHRINE ROAD (4 GM Rigs). We were INSTRUCTED TO PREP the DOZER line back TOWARDS the rest of the crew. (b) (5)

(b) (5) (b) (5) We hiked for two minutes and were told that we were disengaging from the line due to extreme fire behavior. Everyone drove the same vehicles as earlier back out to Hwy 89. The subdivision was NOT completely evacuated at this time, fire personnel were close to the first ones out. We regrouped at a RESTAURANT SOUTH OF YARNALL with all vehicles from GRANITE Mtn & Blue Ridge (b) (5) ORDERED EVERYONE TO GROUP UP TO BRIEF ON the situation. At this time a RADIO TRANSMISSION came over ~~the~~

(b) (5)

Blue Ridge began collecting all of our Medical
Gear And developing a rescue plan.

(b) (5)

(b) (5) left in our range to search.

(b) (5) AND I WORKED ON COLLECTING A MANIFEST

FOR G.M. TASK FORCES AND MEDICAL GROUPS WERE
ORGANIZED FOR ABOUT AN HOUR AND FIRE PERSONNEL

WERE ORGANIZING AN EVACUATION OF SUBDIVISIONS

(b) (5)

(b) (5) ABOUT AN HOUR LATER

WE CHANGED LOCATIONS TO THE NORTH END OF YARVELL
DUE TO FIRE BEHAVIOR.

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

Around 15:30 we (Blue Ridge HotShots) started working to prep the dozer line North until it tied into Shrine rd. Myself and (b) (5) were the first (b) (5) to bump out

and start preping an area of concern. That put our (b) (5) furthest south. With the rest of the crew continuing North. (b) (5) was our (b) (5)

About 10 minutes later (b) (5) tied in with us and told myself and (b) (5) that we were headed back to the Granite Mountain Buggies and helping move them. (b) (5) was sent North to tie in with the rest of the crew and (b) (5) and I headed South on the

dozer line until it hit the 2 track, where BRHC Supt. Truck was waiting for us. We all got in and headed towards GMIHC Buggies. Half way there (b) (5) jumped out and got into our BRHC Ranger with (b) (5). They lead the way in. Among arriving at the Buggies (b) (5) and I jumped

out and got into GMIHC Buggies. We waited for (b) (5) who was driving GMIHC Chase trucks and they followed him out. All the trucks, GMIHC Trucks and BRHC Supt truck and Ranger all headed

round until reaching the North end of the dozer line, where it tied into Shrine rd. Shortly after arriving we were told BRHC was headed out of the dozer line. We waited for them and then loaded up and got out of there, due to High winds and 180° switch in direction, now coming from the North. Smoke pushed right over us and everyone in the area was forced to get out, we all stayed at the Ranch House.

(b) (5)

07/01/13

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

Page 1

(b) (5)

7/1/2013

arrived to Yarnell ICP for briefing, due to lack of briefing we stayed at ICP for a brief time then moved on to the Yarnell fire dept.

Once we left Yarnell fire dept. we moved into div A to scout & come up with some kind of plan Granite Mountain was working on direct & burnout operations during that time.

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

Blue Ridge overhaul ~~scout~~ scouted & trail

come up for a safe place for us to start working.

we also had a (b) (5) and improve two back roads

It was approximately 16:00 when we came up w/ the best plan possible which was to put in some line to and by some time, the whole crew minus the (b) (5) who were scouting & the (b) (5)

who was with the dozer geared up to hike to the area to engage in the proposed work, at that time

other crewmembers were split off to bump our blue ridge vehicles & around to the closest area for when the ~~line~~ line was tied in, before we made it to that area with the vehicles 1 crewmember

in the sup truck was instructed to head back to the spot the crew was dropped off at to pick up

1 crewmember & the foreman to head back to grab the granite mt. vehicles as well

we made it back to the granite vehicles/a total of four of us = (b) (5)

(b) (5)

on both crews would be moved out of the parking area. During this bumping of the vehicles our

insur was ~~utilized~~ utilized for scouting by the (b) (5) & was also used for moving (b) (5)

(b) (5) to the granite mt. vehicles, once all 5 of us personally were in all vehicles both

the blue ridge sup truck, granite mt. sup truck, chase truck and both buggies were manned and

moving out towards our new proposed parking spot (that would be at the end of shrine st.) the group

was composed of (b) (5) we continued the

bump of vehicles to shrine st with the (b) (5) moving in our ranger.

Once on shrine st. we drove down the street near the end to park vehicles & tie in w/ the

crew at that point the foreman was back on the ranger with the (b) (5) and the three blue ridge crewmember

(b) (5) was tied back in w/ the other blue ridge crewmembers who had bumped the

blue ridge vehicles & all vehicles both blue ridge & granite mt vehicles were in the new parking area

(b) (5)

page 2

7/1/2013

(b) (5)

with all vehicles in place of Blue Ridge Drivers Reunited a total of 6 Blue Ridge personnel of
 (b) (5) Blue Ridge in our Annex we were instructed
 to the back in w/ our crew (b) (5) we started heading in toward
 here the rest of our crew was constructing line & fire intensity was at the point of making the
 decision from everyone on Blue Ridge to discontinue the plan of line construction & we retreated
 back to the vehicles to get ready to move out. once the remainder of Blue Ridge made it back
 out to the vehicles we kept the same drivers in the same vehicles & started driving out towards
 69 H, (b) (5) parcel near a market in a parking lot on the north end
 of town. When we arrived was about the time (b) (5)

(b) (5) At that time we prepared all of our units to respond & got
 critical supplies ready for utilization. (b) (5) we stood by for
 further instruction which never came into effect for Blue Ridge crewmembers to act upon, we

(b) (5)

#15:50: Briefing

Blue Ridge was going to hike down the dozer line and start improving. 4 members from Blue Ridge were assigned to stay back and bump the 2 Buggies, chase truck, and sup. truck

#15:55

The Blue Ridge vehicles are in the process of being Bumped. The Fire behavior started to pick up and our

(b) (5)

made the decision to send one back to ~~bump~~ a couple more members of blue Ridge back to the Granite Mountain vehicles to be bumped with the Blue Ridge vehicles.

16:10

The blue Ridge and Granite Mountain vehicles arrive at the St. [?]Joseph Shrine. large black smoke was visible from about 1/4 mile.

16:20 (about)

The fire gets hit with a wind shift.

16:40 →

The vehicle bumpers begin to tie in with the rest of the crew.

16:45

we get the order to R.T.O. back to the buggies and drive to the highway. Fire is consuming everything.

17:00 ^{Blue Ridge} we arrives at our safety zone, which was a mini mart south of town.

(b) (5)

07-01-2013

(b) (5) (b) (5)

GENERAL MESSAGE

TO:	POSITION
FROM:	POSITION
SUBJECT Yarnell Hills Fire	DATE
	Page 1

MESSAGE:
 0800 - BR IHC arrived at ICP and overhead checked in the crew. Instructed to hold tight. Crew closed radios. No weather briefing given.
 0900 - Instructed to head south and hold for further instructions at Yarnell Fire Department. At this time fire activity minimal with 3 light smokes visible.
 1000 - Still holding at Yarnell F.D. fire activity picks up as a strong, darker column of smoke is visible.
 1030 - Instructed to tie in with Granite Mountain and establish an anchor point.
 1045 - Tied in with Granite Mountain's vehicles. At this time (b) (5) took their ^{vehicle} ~~Ranger~~ to scout the area and gauge fire activity before committing Blue Ridge resources. At this time Granite Mountain was conducting a burnout to even the

REPLY fire to a 2-tracks edge that paralleled their division.
 1100 - ~~crew~~ (b) (5) was requested from Blue Ridge. (b) (5) was chosen and he and (b) (5) took the Ranger to tie in with (b) (5), drop off (b) (5) and (b) (5) drove the Superintendent truck back to where BR IHC's vehicles were staged.
 (b) (5), continuing their burnout down the 2-track, (b) (5) advised by (b) (5) to cease firing and consider direct line construction along the black edge and retardant line. After some discussion (b) (5) commits to the direct tactic.

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE/POSITION
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(b) (5)

GENERAL MESSAGE

TO:	POSITION
FROM:	POSITION (b) (5)
SUBJECT: Yarnell Hills Fire	Page 2

MESSAGE:
 1130- Fire behavior on the ~~backside~~ of the small ridge top to the North of the Buggies greatly increases and this information is observed by (b) (5) and relayed to (b) (5). (b) (5) ties in with (b) (5) and was having issues with radio communications and was directed to where Blue Ridge was staging. (b) (5) talked with (b) (5) about communications and general fire activity. (b) (5) eventually got in contact with (b) (5). (b) (5) used our crew frequency instead of communicating over the Tac channels. (b) (5)

SIGNATURE/POSITION:
 (b) (5)

RE: (b) (5)

(b) (5)

1200- Fire activity increases both in ^{the} saddle and to the North of where the buggies are staged. Around this time the air operations increase with VLATs (Very Large Air Tanker) & Heavy Helicopters making drops just east of the

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE/POSITION
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1200 (cont.) - saddle (in the drainage) and east of the large black

column that is heading towards structures and Hwy 89. The drops proved to be ineffective (b) (5)

(b) (5). Fire Activity increases between the saddle (and the flats) and W/NE of where the buggies are staged throughout the afternoon.

1300 - (b) (5) finishes with assignment and holds in place with (b) (5) and crew in staging area. Fire activity increases with fire spotting over retardant. (b) (5) scout out in front of large black column that is NE of crew and gets (b) (5) to push more ground around subdivisions in Lakewood/Marzanita area.

1330 - (b) (5) to subdivision + pushes ground that will tie in with drainage (leading to Boy Scout camp) + the black edge. (b) (5) remains back at staging area + crew gets information that we may do structure protection very shortly.

- Fire column heading NE begins to pick up intensity. Sky turns dark blue + winds still light + from S/SW.

1430 - (b) (5) line + walks (b) (5) back to transport area. Crew moves (b) (5) instructed to gear up + gets a briefing on weather + their assignment. BR IHC will prep dozer line to N/NE back to drainage leading to Boy Scout Camp. Buggies are moved around to where Dozer was staged at Lakewood/Marzanita subdivision. Four drivers are instructed to move buggies to Hwy 89(N) + eventually into Boy Scout Camp off Shrine Rd. Crew begins prepping Dozer line for burnout operations. (b) (5) acts as (b) (5) for the crew. Radio traffic increased dramatically, including weather update from local IMET which included a wind shift report to strong from the NE. Skies were growing very dark. T-storm cell was present.

~~1530~~
1600 - Crew instructed to disengage + move back to Buggies. This takes no more than 10 minutes to complete w/ wheels moving (b) (5) accounted for, including (b) (5) Begin to make our way back to Hwy 89 + Restaurant in Yarnell.

1645 - Crew + vehicle (b) (5) stages at Ranch House Restaurant. At this time on the radio we hear (b) (5)

(b) (5) (b) (5)

(b) (5) Next,

1645 (cont.) - The crew mobilizes equipment (oxygen, medical bags, water) and (b) (5) load the Ranger while delegating aid/triage assignments. Five front row heading South almost parallel to Hwy 89 makes it impossible for (b) (5) to head back towards GM IHC. (b) (5) wait for the column to pass and cool down.

~1700-1715 (b) (5) make their way back to Granite Mountain last location. (b) (5) monitor GM IHC's crew channel.

1820- (b) (5) is on scene with ~~no~~ air support overhead (b) (5)

~~Per~~ Testament of: on 7/1/2013

(b) (5)

Record of Events
Yarnell Hills Fire
6/30/15

written 7/1/15

0630

Depart Hotel in Camp Verde en route to incident

0800

Arrival at JOP, no in-briefing, comm clones were completed

Instructed to stand-by

0900

Relocated, instructed to move to Yarnell FD station and stand-by

1030

Instructed to relocate and tie in with Granite Mountain

1045

Tied-in with Granite Mountain's vehicles

1100

(b) (5) departed in the supt. truck to scout/plan

At this time, Granite Mountain was bringing fire down a Z-trak along the southern heel of the fire

1130

(b) (5) departed to act as (b) (5)
→ improving all Z-traks

1200

As (b) (6) recorded weather, a buildup was reported to me (b) (5)
Cumulus buildup in the N/NW

Granite Mountain and Air Attack/SEATS combined efforts to go direct on the southern heel

(b) (5)

1300

Debate over the placement of a division break occurs over TAC

(b) (5)

Comm problems present themselves in the clone in the form of messed up channel guards (b) (5)

1400

Fire Activity is building up and increasing on the lower northern end

Sometime around 1400, (b) (5) passes crew/vehicles, improving roads to the south of the crew

Between 1430-1500

* Sometime between, (b) (5) is told that he has a ride out on the Ranger UTV if the fire picks up.

(b) (5)

1540

Crew gears up to start prep of a dozerline
→ 1^o and 2^o escape routes/safety zones identified (b) (5)

1545

work begins along dozerline

vehicles (ours) are bumped to the north by 4 crewmembers
→ their (b) (5) would cut towards us to tie-in

1600

(b) (5) broadcast the weather obs. as we worked, noting the present/forecasted windshift

A significant thunder cell had established overhead, from the NE, thunder was heard more and more frequently

1615

Our (b) (5) took a bump up the road to become the furthest progressed group

Fire was visible as began to hook behind a ridge to our N, displaying a large column

1622

We were told to leave the dozerline via 1^o escape route towards the vehicles

1625

Vehicles are departing Shriner Rd as fire crests over the near hill.

After 1630

Arrive at a parking lot across highway 89 Granite Mountain camp, preparing for deployment

Events After 1100

Gathering of medical supplies, space blankets, and water loaded into our UTV and Chase Truck
Medical personnel (within our crew) organized a plan for triage

With fire pushing towards the highway, we bumped the vehicles (including the Granite Mountain vehicles) North along highway 89 (around 1870)

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

had taken the UTV to scout/search for the Granite Mountain crew

After air resources had located the crew, (b) (5) made it on scene, (b) (5)

(b) (5)

Nightfall occurred

(b) (5)

Later, we arrived at our overnight spot and conducted an AAR.

We ate dinner and I bedded down at 23:16.

(b) (5)

when we started prep on the dozer line (b) (5) had established our escape route. ~~rather than to the buses~~

4 crew members had bumped our busses to the community so our escape route was down the dozer line and to the busses and out to the SS.

while prep'ing the dozer line (b) (5) plus one bumped out to ~~the~~ more granite mountains busses informing them first. they said it was ok

we bumped out made it safely to the busses and decided towards the SS where all the other resources were.

(b) (5) mess while took the 2 track car and met up with (b) (5)

(b) (5) (b) (5) drove out to the SS and met up with us.

we all made it safely to the SS but still since granite mountain was up there.

(b) (5)

(b) (5) informed him fire was very active and we were on the main road (SS) (b) (5)

(b) (5)

we immediately start prep'ing on a search and rescue mission (DIP only)
gathered supplies and suits to get ready to go search for them

(b) (5)

our bases ~~were~~ go in the danger with all supplies to start search and rescue.

IC calls for a search and rescue helicopter to search for granite mountain they spot them and get coordinates

our bases set them and arrive on scene (b) (5)
we bumped the truck north on the road because structures and the fire activity was picking up where ~~we~~ we were.

(b) (5)

(b) (5) we bumped again north on the road

buses came up back and we load up and heard AICUP to take to IC

we all load up to the sleeping gear and have an AAP gear the days events.

had to be (b) (5)

7/1/13

- arrived at ICP
- got ~~checked~~ all radio frequencies
- bosses got non to minimal briefing from IC
- went to Yarnell FD
- Staged there waiting on instructions
- From there drove to gather a plan with the division (2)
- Staged on the road that granite maintains bosses were on
- bosses went to scout our possible line construction
- while down that granite maintain was on top of the ridge deciding whether or not to go direct or not (seats were dropping on the active fire on the ridge)
- An attack planned to (b) (5) that there was no heat and it was OK to go direct.

(b) (5)

- Blue ridge (b) (5) were ~~at~~ Scouting line, ~~but~~ they were having radio trouble. noticed that the look guards were off and needed to be fixed.

(b) (5) throughout this period was (b) (5) from the trucks monitoring and informing our bosses who were Scouting on fire behavior

- North end was starting to pick up and visible flames were noticed from the bosses

(b) (5) was (b) (5) and started to put down line from the road we were on to the community.

- dozer line was finished & we went to work
- as soon as we started (b) (5) over the radio informed us that there was a cell coming through and expect 50 mph winds from the NW
- we started prepping the dozer line half a chain and brush over 2ft
- we got through our tank

(b) (5) cuts (b) (5) for us watching fire behavior from a rock ridge where we were working

- we finished one tank of gas and our (b) (5) over the radio said winds have shifted and the fire is moving & pan towards us. we needed to get out and head to the bosses.

(b) (5)

written account
of events @ Yarnell Hill Fire

①

At 1830 on June 29th the Blue Ridge Hotshots were dispatched to the Yarnell Hill Fire on Arizona state land near Yarnell. Due to a late start the crew stayed the night in Camp Verde and headed to the fire at 0630 on the 30th. We arrived on the fire and checked in at 0800 and we were to hang tight for a assignment. At about 0900 we were told to go to the Yarnell fire department and stage. At 1000 operations called and asked if we could tie in with Structure group Codes with a (b) (5) (b) (5) we were instructed to go down Mountain and Lakewood. When we arrived we parked our trucks in a flat grassy area were Granite Mountain ITC's buggies. As we continued down the two track we past by Granite Mountain Supt truck and Chase truck that had dozer line around them. We continued down the road and (b) (5) (b) (5) from (b) (5) (b) (5) called us on the 1 and told us to switch over to fac 3. We switched over and he informed us that Comms were bad and gave us a run down on what he new. As we got down the road we tied into (b) (5) who had the (b) (5) working in front of us. He informed us that the dozer ~~to~~ didn't have a radio and he would like him to clear out the roads that ran north and south off the main two track. We called (b) (5) to drive the Polaris ranger up the fire road and to bring an extra radio and person to drive our Supt truck out. (b) (5) got tied out on the (b) (5) and started working him. During this time we were listening to Granite Mountain talk to Air Attack about pre treating the Green side of there burn they were doing. Air Attack told them they will drop

the seats on the heat and they could go direct-

(b) (5) We made our way up the saddle toward Granite mountains with the ranger. When we met them we talked about the bad

close and lack of briefing. We gave them some waters shrive and Gabonals and they asked if we could bring there (b) (5) We introduced

ourselves and took him down the hill. (b) (5) and I took a drive ~~down~~ north on 89 to get a scouted a two track that headed north from where GM Supt truck was and during that were heard a conversation between (b) (5) who was designated as (b) (5)

about a half hour earlier. They were talking about the division breaks and ~~were~~ who was taking what (b) (5)

(b) (5) while we were scouting we noticed Air tankers' ^{helicopter} dropping on the south flank which at this point had a slow to moderate speed rate. The air tankers seemed to be effective for a short period. As we drove back toward GM Supt truck we were called by (b) (5) and we told him

we would face to face with him in a minute when we met with (b) (5) we let him know what we had scouted and five activities we had seen. ~~Another~~ There was a ridge due ^{at least} east of our location that had a good sized column coming from the other side. (b) (5)

Saw that and said he had to go and we never saw or heard him on the radio the rest of the day. At this point there was known known division break. We drove back and fired back into the crew to brief them on what we saw. ~~and told them to head~~ They told us ~~that~~ they saw what looked like a almost mid air collision with the Vlat and a sky crane. After talking we told them to hang tight. ~~and~~ while we

rem Tac 1
isc
1 Tac 3
2 Tac 2

As we were heading out towards ~~the~~ highway 89 to ~~go~~ see what the main fire was doing we ran into (b) (5) we let ~~her~~ him know what the dozer had gotten done and what we were seeing for fire behavior. He then let us know that he wanted the dozer to push an old two ~~to~~ track to a ~~an~~ old fuel break which would tie into Shrine rd. He said this would cut off most of Yarnell, he also told us of a trigger point the to evacuate Yarnell was a ridge just due north of town we got (b) (5) pushing the two track with the dozer. ~~only~~ (b) (5) and I headed up 89 to get eyes on the main fire. When we hit Hwy 89 ~~there~~ we notice ~~the~~ the west flank running pretty hard towards the Hwy. ~~road~~ There were many citizens parked along side the Hwy watching the fire. We then went back towards Yarnell to Shrine rd to see if the dozer was getting close to tying in. As we got down ~~is~~ were the dozer was going to tie in we noticed a couple of type G engines around the structure. We could hear the (b) (5) and (b) (5) called to let us know he was getting close. (b) (5) and I then scouted ~~for~~ some roads to the north of Yarnell ~~to~~ see if we could ~~cut~~ anything tie ~~to~~ into anything else. We then drove up Shrine and up the dozer line towards the crew and before we got to the crew we decided that I ~~to~~ would be best spent prep'ing the dozer line toward Shrine. 15:30 (b) (5) had four of our guys bring our truck around ~~around~~ and the rest geared up ~~and~~ and headed to tie dozer line prep'ing towards Shrine. I tried to call (b) (5) a few times on tac 1 (Dist) without any luck so I call (b) (5) (b) (5) and was able to talk to (b) (5). I told him that we were going to start prep'ing the dozer line ~~to~~ be able to burn if our haul was forced ~~to~~ we would

at least be able to protect some of the structures
 he agreed that our time was best spent down towards
 the structures and that it was slow going and they
 would probably be another hour before they tried into
 the two track to the north. (b) (5) called ~~me~~ ^{me}
 right after that to let me know he had copied direct
 and agreed with the plan he also said he would like
 to grab up ~~the~~ when I get the chance I told him
 I would head his way with the ranger. (b) (5) grabbed
 his gear to go and look at a rocky area to see
 if we could hang up fire if we had to burn. I
 headed up toward Granite mountain. As I headed west
 towards them I noticed fire activities picking up
 close to were (b) (5) and as I
 got closer ~~in~~ ~~the~~ I looked back to the east and
 notice the whole flank had gone from a backing fire to
 a running fire with 50+ foot flame lengths I was just
 about to call (b) (5)
 to the two track I pulled up (b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (5) I that we needed to
 move there ~~the~~ vehicles due to fire behavior. I didn't have
 any luck on the I so (b) (5) let me use ~~the~~ his radio
 to talk on the crew net. ~~the~~ I talked to (b) (5) and
 he agreed that with the increased fire behavior they should
 move there trucks and they all called out were the keys
 were for each truck. ~~the~~ I also asked (b) (5)

(b) (5) I than
 called ~~the~~ (b) (5) to let him know that I needed three
 drivers to help move ~~the~~ Granite mountain's vehicle

due to the increased fire behavior. He said they were heading around to help. As we got to the Supt truck and chase truck (b) (5) got out and started both vehicle while we waited for the other drivers. I noticed that the fire was approaching quickly so I drove the ranger out to meet the drivers and quickly ~~got back~~ grabbed (b) (5) and headed for the trucks. (b) (5) got in the truck and him and (b) (5) headed out along with the other trucks. I drove down the dozer line where my guys were working and stopped and talked to (b) (5) ~~about~~ we talked about the increase in the fire behavior. I then headed for the Supt truck to refuel the Ranger. I met (b) (5) there and I was called by (b) (5) on the 1 and he asked if burning the ~~two~~ track was still an option - I told him ~~no~~ no and that if it hasn't yet it will burn over the ~~rest~~ two track very quickly. He copied and (b) (5) called and agreed with what I said and he said where the trucks were parked was all black. (b) (5)

(b) (5) I copied and ~~was~~ (b) (5) and I headed east on the dozer line to check on our guys and see how far the fire had progressed. As we headed down I noticed a task force of resources at the ~~the~~ old youth camp at the end of Shrike rd. As we past our ^{guy} we noticed the fire running at a very rapid rate to the south. (b) (5)

(b) (5) also updated us and we decided to push our guys out towards the ~~the~~ trucks. We headed out to the old youth camp. When we got there a ~~member~~ member of the Task Force asked if they needed to go. We told him yes and he started calling on the radio and hitting the siren on his truck. His crew came out and they left. I tried multiple times to call (b) (5) on Tac 1, 2 & 3 without luck.

I then told (b) (5) we needed to drive up the draw and push those guys out. Our crew had loaded up and left. As we got up the draw we ran ~~to~~ into a group of 3 or 4 folks, we told them they needed to get in their ~~to~~ trucks and leave. The individual said they were leaving but there were more and they weren't listening. We kept driving up the draw and saw the rest of them pushing out. We told them they needed to hurry and we followed them out. When we got back to their trucks I stressed them ~~to~~ that they needed to hurry. We were getting ~~to~~ multiple spots and it