Please begin Chapter IV comments here:
Previous Comments:
Chapter I: http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-investigation-ignored-major-mistakes-by-the-state/
Chapter II: http://www.investigativemedia.com/granite-mountain-hotshots-were-asked-if-they-could-protect-yarnell/
Chapter II supplement: http://www.investigativemedia.com/state-forestry-divison-fined-nearly-560000-for-mistakes-in-managing-yarnell-hill-fire-that-killed-19-hotshots/
Chapter III: http://www.investigativemedia.com/chapter-iii-for-comments/
Thank you, John
© Copyright 2014 John Dougherty, All rights Reserved. Written For: Investigative MEDIA
its wood post and 3 strand barbwire fence…to answer someone what I saw 6-30-13 and all my hikes to that area the past almost decade in the location of describing the fencing for the Helm’s-
I confirmed it with another hiker and as well Yarnell local Buford-
I knew it was that but Sonny threw me off trying to tell me it was stucco but I told Sonny that was the front gated area not the area in question-
I hoped I answered the question I could not find and went with what Sonny told me to answer—
I am not sure why I was asked that but Sonny said I needed to come and answer someone; I scrolled to find the question to put it in right spot but I am still so tired and cannot locate it. I don’t know why the fencing matters right by the Helm’s but I can tell you ANYONE who is respectful before the fire or even after would not go that close in the tight terrain area yet they would possibly curve around their hill there by the dry cattle ground tank and go up where they came down during daylight not dark—then you scale the base of boulders & tight terrain around to the old grader wash road- I feel bad that the terrain burnt away because the Helm’s had a lovely private spot and they lost that from that fire because not only is their tight green terrain not there but people sneak in the restricted area and at times people are on their land (Helm’s) not even realizing it. GOOGLE Yavapai Assessor and you will see they own outside the areas of that fencing as well but people do not do what I do and get written permission from land/home owners if I am hiking off state or BLM land- it’s a respect thing. I know who owns every spot I lay my feet.
and one more thing, I should have said see; the Loop Fire, the Battlement Creek Fire, the South Canyon Fire as far as hotshot deaths go, AND see, the YARNELL HILL FIRE.
Has any one listened to Roberts Caldwells Second video. Im pretty sure this is the conversation between marsh and ops saying to hunker down and stay safe. Not sure if this has been mentioned yet. Way to many posts on this site with no real relevance to anything.
NOTE——New chapter V started go to it——-
The exact URL for Chapter V of this ongoing discussion is…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-v-comments/
**
** THE SAIT DID USE THE WORDS ‘MOPPING UP’ TO DESCRIBE
** THE FIRE STATUS ON SATURDAY MORNING.
This is a follow-up to a previous post where Sitta wondered if the
words ‘mop up’ or ‘mopping up’ were ever actually used to describe
the status of the Yarnell HIll Fire on Saturday morning… when all
reports agree the fire was only 2-4 acres and showing ‘little to
no fire activity’.
As it turns out… that is exactly how the SAIT described it.
Here is Sitta’s original question… and my initial reply…
>> WTKTT reply to Sitta post on February 10, 2014 at 8:20 am
>>
>>>> Sitta wrote…
>>>>
>>>> Mop up may take place on quiet sections of a large, uncontained fire.
>>>> Usually, though, the mop up phase doesn’t really begin until the whole fire
>>>> is lined. I was under the impression that on Saturday the crews were
>>>> still containing the fire (building line around it), not mopping up. Do the
>>>> details or records exist that can more clearly tell us what was actually
>>>> going on?
>>
>> Not really. There are some vague descriptions and clues and, of course
>> the photographs from Saturday.
>>
>> ALL of the official reports ( and SAIT interviewees ) agree that on Saturday
>> morning there was no visible fire, little or no smoke, and descriptions
>> vary from ‘Fire was very minor’ to ‘Fire showing no activity’ and ‘Fire
>> was only 2-4 acres’.
>>
>> They all also agree that everyone assumed the fire was ‘contained on
>> all four sides’ and never grew in size all day… until it jumped the road.
>>
>> The ONLY report that even mentions what the DOC Lewis crew’s actual
>> ASSIGNMENT was that morning is the ADOSH report which says this…
>>
>> “At 1100 a BLM helicopter transported seven firefighters to the top of the ridge.
>> One helitack crew member and six DOC Lewis Crew firefighters hiked in the
>> rest of the way ( for a total of 14 firefighters there at the 2-4 acre fire site ) to
>> construct handline, cold trail and hot spot.”
>>
>> So the words ‘mop-up’ are never specifically mentioned, but the actual
>> source for this quote and/or who ever said that was their actual
>> assignment is also not mentioned in the ADOSH report, or
>> anywhere else.
As it turns out… that is an incorrect statement I made.
The OFFICIAL SAIT documentation DOES say that one of the things DOC Lewis
crew was actually doing on Saturday morning/afternoon was simply ‘mopping up’
( their words ) the Yarnell Hill Fire.
The specific words ‘mopping up’ were written by the SAIT investigation team itself
in their preliminary report that they released just 72 hours after the incident
and after the first pass of interviews.
That original 72 ‘summary’ report from the SAIT is still online here…
http://www.azsf.az.gov/system/files/documents/files/Yarnell%20Hill%20Fire%20Summary%20Revised%207-18-2013%2016%2030.pdf
It contains one of the only specific quotes about what the Lewis DOC crew’s
actual ‘assignment’ was on Saturday morning, June 29, 2013.
That quote is as follows…
“A six man squad from Lewis Crew and one BLM helitack crewman were flown
into the fire ( Saturday, 10:30 AM ) by the BLM light helicopter.
( An additional 7 members of the DOC Lewis crew ‘hiked in’ to the same spot
for a total of 14 firefighters there at the 2-4 acrew fire showing little to no activity
at that time. ) Firefighters made progress hot-spotting the few active areas and
MOPPED UP (extinguishing burning material) along the two track jeep road.”
NOTE: The SAIT specifically says they were just ‘mopping up’ AND that their
focus ( all day? ) was ‘extinguishing burning material along the two track
jeep road’. This is the very ‘jeep road’ where the fire would ‘escape’ more
than FIVE hours later after these 14 men had been working up there all day.
This preliminary SAIT report released just 72 hours after the Yarnell incident
is also the ONLY official document that gives any detail at all about what
happened later that afternoon… when the fire ‘jumped the jeep road’ and
became the fire that would need to be fought on Sunday.
That quote is as follows…
“At about 4:30 p.m. a small unburned island on the east side of the fire
flamed up and spotted across the two track jeep road on the east side
(called a “slopover”).”
That mention of a ‘small unburned island’ is never mentioned again in
any other official report. All the (final) official reports simply said that
sometime around 4:30 PM the fire that had been ‘fully contained on
all sides’ for over 5 hours suddenly ( and inexplicably ) ‘jumped the jeep road’.
So even though the SAIT specifically says the Lewis DOC crew was
just ‘hot-spotting’ and ‘mopping up’ all day ( along the two-track jeep
road ) there still is no evidence whether they were using any ‘indirect
attack’ or ‘burnoffs’ of their own to accomplish that… or whether any
such ‘manual burnoff’ might have been how the fire “accidentally”
escaped over the jeep road circa 4:30.
>> On February 15, 2014 at 3:16 pm, Observer asked…
>>
>> WWKTT- Why the quotation marks around “accidentally”?
>> Are you still of the opinion that group was setting a line of
>> fire that got out of control?
Observer…
Short answer: I no longer believe they were ever doing any large,
organized ‘line burnouts’ that day… but YES… I still believe it is
POSSIBLE that this documented flare-up of just a ‘small island of
unburned material’ might have been manually ignited as part of
the ‘cleanup’ and ‘mopping up’ the SAIT says they were doing up
there all day.
Longer answer…
RTS and others have already pointed out that if they actually had been set
up to do any kind of major ‘line burnout’ ( for over a mile as one of the rumors
that was circulating later that night said ) then there would have most probably
been a lot of ‘radio traffic’ about that ‘event’ and I now agree with everyone
else about that…
…but it might not have been such an organized ‘line burnout’ at all.
See the quote from the SAIT itself in their preliminary report where the
actual cause of the ‘escape’ was listed as simply a ‘small unburned
island’ near the jeep trail…
“At about 4:30 p.m. a small unburned island on the east side of the fire
flamed up and spotted across the two track jeep road on the east side
(called a “slopover”).”
So that doesn’t sound like any kind of organized ‘line burnout’ event,
planned or not.
It was either this ‘small unburned island’ flaring up all by itself OR it
was just a small ‘indirect cleanup burn’ that was manually initiated in
order to ‘clear out’ that little ‘unburned island’ about an hour before they
were supposed to all be air-lifted out of there.
Russ Shumate’s original plan was to helicopter them out of there by
15:30 that afternoon… so I still think it’s possible they might have
decided themselves to just try and ‘clear out’ that little ‘unburned
island’ themselves about an hour before they were supposed to
finish their shift… and something went wrong.
I also don’t think that, unlike a full planned ‘line burnout’, that that kind
of simple burnoff/cleanup work just to clear out little ‘unburned
islands’ would have been something that would have generated any
radio traffic at all. It would have just been part of whatever they were
doing up there that day.
Don’t forget that these kind of little ‘burnouts down/back to roads’ was
exactly what Granite Mountain was doing after they arrived at the exact
same ‘anchor’ area the NEXT morning… and they felt no need to have
management fully informed about every little fire they were setting on
purpose. It was just part of Marsh’s chosen ‘indirect attack’ approach and
they were just going about their business lighting back-fires and whatnot.
There is no evidence that the Lewis crew ever did any ‘indirect attack’
or ‘backfires’ or ‘small burnouts’ up there on Saturday at all… but
then again… there is no real evidence WHAT they were EVER really doing
up there that day… except eventually running out of chainsaw gas and then
being able to get any more even after that ‘small unburned island’ flared
up ( somehow ) at 4:30 PM and jumped the jeep road.
It’s not all that likely they, themselves, caused the fire to jump the road…
but I believe it’s still possible that might have been what actually happened.
Typo in second-to-last paragraph above.
The DOC Lewis crew was UNABLE to get anyone to bring them
any more chainsaw gas once they ran out… so they lost the
use of their chainsaws BEFORE the fire suddenly ‘jumped the
two-track road’.
Whether that loss of the use of their chainsaws caused them to
actually switch to using ‘small burnouts’ to finish their work
before their shift was supposed to end at 1530 is probably
just one more good question that needs to be answered about
what really happened up there on Saturday.
The BR notes clearly indicate there were civilians still in town later than I realized, probably well after 1700. Does it not seem that the wind shift that killed GM might have actually saved lives in Yarnell? The shift it seems to me probably slowed the progress of the fire towards Yarnell just enough for people to get out. If the fire had continued running full tilt at Yarnell, it seems like it would have gotten there even quicker, and likely overrun some civilians. Correct me if I am wrong, but the recent comment (in one of the entities’ claims denial) that the evacuations were a success in that no one died is “head in the sand” to the max. That no civilians died is looking more and more like a blooming miracle.
Reply to mike post on February 15, 2014 at 5:39 pm
>> mike said…
>> That no civilians died is looking more and more like
>> a blooming miracle.
Yes, it is.
Have you not seen the scary video taken by a Glen Ilah resident
as he was evacuating from deep within the Glen Ilah subdivision
at pretty much the exact moment the deployment site
burnover was taking place?
That video is here on YouTube…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_AjhL448ZA
The first few ‘segments’ in the video were filmed from his
house in Glen Ilah on Saturday night… and the fourth and
fifth segments were shot from his driveway in Glen Ilah about
3:45 PM on Sunday, June 30, 2013… but the SIXTH segment
shows him evacuating in the nick of time on Sunday afternoon.
As the ‘evacuation’ segment in his video starts… the resident is
exactly (only) 1,382 yards due east of the deployment site itself
at exactly 1648 ( 4:48 PM ).
It is pitch dark. Houses are on fire all around him and fields
fully ablaze as he follows a DPS Ambulance out to safety.
I originally posted ALL the details about this video ( times,
latitudes, longitudes of all the moments in the video, etc. )
over in Chapter 3 of this ongoing discussion.
Here’s a quick summary from that original posting…
WantsToKnowTheTruth on January 2, 2014 at 10:13 pm said:
** VIDEO SHOT BY GLEN ILAH CITIZEN ON JUNE 30, 2013
** WAS TAKEN AT THE EXACT MOMENT OF BURNOVER
** OUT AT THE DEPLOYMENT SITE.
A few days ago, Eric found some videos on YouTube taken
in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
ONE of the videos Eric found, taken by a citizen of Glen Ilah
( which shows him evacuating his house in the nick of time at
the western edge of Glen Ilah that afternoon ), has turned
out to be quite important because of exactly WHEN and
WHERE he shot this video.
In this video, at +1:12, right after he says “There goes a
neighbor’s f***ing house… Holy s**t”… the camera pans down
for a moment and we see the fully lighted instrument panel in
his car.
An LED panel on the dashboard says…
Time: 4:48 PM
Temperature: 97 degrees F.
4:48 PM is at or about the exact time of the burnover at the
deployment site… and the camera is actually only 1,382 yards
away from the deployment site itself at the moment he is filming
himself evacuating. The sky is PITCH BLACK at that moment
and it looks like the middle of the night.
Here are the YouTube details on that video…
YouTube title: Yarnell Fire
Published on Jul 19, 2013
By YouTube User: fathomsuperfly ( 5 videos )
YouTube About Information: Yarnell Fire. This is my escape
from Glen Ilah, neighborhood that got the worst of the fire.
The first THREE ‘segments’ in the video appear to have been
shot from the driveway of his home in Glen Ilah sometime just
after sundown on Saturday, June 29, 2013.
The next TWO segments appear to have been shot sometime around 3:45 PM on Sunday, June 30, 2013. Again… both of
these videos are being shot from the driveway of his home in
the western part of Glen Ilah… where we will then see him
evacuating from in the next segment at 4:48 PM.
The smoke cloud is building fast just to the north.
The SIXTH segment begins the sequence of videos he shot
while actually evacuating from his home at 4:48 PM the afternoon
of July 30, 2013.
That is pretty much the exact moment when the burnover was
taking ( or had just taken ) place at the deployment site just
1,382 yards due west of where he is now shooting video.
It is TOTALLY DARK at that moment, in that area, as if it were
the ‘dead of night’.
As usual… with any latitude,longitude values shown below, just
cut-and-paste the line with the comma separating the two values
into the address bar of Google Maps, hit ENTER, and a GREEN
ARROW will be pointing to the exact location.
** Segment: Start: +0:41 End: +0:43
Late afternoon, Sunday, July 30, 2013. Circa 3:45 PM.
Shot from the end of the driveway of his home, out near Ridgeway
drive, and looking north/northwest down Ridgeway Drive.
The wind is blowing pretty hard.
Camera location is exactly here…
22906 Ridgeway Dr, Yarnell, AZ 85362
34.217616, -112.764221
He is at almost the western edge of Glen Ilah and the distance
from where he is standing ( his house ) to the center of the
deployment site itself ( due west ) is…
4147.74 ft
1382.58 yards
0.7 mile(s)
The distance from the camera location, due west, to the center
of the Boulder Springs Ranch is…
2128.38 ft
709.4 yards
0.1 mile(s)
** Segment: Start: +0:44 End: +0:51
Shot from almost the same location as the previous segment,
just a few moments later.
Shows the small white house with a grey roof that appears to
be the camera operator’s actual residence.
He is now standing IN his own yard panning the camera south
instead of north.
Camera location is exactly here, near the tree in his yard…
34.217565, -112.764118
** THE START OF HIS EVACUATION FROM GLEN ILLAH
**
** Segment: Start: +0:52 End: +1:10
This is the segment that is later in the afternoon on June 30, 2013,
but starts out completely BLACK because of the smoke cloud
now overhead.
He is evacuating now.
We see him pulling out of the driveway of his home and about
to head north on Ridgeway Drive.
** Segment: Start: +1:11 End: +1:17
He has just left his driveway, is heading north on Ridgeway Drive
and we see him taking a right-hand turn onto Westward Drive to
head east and out of Glen Ilah.
Visbility is almost ZERO at this point.
At +1:12, right after he says “There goes a neighbor’s f***ing
house… Holy s**t”… the camera pans down for a moment
and we see the fully lighted instrument panel in the car.
An LED panel on the dashboard says…
Time: 4:48 PM
Temperature: 97 degrees fahrenheit
There is other videos like this we have seen from people but has not been made public. We left much later than this man and saw much more damage before leaving that June 30th, 2013. These are videos I wish people who shared to us would share to you all or share to us in a way we can share to you all. Enough keeping this quiet. We believe what we saw that day plus others’ accounts is very important for you all here to properly assess this fire as Joy feels strongly about that people should do the right thing and share what they have no matter how tiny of information.
Reply to sonny post on Feb 16, 2014 at 5:22 pm
Thank you, sonny. Totally agree.
No detail is too small when it comes to piecing
together ( for posterity’s sake ) exactly what
happened that entire weekend in Yarnell.
People deserve to know.
I believe the significant thing about the video
posted above is that it was shot at exactly the
time ( or just minutes after ) the burnover
event out at the deployment site and will probably
turn out to be the closest video to the actual deployment area shot around that time, unless
the Boulder Springs Ranch security cameras
were still recording video at that time.
The camera was only 1,382 yards east of the
deployment site and only 709 yards away from
the center of the Boulder Springs Ranch.
Question for you ( or anyone )…
Does ANYONE know where Yarnell Fire Chief
Jim Koile was all day on either Saturday ( June 29 )
or Sunday ( June 30 )?
Did he remain ‘in town’ that weekend and was
he present at the Yarnell Fire Station… or out
helping with evacuations when the time came
on Sunday?
There is some mention of him in the official
reports regarding Friday, June 28… but then
there is then absolutely NO mention of him at all
for the rest of that weekend… or even for the
days following the incident on Sunday.
If Chief Koile was NOT there that weekend…
then who was manning the Yarnell Fire Station?
Elizabeth — a little more specific would be better. If Hot Shots were being asked to take there trucks or ATV and make sure residences were being evacuated that’s possible and still work within the 10 and 18 as you move but not on foot assisting the Sheriff’s. Granit mountain was not in that position where they were. If your saying BR took there ATV and tried to find the crew that also is doable with Safety and not getting in a jackpot them selves.
This whole statement seems to be trying to make a story that makes Granit Mountain Hero’s which dose not fit where they were what they were doing or how long it would have taken to get to town. If your talking BR Brown trying to find the crew follow his route he stayed in the BLACK during his search with the other 2 ATV’s. He was staying safe. Granit mountain was not in a position to help any one and should have stayed in the BLACK.
OK read the BR statements. Fire Fighters for years have ran thru jumped thru flames to a safer location. Driving ATV’s on a road thru flames to the cold black at 25 to 35 MPH after checking the situation That’s not a violation of the 10 and 18 that I know of They had all the info to make that happen with out injury. They did not need LCES to do that.
Looks like ADOSH simply just got around to fulfilling all the
pending FOIA requests and everyone simply got their
CDs last week. The Blue Ridge logs are just the same
REDACTED stuff that ADOSH got at the last minute
before they released their report.
I don’t know what else might be in the logs… but that
simple Arizona Republic article doesn’t really tell us
anything we hadn’t already figured out over here.
Matter of fact… the article is actually still WRONG about
some things.
All THREE of the PNF hires Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd
and KC (Casey) ‘Bucky’ Yowell had ‘joined’ Frisby and
Brown with the other two UTVs… and not just two of them
as the article is reporting.
The only real ‘dangerous’ part was also what we already
figured out over here… and that was making it to the
St. Joseph Shrine parking lot and then the final 200 yards
to the Youth Camp so they could then take a ‘left’ onto
that cutover road that they already knew was fully
bulldozed and would be ‘safe to travlel’ because that’s
where Blue Ridge had been working all day.
The rest of the trip was ‘hot’ ( with probably side of
the road spot fires ) but essentially all ‘in the black’
by that time.
I wonder if the ADOSH release(s) this week were
ONLY the Blue Ridge logs… or whether some people
finally now have ALL of the material that we know they
had before they published their report.
I would be particularly interested to know if ADOSH
released notes/transcripts of their known interviews
with Justin Smith, Jake Guadiana and other members
of the DOC Lewis crew who worked the fire Saturday.
Justin Smith was the ICT4(T) trainee that Russ Shumate
specifically hired on Friday to work the incident on
Saturday. Russ was letting HIM ‘run the fire’ for most
( all? ) of Saturday… right through the ‘incident’ where
the fire jumped over the jeep trail and became the fire
that had to be fought on Sunday.
Jake Guadiana was the DOC Lewis crew boss who
was actually out there with the crew as they worked
that small 2-4 acre fire all day Saturday… until it
‘accidentally’ escaped over the road around 4:30 PM.
I’d also love to see the FULL Blue Ridge logs ( or at least
have an idea of what was redacted… and WHY )… but
looks like that might only be available after the trials,
if ever.
WWKTT- Why the quotation marks around “accidentally”? Are you still of the opinion that group was setting a line of fire that got out of control?
I don’t believe it as much as I did at first
when studying what happened on Saturday…
but yes… I still believe it’s a possibility.
I’d still like to hear more from the people that
were actually out there that day.
We KNOW that ADOSH has interviewed
all the DOC Lewis Crew bosses and some
of the crew that were actually out there
that day… but the ADOSH report never
really reported any details from those
interviews. Even the ADOSH report
doesn’t say exactly what happened
that afternoon.
Followup…
Observer… see a longer answer
to your question up above which
also contains new information
about the SAIT itself describing
what the Lewis Crew was doing
as ( their words ) ‘mopping up’.
That post is now just up ABOVE
this one since the thread itself
just seemed to have changed
to listing ‘last postings first’.
It has the following date and title…
On February 15, 2014 at 11:04 pm
WantsToKnowTheyTruth said:
** THE SAIT DID USE THE
** WORDS ‘MOPPING UP’
** TO DESCRIBE THE FIRE
** STATUS ON SATURDAY
** MORNING.
And one more thing…I was asked almost 10 years ago to donate a Happy Jack Hotshot crew t-shirt to the WFF, and I called around and found a never worn shirt that a friend of mine had in a trunk that I sent to them, which you can see on display if you ever visit their museum. In addition…I offered other Happy Jack and Santa Fe Hotshot crew memorabilia I had to them in the process. So…as you can see, I have been a supporter and believer in the WFF mission for a long time myself, but I am concerned about Brendan’s overall future…even if I would like him to tell us what he knows.
The more I read all the investigation notes and compare them
with other ‘tidbits’ from the three ‘official’ reports released… the
more I think that Brendan might not be the only one who has
some of the answers. ( I’m leaving Willis out of the equation
for the moment ).
I think it’s possible that Prescott FF Marty Cole also knows more
than he has ever said to anyone.
It’s still sort of a mystery what was actually going on with
Brendan once Marsh broadcasted his “We are deploying”
message. About the only thing we know for sure is that
Brendan was there in the Ranch House Restaurant parking
lot along with everyone else… and he STAYED there
throughout all of the anxious moments following that last
transmission from Marsh… and on up until the point where
Ranger 58 thought they had ‘found them’ up at the anchor
point, the ground rescue team was organized, and that’s
when Brian Frisby got with Brendan and obtained the actual
GM Crew Manifest for the day directly FROM Brendan.
Frisby gave it to Captain Trueheart Brown before they left
on the ground rescue mission. It was physically in Brown’s
possession when they all finally ended up at the ACTUAL
deployment site.
After that ( Brendan giving Frisby the GM crew manifest in the
parking lot ) the only thing we know is that Marty Cole met up
with Brendan and Cole says he ‘collected’ Brendan and was
then ‘taking care of him at that point’.
I find it inconceivable, given the circumstances at that moment
( no one was still really SURE where the heck they deployed ),
that Marty Cole didn’t at least ask Brendan some simple/relevant
questions like….
“What happened?”
and/or
“Do YOU know why they left the black and where they were going?”
and/or
“Do YOU know where they might really be right now?”
I would also find it equally inconceivable that if Marty Cole had
even asked Brendan these kinds of simple ( but important )
questions… that Brendan would have said…
“No comment”.
So yea… it’s perfectly possible that PNF FF Marty Cole and
anyone else who was near Brendan ( even BR guys ) as
the tragedy unfolded ( and there was NOTHING more important
at that moment than determining WHERE they might REALLY
be )… possibly heard Brendan say some things that haven’t
surfaced yet.
I keep focusing on Brendan (and yes, I leave Darrell Willis out of it for obvious reasons), because it was his crew that died. Marty Cole is a true insider in the Prescott Fire Department and he is unlikely to cross the “Red Line”, which is very similar to the “Blue Line”, only for firemen…I’m just sayin’.
I don’t think the Blue Ridge Hotshots or anyone just standing near Brendan would have the information.
So Elizabeth gets the BR unit logs and they confirm her belief that Granite Mountain was moving in order to possibly save lives. Setting aside the merits of that, how could she say such a thing? The only way that really makes sense is if BR was asked to do the same thing. So was there a request to BR that indirectly tells us what was requested of GM?
Well… if you read carefully to Elizabeth’s
‘codetalk’… I think what she was really
trying to say ( including that stupid question )
is that she now has proof that a Type 1
Hotshot who was in Yarnell that same day
would ‘ignore the rules’ in order to save
lives ( E.g. Fellow firefighters in trouble ).
That’s the interpretation she is probably
putting onto Frisby or Brown’s statement
in a Unit log about going on the ground
rescue mission when they describe that
moment with ‘Fuck it… let’s go for it’.
That seems to be the ‘translation’ of her
comments above… but I’m not sure I
have the full hang of her style of
‘speaking in riddles’ yet.
If that is what she is talking about… I think
she fails to grasp that ( while certainly
risky ) the decision to go on the rescue
mission was actually NOT going to ‘violate
standard WFF rules’ nearly as much as
what GM did.
They were going to ‘travel in the black’
out to that ridge… and nothing else. I’m
sure if they hadn’t been able to do that
( all the way ) they would have turned back.
Ranger 58 was hovering right over their
destination and had ‘eyes on them’ the
entire way. We still don’t know for sure
whether Ranger 58 advised them that
the trails were ‘all black’ out that way
before they even left on the mission.
It was a risk… but the rules WERE in place.
Nope, not buying that. She is a lawyer and words mean things. Saying that GM was moving to save lives because BR was later willing to do the same is a non sequitur, would be jumping to a conclusion without evidence. Now she was hinting there was evidence for GM’s motivation in those logs. She specifically said the logs confirmed her view that GM moved to save lives. She was using the later example to refute the suggestion that WFF do not do that. if it involves breaking the rules.
Okay. Whatever.
Not going to play THIS game.
There are enough ‘riddles’
to go around without someone
now just ‘hinting’ at something
in a Unit log and leaving us
to guess what she really
means.
I guess we’ll just wait and see
if she really ever DOES say
exactly what she meant.
I hope she does.
This is covered in the Az Republic today. Their story is about the rescue mission solely. The logs came via ADOSH, and were significantly redacted by the USFS. Wonder if these will be posted anytime soon.
Well… it’s exactly
what I thought,
then. The log
just describes
some of their
incremental
decision making
as they worked
they way out
to where Ranger
58 was hovering
over what they
first thought
was the
deployment site.
This article doesn’t really tell us anything we hadn’t already figured out over here.
Matter of fact… the article is wrong about some things.
All THREE of
the PNF hires Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell were with Frisby and Brown, and not just two of them as reported in the article.
Copy that. The reason I leave Willis out of this
particular equation is because even though it’s
also perfectly possible Willis heard the same
‘everything’ that took place from (say) 3:50 to
4:20 PM over the intra-crew frequency…
…we KNOW ( for sure ) that Brendan did.
It’s possible Willis only heard SOME of it… but
we KNOW Brendan heard ALL of it.
At the very least… I wish Brendan would come out
and tell us we are all full of shit… and that he
never heard anything other than what he has
already reported hearing… and that even the
official reports are WRONG when they say he
heard ALL of the crucial ‘decision making’
that day.
FYI – In the article I read a few days ago in Prescott, it said than Brendan would remain in Prescott for his new job with the WFF, which is what my post said.
I have some real concerns about Brendan. From everything I have picked up on to date, Brendan has not told anyone, or at least anyone who is making the information public, everything he knows about what happened on the Yarnell Hill Fire.
The reason I mentioned Brendan in my previous post was an attempt to put more of the spotlight on him, and to remind everyone that Brendan knows things he isn’t hasn’t made public, and I think he owes it to his crew, and everyone who was paying his salary on the Yarnell Hill Fire to report everything he knows about what happened on that fire. To the public…to you and to me, period.
Elizabeth has commented in the past that we should be careful about putting anyone who was there that day on the spot to tell what they know. I on the other hand, do not think you can make an omelet with breaking some eggs, and I am willing to break as many eggs as necessary to get the truth. The public both needs to know what happened on the Yarnell Hill Fire, and the public has a right to know everything that happened on the Yarnell Hill Fire. Period.
I did not intend to put a big spotlight on the WFFF, yes…I am really glad they are doing what they are doing…kudos to them. But no…I don’t believe setting Brendan up from Prescott, to travel around the country to raise money through donations by continually reliving his experiences or putting him forward as a grief counselor for future wildland firefighting victims is the right thing to do…for anyone. It is just my opinion, and this is after all, an opinion blog.
Secondly, the most important (I thought) part of my comment was to address to BOMBSHELL that RTS dropped in his previous comment about Eric Marsh. Especially the part of his comment that stated he has more examples to come of Eric Marsh being willing to take risks that no other hotshot crew bosses were in order to make some dumbass line overhead happy.
The implications of those revelations, in conjunction with conclusions that both WTKTT and I arrived at regarding the significance of Eric Marsh’s recent employee evaluations is, I believe, the answer to the question we have all been asking, “Why did the Granite Mountain Hotshots die?”
And I want to state one more time, my absolute conviction based on all of my experience, training, and background that the employee appraisal that Eric Marsh got was the beginning of his permanent removal as GMHS Superintendent, and quite possibly the termination of his employment with the Prescott Fire Department, if he did not change his ways ASAP as far as Darrell Willis was concerned. And that meant accepting the fact that Darrell Willis, Chief Fraijo and the City of Prescott was playing fast and loose with the rules. Darrell Willis was going to replace Eric Marsh with Jesse Steed because Jesse Steed was willing to play ball and sign what Willis put in front of him. Period.
Finally, I did say in my comment that “I presumed” Brendan was surrounded on a daily basis by a “support group”, and that was one of the big reasons why I thought he should have stayed with the Prescott Fire Department. And none of the former Granite Mountain Hotshots who are now full-time Prescott firemen were qualified to be firemen when they were on the hotshot crew, but that is the point of the GMHS, they were a training and recruiting platform for almost all future Prescott firemen. I have the impression there are a couple of dozen former GMHS who are now firemen.
And I don’t think anybody told Brendan he did not have a future with the Prescott Fire Department. Prescott, Arizona, and the surrounding area loves the Granite Mountain Hotshots, their memory and their sacrifice. I don’t think any chicken shit city manager would have risked the wrath of the community by not doing the right thing by Brendan. But hey…once again, that is just my opinion…for whatever it is worth.
Besides, the wrath of the Citizens of Prescott is beside the point. Law enforcement and fire fighters take care of their own….period. The Prescott Fire Department would have taken care of Brendan. Just as almost every other uniquely identifiable group almost always takes care of their own.
Two things, unrelated to asparagus:
1. RTS, I am sorry that I offended you with my post a couple of days ago. I was not trying to be “Queen” – I only offered my comments because I know that so many of the families of the men who died read on-line media sources like this one, and I thought I had a few relevant comments to share. I apologize for offending you, RTS. I have the highest respect for you, and I remain grateful that you share your time and insight.
2. For the *current* Hotshots reading this thread, here is a question: Would YOU personally be willing to violate the 10 and 18 if your grandmother was in danger of burning to death if you did not violate the 10 and 18 to try to get to her to save her?
That is the stupidest question I have ever heard. The 10 and 18 deal directly with wild land Fire not saving people or buildings.
If the people you are responsible for are in trouble you would do what you could but violating safety would just add you to the fatality list. Untrained and unequipped people running into a building usually don’t come out. You make that decision on your own you don’t drag a crew with you. I do not know of any wild land fire where anyone tried to save some one and broke the rules. They are not designed for that scenario……….
However, a related scenario might have been in play at the YHF. Was Granite Mountain asked to move to Yarnell for structure protection, or for evacuations AND structure protection. The exact nature of Musser’s request is not known publicly. No, they were not going to run into burning buildings, but being asked to help with evacuations might have increased the pressure to move to Yarnell.
I believe this question has gone around the room
before and while we still do NOT know the exact
nature of the request(s) that went out to
Marsh/Steed/crew ( but we know they did )… I
think the consensus before with regards to ‘helping
(specifically) with evacuations’ was…
How in the heck are 19 guys on foot with heavy
packs and chainsaws and pulaskis supposed
to help ‘evacuate’ anyone… without becoming
just 19 more people without transportation
that would then need to be evacuated as well?
If they really needed help with ‘evacuations’… then
all the resources to do that were NOT 2 miles
away sitting on a ridge… they were all assembled
in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot, a
stone’s throw from where they were needed.
4 empty Hotshot Crew Carriers ( could hold
at least 40 people ).
1 other complete Type 1 Hotshot crew
( Blue Ridge – 20 guys ).
About a dozen other ‘fire vehicles’.
Water trucks, engines, etc. etc.
Dozens of other firefighters.
The list goes on.
If someone really did insist that 19 guys 2 miles
away were somehow needed for evacuations
with all that horsepower already in town that
ended up just standing around in a parking lot
not doing much of anything ( because everyone
pretty much did get out safely before GM got
anywhere near that ranch where they, themselves
would have just been trapped even if they made
it there )…
…then why didn’t they also ‘call them off’ when
it became obvious they weren’t going to be
needed?
That all comes down to communications, of
course ( or lack thereof ) and the mystery that
remains from that day which is WHY ( no matter
what the reasoning was for moving ) they felt they
needed to be almost purposely ‘secretive’ about
what they were doing.
Brendan himself might not even have ALL the
answers here… but he surely has some that
we haven’t heard yet.
I don’t know all the answers to your questions. One might be BR said no. On the other hand, ask Gary. He has said the same thing, so I doubt it is a ridiculous thought. To this day, Gary says “evacuations and structure protection”.
mike… it’s all still possible. Yarnell
was a known ‘retirement’ area.
Everyone in that part of Arizona knew
the saying about Yarnell…
“It’s a place where the 70 years olds
take care of the 80 year olds and
the 60 year olds take care of the
those in their 70’s”.
So yea… it still may be all about
what fire command THOUGHT
might happen ( total disaster )
without maximum evacuation
from support from any FF who
could walk and was at least
wearing some Nomex.
The biggest head-scratcher for
me throughout ALL of this struggle
to find out the real motivations
that day is WHY anyone would be
so afraid to admit that that is
exactly what was going down
that afternoon.
Sure… it would change the post-accident conversation to
all about whether WFF should
EVER be pretending to be
structural… but why would anyone
think it would DIMINISH the
memory of those 19 men?
For most of the public at large I
would think the knowledge that that
is EXACTLY what they were trying
to do would do nothing but make
them even greater ‘heroes’ than
the honors already bestowed.
So I really don’t understand all
the secrecy… and all the reluctance
to talk about June 30, 2013.
I really don’t understand what
everyone is so afraid others might
‘find out’.
Nothing brings them back… but
their living relatives, children,
and future grandchildren still
deserve to know what was
really going on that day.
Bob, perhaps I was unclear. Allow me to try to explain things differently:
I just received today the Unit Logs from the Blue Ridge Hotshots. These documents confirmed my view that the reason why the GM guys left the black is to try to save some human lives.
Some people claim that the Granite Mountain Hotshots violated the 10 or 18 by leaving the black (and leaving the black without a lookout, without well-working radios, etc.), so my question was designed to ask:
Would you leave the black if you thought you could be saving someone’s life by getting to them more quickly by virtue of leaving the black, *and* you thought that you could beat the fire through the valley (because you did not realize that the wind would shift 180 degrees)?
Apologies – it is still a very awkward question.
Elizabeth –
I had this same discussion about 3 months ago with RTS and Bob. I was told then the idea of “risk a life to save a life” was something structural firefighters might do, but not really the case for WFF. But I suspect you might get a range of responses. But I bet nearly all if not all hotshot supers would say no.
Your comment obviously raises the question – did BR get asked and turn them down. Remember Marsh or Steed initially told Musser no, ask BR.
Mike, the most recent documentation that I have unearthed will refute RTS and Bob.
“Fuck it – let’s go for it.” That is a direct quote from a very senior Hotshot crew leader (not Marsh or a GM guy) who was about to take a huge risk (seemingly in violation of the 10 and 18) to try to save someone’s life.
If you are talking about the YHF – that means BR (hotshot, not GM). That likely means Frisby or the captain (Trew?). Are you talking in reference to trying to save GM or going into Yarnell – sounds like it could be referring to the former.
One of the things I’ve been
taking notes on here ( but
wasn’t quite ready to post
about ) is more followup
on the PNF Helmet-Cam guys
Hulburd, Clawson and Yowell.
I’ve been trying to nail down
EXACTLY when the ‘ground
rescue’ party was either
requested and/or launched.
Near as I can tell so far… that
moment happened when the
Range 58 DPS chopper
THOUGHT it had found the
deployment site out there
near the anchor point… but
the DPS chopper pilot did
not consider it safe to land
at either the original helispot
( still too hot ) or anywhere
else nearby.
I think THAT is the moment
the coordinates were sent
out over the radio… and at
that moment it was either
someone try to reach them
on the ground or wait an
unknown amount of time
until it was safe for Ranger
58 to land at the helispot.
So yea… given that
scenario… I could imagine
all FIVE of those men who
would take the risk ( Frisby,
Brown, Hulburd, Clawson
and Yowell ) ALL saying…
“Fuck it… let’s go for it.”
If anyone was alive… they
could be the ones loading
the lift-gurneys up as the
THREE Medevac choppers
that were actually already
arriving up at the helibase
hovered overhead.
It was worth the risk… but
only Frisby and Brown really
knew the way up there…
so they led the way.
It was not that irrational a
decision. Frisby and Brown
had worked that area all day
and they knew they could
take it in ‘steps’.
If they could reach the Youth
Camp… they could then get
onto the cutover road that
they were dozing/clearing
all day.
If they could make it to
the Sesame area… they
could make it up to where
Sesame trail met the clearings.
Then they could just take
every part of the trail west
one bit at a time… and could
still turn around if they had to.
They knew the way.
They had a visual that day
all the way to where Ranger
58 was ‘hovering’ over what
it thought was the deployment
site.
No one wanted to die that
day. Not even them. It was
a reasonable risk with
just incremental decisions
to make on the way and
so they went for it.
I would have said, “no”. Nothing was more important than the safety of my crew and although I have said I was conditioned to “fight fire AGRESSIVELY but provide for safety first”, I never wanted to go home to face Richard Allred or Orlando Romero without the hotshot crew they entrusted to me intact (a few medevac’s here and there were unavoidable, but that was acceptable).
I am responsible for 18 other guys we are a line building crew not a engine crew or a sheriff department search and rescue. Wild Land Fire Fighters do not have the equipment or training to deal with structure Fires or rescue operations. That is why Urban interface is causing such a problem. It has to intermingle two types of Fir Fighting each one has a separate responsibility.
Granit Mountain was not responsible for the building fires they were not equipped to do so.
Also a good 2 hour hike to town. Taking that kind of risk is not what wild land fire fighters are trained to do. So my answer is NO all hot shot crews are trained in wild land fire and the 10 and 18. Its not like 911……………..
AMEN!
Regarding Marsh and the ALLEGED GMHS bad decsions with good outcomes attitude, the two fires where two separate HS Supts commented on Marsh seemingly always wanting to ‘ONE-UP-YOU’, they were the 2009 Station Fire on the Angeles NF and the 2011 Gladiator Fire on the Prescott NF.
The Supt. on the Station Fire said that Marsh and the GMHS was doing some fairly unconventional and unsafe tactics and GETTING AWAY WITH IT. He said they should have known better. He said he counseled Marsh on what he was doing, but it appeared that it did no good because he/they kept at it.
Reply to gary olson post on February 14, 2014 at 3:58 am
>> gary olson said…
>>
>> Those survivors, or the families of those victims, will have their own
>> friends, family, clergy, peer counselors, and communities to turn to.
>> Do you think Mr. Donut has the mental, emotional, educational, or
>> professional background, experiences or training to be a traumatic
>> event counselor?
I believe the answer there would obviously be no… unless Vicki’s
organization is also going to sponsor Brendan for a complete round
of classes to obtain the training/degrees normally required/needed
for any kind of direct (professional) grief counseling.
Actually… not to cast any asparagus on Vicki’s organization… but looking
at her ‘staff’ page… it doesn’t appear as if the kind of professional training
or degrees normally expected for such a declared profession are that
much in evidence anywhere… and that itself perhaps brings up another
possible ‘lesson to be learned’ from the Yarnell tragedy.
If Brendan felt he had to turn to THIS organization to get ‘the help he really
needed’… and there weren’t any other ‘professional’ alternatives readily available
to him via either the Prescott Fire Department or the WFF organization(s)…
…I would say that’s a problem that needs to be addressed right there.
Look at this published ‘outreach/counseling’ page at the Wildland Firefighter
Foundation website.and just read some of the actual ‘professional’ advice
they are trying to give to someone who just lost a loved one in a fire…
http://www.wffoundation.org/SectionIndex.asp?SectionID=11
Direct Quotes from this published ‘professional’ advice…
“Choose a trigger word that feels somewhat like a reprimand to you.
Mine is bogus which reminds me that it is bogus to practice negative behavior.
When you catch yourself daydreaming, slap your hands together sharply and firmly say your focus word. The hand clap will sting a little, the noise of your hands clapping provide audio as well as your voice saying your trigger word giving you a clear reminder that you had checked out. Practice doing this now. The action will bring you back into focus quickly.”
Are you kidding me?
If this really is the accepted ( or the ONLY? ) ‘go to’ organization for WFF
incident survivors… I would say this is a situation that needs some
attention all by itself.
Vicki saw a need in the WFF community… and she set about filling that
need in an honorable way. Kudos to her ( and her son, who helps her
run the organization ).
But if that’s supposed to be the OFFICIAL ‘goto grief counseling’ organization
for all of the WFF firefighting community… well… there’s ANOTHER big problem
that needs to be solved right there… right NOW.
>> gary also wrote…
>>
>> Being a sympathetic victim only goes so far. Does that
>> sound like a healthy thing for him to be repeatedly doing, or a viable long
>> term plan, or realistic career path?
Only Brendan can answer that for himself, I suppose… but I hear ya.
Simply having ‘gone through’ something does NOT automatically mean
you are qualified to ‘help others get through’ a traumatic event.
Something tells me that the ‘stay in Prescott and be a hero’ scenario
you were imagining for Brendan simply wasn’t being offered… and he
had to do SOMETHING.
He wasn’t qualified to be a structural firefighter… and as soon as it became
obvious the GM Hotshots will NOT be reconstituted I think he was being
gently informed he might need to seek some other employment.
Speaking of ‘gently informed he might need to seek some other employment’…
Everyone DOES realize that that ’employee evaluation’ with the not-so-subtle
WARNINGS in it that Willis shot Marsh’s way just 57 days before the
Yarnell incident was issued WHILE Marsh was already ‘relieved of his
duties’… right?
Willis’ direct request/directive to Eric Marsh in his May 3 Employee Evaluation…
“I also would like you to begin the mentoring of Jesse Steed as your
replacement giving him opportunities and the freedom to lead the crew and you
take a more hands off approach.”
So on May 3, 2013, Willis is TELLING Marsh that he wants him to BEGIN
the ‘mentoring’ process for Jesse Steed to replace Marsh as the ‘Supervisor’
for Granite Mountain.
That would indicate that Willis himself thought ( even on May 3, 2013 ) that
Steed had a ways to go before he would be ‘ready’ to be the Granite Mountain
Supervisor…
…but on that very date ( May 3 )… Jesse Steed was ALREADY the ‘acting
Supervisor’ for Granite Mountain and was ALREADY the one who Willis trusted
just 10 DAYS earlier ( April 23 ) to sign the ‘certification’ document that Marsh
had been refusing to sign.
Willis has said in subsequent interviews and emails surrounding this
‘document signing’ frap that on April 23, when the certification document
was signed, Steed was ‘fully qualified’ to be the (acting) Supervisor for Granite
Mountain and ( also according to Willis ) fully qualified to be signing the
‘certification’ documents for that group…
…but just 10 DAYS after Steed signed that document on April 23, here
he is telling Marsh he wants him to ( sometime soon ) simply BEGIN the
‘mentoring’ process so that Steed WOULD be qualified as his replacement
at some point in the future.
If Willis really didn’t believe Jesse Steed was already fully capable of being
the Granite Mountain Supervisor and not in need of someone to ‘BEGIN
the mentoring process’ for that…
…then why would Willis have been OK with Jesse actually being appointed
to that very position on April 18, 2013, when Eric Marsh was ‘relieved’ of
the position because of an injury and placed on ‘light duty’?
Willis also saw to it that Prescott FF Tom Cooley was also designated
‘Temporary Captain’ for Granite Mountain while Steed was the ‘acting
Superintendent’. That also seems to mean that Willis didn’t think any
of the current GM ‘squad bosses’ were either capable or qualified for
the ‘Captain’ position, either… which is why he must of felt the need to
bring Cooley ‘from the outside’ for that temporary ‘Captain’ assignment.
It is ( was ) a very strange situation.
April 18, 2013 – Marsh had been refusing to sign a GM certification document,
suffers a motorbike accident, and is relieved of his position as ‘Superintendent’
for Granite Mountain. GM Captain Jesse Steed is appointed ‘acting Superintendent’
for the Granite Mountain Hotshots, but no one from inside GM is promoted
to ‘acting Captain’. Willis goes ‘outside’ GM and brings in Prescott FF
Tom Cooley to be the ‘acting Captain’ instead.
April 23, 2013 – ( 5 days later ) – The GM ‘certification’ document is signed by
‘acting Superintendent’ Jesse Steed. It is also signed the same day by
Darrell Willis and Chief Dan Fraijo.
May 3, 2013 – ( 10 days later ) – Willis types up his ‘Employee Evaluation’
of Marsh and specifically tells Marsh he wants him to BEGIN the process
of ‘mentoring’ Jesse Steed to (someday) be able to replace Marsh as
the GM Superintendent… even though on this very day Steed is
ALREADY ‘acting Superintendent’ for GM and has already signed the
GM ‘certification’ document(s) for 2013. So ( in Willis’ mind? ) Steed
WAS ‘fully ready’ to be a Type 1 Hotshot supervisor to the point where
he would sign the documents Willis wanted him to sign… but Willis
also felt he was NOT ready to ‘actually lead the men’ and wanted
Marsh to BEGIN the ‘mentoring process’? Weird.
June 18, 2013 – ( 1 month+ later ) Eric Marsh is no longer on ‘light duty’ and
is again ‘acting Superintendent’ for GM as they work the Doce Fire.
June 30, 2013 – ( 12 days later ) – GM agrees to accept an assignment on
their scheduled day off and work the Yarnell Hill Fire where Darrell Willis
has already been hired as a ‘Division Supervisor’ the night before and will
be working as SPGS2 on Sunday on the same fire.
WTKTT<
" not to cast any asparagus" – you meant aspersions right?
Yes. Sorry. That wasn’t a typo. I just thought everyone would ‘get that’.
Actually… I probably didn’t say near enough up above about how Vicki deserves all the kudos in the world for what she is trying to do. She saw a genuine need in the WFF community and she has set about trying to fill that need with honor and every best intention.
My only point was that if her organization is now considered the primary goto group for professional grief counseling following WFF fatalities… then that situation probably needs to be looked at.
Shit, at least I am not casting asparagus in my posts on this thread…. 🙂 (I believe WTKTT was the guy who criticized ME for not reading my draft posts before posting them here.)
Also, WTKTT, I am not a therapist, but I think the technique you cited and then strongly criticized from the WFF organization is a valid behavioral therapy or CBT technique. I have not “googled” it to be sure I am correct, but I am pretty sure it is a valid technique used to deal with struggles with recurrent/pervasive thoughts, for example. So, for example, if I am dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and one of my symptoms is that I get “stuck” in my own mind and start reliving the fire and saying to myself “if only I had done [x],” and I cannot break out of that line of thinking, such that I am no longer doing well functioning hour by hour, minute by minute, and I am instead stuck in my mind, reliving that day and those thoughts, one way to try to stem those “intrusive” thoughts can be the technique apparently posted on the website that you then cited and critiqued.
Again, I am not a therapist or a trained mental health professional, but I vaguely recall one of my close relatives who is a psychiatrist telling me something about this technique and “intrusive”/obsessive thoughts.
Reply to Elizabeth post on Feb 14, 2014 at 1:16 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> Again, I am not a therapist or a trained mental
>> health professional,
Neither am I… and (apparently) neither is anyone
listed as being ‘on staff’ at the Wildland Firefighter
Foundation ( see their website ).
Also… the ‘professional advice’ quote at the link
above is not even ‘attributed’ to anyone or
signed by anyone… even though it is written
from the first person.
The organization probably DOES have access
to professional therapists and whatnot… or at
least could probably help someone find someone
to help them in that way if needed… and
they do not directly advertise themselves as being
in that (specific) business… but in case you
missed the point of my post…
If this particular agency is being identified as the
primary ‘goto’ place by the WFF community for
people who have just suffered a fire-related
traumatic event I think that would be
mis-characterization of even what THEY say their
intended ‘mission’ is.
It’s a wonderful organization. It really is.
I probably didn’t say enough up above about what
Vicki has been able to do with the best of
intentions. She saw a need in the WFF community
and she went right about filling it with all the
good intentions she could muster. Kudos to
her ( and her son who helps run the foundation ).
I really mean that.
But it is what it is… and it’s not what it’s not.
I hope people don’t confuse the two.
Reply to RTS post on February 14, 2014 at 9:37 am
>> RTS said…
>>
>> ” not to cast any asparagus”
>> you meant aspersions right?
Yes. I did. Sorry. It was not a typo. I don’t know where I
first picked that phrase up but I guess I thought most
people would understand what I meant.
And I did mean it.
I am NOT casting ‘aspersions’ on the Wildland
Firefighter Foundation. I think it’s a wonderful
organization that fills a need in the WFF community…
…but all the talk lately has made it sound like these
people are professional therapists themselves… or
directly engaged in that line of work… and that is
simply NOT the case. That’s not what they do ( or
even advertise as one of their services ).
First of all, Elizabeth is absolutely correct about the trigger and clap technique. It is a variation of a well-known behavioral modification psychological technique. While it sounds a bit silly, it probably does work to some degree. Patients learn they do not have to be controlled by their negative thoughts.
I do not think the WFF has ever presented itself as an alternative to professional psychiatric advice. Rather it seems to be a place that provide some funds, a place to help find resources, and a place for firefighters and families to connect with another so they do not feel so isolated. During the aftermath of the tragedy, I noticed how many wildland firefighters recommended the WFF as a place to send donations. I did so, and I was pleasantly surprised by 2 things. First, I did not receive some useless trinket or T-shirt. Second, I have NEVER received another fundraising request. I am already inclined to donate again.
Finally, I think Brendan McDonough probably felt the need to escape Prescott. Imagine being somewhere where everything reminded you of the tragedy and everyone felt sorry for you and wondered how you were. It would not take long for it to drive you nuts. Ironically, I do not think he will get that pity at the WFF. Too many others in the same boat. And he won’t be a professional counselor, but just someone to talk to and relate to. I hope he does some real good there.
WELL RTS…if that story is true, it certainly would cause me to re-evaluate everything I have ever said or thought about Eric Marsh. I am not saying I doubt your veracity or the veracity of those who told you the story…I am only leaving the door open to the possibility that what happened may have been misinterpreted on misreported somewhere along the line by somebody. ESPECILLY if you have more examples…OMG!
Which goes to prove what I have said before, and what I have thought numerous times…I regret ever getting involved in this controversy in the first place, because I don’t have a clue what really happened on the Yarnell Hill Fire. Only a couple of people do, and apparently they aren’t talking.
Speaking of people who aren’t talking. I do have some thoughts about Mr. Donut and his new job. Let me see if I have this straight? He quit a job where he had the very real possibility, if not the guarantee of becoming a full time Prescott Fireman with health benefits, a dental plan, a pension, early retirement, status within the community as a professional who gets to ride around in a big red fire truck with his status as the Lone Survivor, and the town hero? He was not only surrounded by a support group (I presume) on a daily basis, but he would never had to return to the fire line. I can’t believe the Prescott Fire Department is ever going to field another hotshot crew…brush disposal crew…maybe, it depends on the availability of federal grant money, and their lack of shame…but who knows? In any case, Mr. Donut would never had to go out again, he would have been riding around in a big red fire truck checking smoke detectors or fire hydrants for water pressure or waxing the big red fire truck or whatever.
And he went to work for a 2 person (?) wildland firefighter charity in Boise, Idaho, from Prescott Arizona? What exactly will he do for the WFF when he wakes up tomorrow morning…take calls or make calls to potential donors? Sure, he will travel, OCCASIONALLY…to repeatedly tell sympathetic groups around the country about his experiences on the Yarnell Hill Fire (like a traveling sideshow or a 2 headed firefighter) to solicit donations for the WFF while he waits for the next wildland firefighter tragedy so he can offer his support? And good luck getting hired by the Prescott Fire department again. The assholes down at city hall closed the book on Mr. Donut with a great sigh of relief…one problem…GONE!
Those survivors, or the families of those victims, will have their own friends, family, clergy, peer counselors, and communities to turn to. Do you think Mr. Donut has the mental, emotional, educational, or professional background, experiences or training to be a traumatic event counselor? Being a sympathetic victim only goes so far. Does that sound like a healthy thing for him to be repeatedly doing, or a viable long term plan, or realistic career path?
I know I am a negative person by nature. Not only do I see the glass as half empty…but I think you shouldn’t drink it from it because somebody probably pissed in it. BUT…I am never disappointed by life…and sometimes I am actually pleasantly surprised when things actually go well, or work out for the best in the end. So who knows? I am obviously clueless, I give up!
For the Arizona residents in here; as a matter of jurisdiction, can anyone tell me what responsibility the local municipal fire department has in fire suppression on state land in Arizona?
I ask this because, where I live here in the east, (New York State) we have no un-incorporated areas. Every inch of the state is covered by some form of municipal fire department. Maybe paid or volunteer or a combination, but even in remote areas there is a local level municipal fire department receiving tax money to provide fire suppression services for it. (State pays land taxes on it’s holdings to local government)
We have some significant tracts (hundreds of thousands of acres each) of state lands and even on those tracts, the local municipal fire department is obligated by state law to respond to a fire there. (We have a very minimal amount of federal lands) The State does by law require itself to maintain a firefighting force (Minimal) to respond to wildfires, however the initial attack agency will almost always be the local municipal fire department.
The local fire department is not required by law to transfer command to the State when they arrive, however most will simply because the State then becomes responsible for the financial cost and legal liabilities. “Deeper Pockets”.
Elizabeth,
OMG> So, it sounds to me that you are kinda claiming Queen-of-the Hill status and have self-appointed yourself as the ultimate arbiter of what we should or should not bring out into the open.
It’s pretty clear that you’re referring to me as the “at least one person on this thread” bringing into the open instances of PRIOR BAD DECISIONS WITH GOOD OUTCOMES or however you chose to describe it.
And as far as the psycho-babble goes, there is NONE of us current or prior WFF “OVERESTIMAT[ING] any missteps made by those who died that might have led to their deaths while UNDERESTIMATING the normal or typical compliance with the rules, guidelines, best practices, etc. that are alleged to have been violated by the victims of the tragedy.” Nope, not doing that because we all EXPERINCED ithem and saw them, and CAUTIONED them on SEVERAL occasions. But to no avail. As TWO separate HS Superintnedents on TWO sepaprate fires put it “it was always like Marsh was trying to ‘one-up you.’
The ATV issue? If it was in that bad of shape and that unreliable and that unsafe, then they should have never taken it on the fireline. That shows to me more of the PRIOR BAD DECISIONS WITH GOOD OUTCOMES mode they operated in. And it speaks to their attitude toward safety in general. Like the sleeves rolled up issue, it’s an ATTITUDE thing.
I chose and choose to be anonymous and to REMAIN anonymous for good reasons, so get over it. It ain’t gonna happen!
I have no problem bringing this stuff up and airing it. The SAIT and SAIR completely ignored these HUMAN FACTORS issues. I’m sure the families, friends, and loved ones of those men would much rather know the truth rather than the lies and coverups the SAIT presented.
I have no idea what HS you’re taking to but it was pretty well known by many of their peers regarding their continuing pattern of BAD DECISIONS WITH GOOD OUTCOMES.
For example, I ALLEGE that on the 2011 Horseshoe Two Fire, several HS Crews, including Marsh and GMHS, were given a downhill line construction with fire below assignment (Watch Out #9). All but one of the HS crews refused the assignment (with an optional tactic). And gues which HS Crew was the one HS Crew that did not refuse the assignment? It was the GMHS. I once again ALLEGE that Marsh’s comment to the other HS Supts. was “hold on now, let’s reassess this one, I THINK WE CAN PULL THIS OFF.” CLEARLY, this suggests PRIOR BAD DECISIONS WITH GOOD OUTCOMES. They’ve gotten away with it before, so let’s try it again.
I’m using inductive logic at this point. Inductive reasoning is reasoning in which the premises seek to supply strong evidence for the truth of the conclusion. Furthermore, unlike deductive arguments, inductive reasoning allows for the possibility that the conclusion is false, even if all of the premises are true. Source: Wikipedia.
” the fact that I have not heard a single tangible, non-anonymous thing about any sort of specific prior or pattern of dangerous/risky act(s) says something.” Really? Just what DOES it say?
I have NO problem making these ALLEGATIONS. Stand by for others.
RTS… I think it’s almost eerie that you use the phrase…
“I think we can pull this off.”
I have listened and listened and listened to the communications
that were accidentally captured that day and at some point I
became sure that if Christopher MacKenzie’s video had lasted
but another 20 seconds or so…. we would have heard Marsh
or Steed ( or BOTH ) say…
“I think we can pull this off… but if we’re going we better
go right now”.
There are still ( at least ) two people still alive that can probably
verify whether anything like that was spoken just prior to them
leaving the safe black at 4:04 PM.
Brendan McDonough ( known to be listening at that time. )
Darrell Willis ( said he was listening at that time ).
The phrase that got me (assuming this is close to a quote) is “hold on now, let’s reassess this one….”. Sounds like what have been his thought process after initially turning Musser down.
mike… you may be exactly right.
We first learned of Musser’s request to GMIHC
to “spare resources for Yarnell” in the ADOSH
report following THEIR interview with Musser
( the SAIR never mentioned it ).
However… even the ADOSH report says that
Musser did NOT know “exactly who he was
talking to”. According to Musser, it might have
been Marsh saying “we are committed to the
black… call Blue Ridge”… but it might have
been Steed.
ADOSH page 18…
Shortly thereafter, Operations Section Chief 2
Musser radioed GMIHC and asked if they could
spare resources to assist in Yarneil. Either Marsh
or GMIHC Captain Steed responded that they were
committed to the black and that Musser should
contact BRIHC working in the valley (during his
interview Musser stated that he wasn’t sure who
he was talking with).
Let’s assume for a moment that it WAS Steed
who actually “shot back” to Musser before
Marsh had a chance to say anything.
Steed had already heard OPS 1 Abel tell BOTH
of them to “Hunker and be safe ( in the black )”
and Steed didn’t hear Marsh disagree or voice
another plan… so when Musser called out
directly to GMIHC ( and not DIVSA )… Steed just
shot back quickly and told Musser what he
he really, truly understood their current plan to be
from what he had heard OPS1 Abel tell them to do.
Then, all of sudden, ( and right after Steed’s
response to OPS2 Musser ) Marsh calls Steed on
the private intra-crew and PERHAPS says
something like…
“Hold on now… let’s reassess this one.”
THAT is when the whole ‘comfort level’
conversations began which eventually led to
to the ‘alternate decision’ ( E.g. I think we can
do this ).
It WOULD explain what happened, and the
series of conversations that we DO know about.
Marsh had been fulfilling Darrell Willis’ directive
to him from the employee evaluation and had
been (quote) “letting Steed run the crew” all
day… but that call from Musser was a ‘direct
request’ from an OPS at the fire command level.
Maybe Willis’ other “I expect excellent performance”
directive from the same employee evaluation just
57 days earlier was now “ringing in Marsh’s ears”.
Maybe Marsh thought Steed’s quick response
to an OPS level request was ‘too hasty’… and
now here come all the private “Hold on now…
let’s reassess this one” and “let’s see what your
comfort level really is” discussion(s).
There may have then been even ANOTHER
request in there from someone else just
shortly after that ( Willis? Someone else? )
which just ‘upped’ the pressent and then led to
Marsh’s known statements to Steed…
“I could just feel this comin’, ya know”.
and…
“That’s why I called you BEFORE to ask you
what your comfort level was”.
The “called you BEFORE” quote from Marsh to
Steed still indicates that MacKenzie captured
the SECOND ‘comfort level’ discussion that day.
They talked about this ‘comfort level’ MULTIPLE
times, not just once.
Caveat: This is obviously all conjecture and
an attempt to ‘fill in the blanks’ in a known
series of conversations and ‘decision making’,
but it would make sense.
Marsh called for “let’s reasses this” after Steed
shot back to OPS 2 Musser (quickly) before Marsh
could jump in and before ‘consulting’ with him first.
Again… Brendan McDonough would most certainly
know if this is the way it really went down that day.
DON’T BELIEVE EVERYTHING EVERYONE SAYS……
One of the key questions in all of this is: “Why did the Granite Mountain Hotshots go down into the unburned valley where they ultimately died?” At least one person on this comment thread has indicated his view that the deadly descent can be explained (at least in part) by Eric Marsh’s or Jesse Steed’s alleged excessive risk-taking or “prior dangerous acts,” implying that Eric Marsh and GM had a history of doing unreasonably unsafe or needlessly risky things from which they escaped unharmed, such that they became “emboldened” or such that an abnormal and unreasonable level of risk-taking became their norm, in which they then developed misplaced confidence. While it is possible that this issue or factor could have been at play, I want to make a few points to try to help ensure that this theory is not blindly, prematurely, or relatively factually-baselessly accepted as truth at this point, prior to the revelation or discovery of verifiable facts that would suggest that this actually a factor at play:
1. Cognition: It is generally well-accepted among behavioralists and social scientists/researchers that, in the wake of a tragedy like the Yarnell Hill Fire, there can be a tendency among others in the relevant peer groups (e.g. current or former Hotshots, firefighters, emergency professionals) to OVERESTIMATE any missteps made by those who died that might have led to their deaths while UNDERESTIMATING the normal or typical compliance with the rules, guidelines, best practices, etc. that are alleged to have been violated by the victims of the tragedy. Out of respect for the deceased men, I urge you to keep this well-documented cognitive bias in mind, to avoid the tendency to decide prematurely that the “prior dangerous acts” notion is the right one to believe.
2. Verification: Unless and until someone who is NOT anonymous can point me to one verifiable instance in which Marsh did something that a majority of the reasonable Hotshots with whom I now have e-mail contact would view as needlessly and abnormally risky, I personally believe that it is irresponsible if not needlessly disrespectful to the families of the deceased men to give credit to the “prior dangerous acts” narrative. Lest anyone try to cite GM’s burned UTV/ATV/whatever as evidence of prior or a pattern of risky decision-making, note that the one living person who was *there* when the GM UTV/ATV/whatever burned in a fire does not describe it in a way that suggests “dangerous or risky act.” Rather, as I understand it, the UTV/ATV was in lousy condition, it had been crapping out, and it died the day it burned. When the fire started moving toward it (as it sat there, dead, refusing to start), the GM guys decided that, rather than scamper to figure out how to move it since it would not start (and it was in a relatively inopportune location and it was heavy), they would just leave it, and, if it burned, it burned. Given that it was already non-operational and likely on its last leg, leaving it was not an “accident” or needlessly risky move that bit GM in the ass.
3. Confidentiality: The men who claim to have “inside” information about prior bad or dangerous or needlessly/unreasonably risky decisions by GM know who I am, they know how to reach me ([email protected]), they know my bona fides and qualifications (and I can provide references across the nation), and they know that, if they share verifiable information with me about prior bad acts, and they tell me that they want to remain confidential, I view myself as risking my own professional license if I turn around and violate that confidentiality deliberately. Given my licensing, I believe that I have a far, far more serious obligation to respect any agreed-upon confidentiality than even a reporter or journalist has. Therefore, the fact that not a single witness nor even a single iota of verifiable data or evidence has come to my attention that would suggest “prior dangerous or risky acts” (that I can then try to track down and verify) suggests to me that no such pattern of conduct exists. Everyone knows that I have no dog in this fight, and that my primary goals are to (a) help the folks in the community most directly impacted by the Yarnell Hill Fire get information and transparency so that they can try to process it and get some modicum of closure, and (b) help compile or unearth relevant information for purposes of current hotshots being able to learn all possible lessons from this tragedy to avoid similar tragedies in the future. Given these goals and given that I have a *provable* commitment to confidentiality, the fact that I have not heard a single tangible, non-anonymous thing about any sort of specific prior or pattern of dangerous/risky act(s) says something.
In a quasi-related vein, be aware that every single nationally-known audio forensics expert I have tracked down since Maclean’s, Neill’s, and Gabbert’s horrifying January 19th “news” blog came out has essentially confirmed my view that it is basically a fool’s errand to try to claim “conclusively” the types of things Maclean, Neill, and Gabbert published regarding the 161620 video clip and the Yarnell Gamble video clip. My professional view is that people who are otherwise viewed as credible regarding wildfires (e.g. Gabbert, Maclean, and Neill) have the OBLIGATION to be incredibly careful about publishing what they tout as “new” or “contrary” information, given the emotional toll such pronouncements can have on the grieving families and communities. I am still shaking my head over that debacle, and my heart goes out to the families of the GM guys. I would almost rather they have radio silence than be subject to the emotional roller-coaster of getting “new” and “contrary” information that they then later find out is neither new nor contrary.
If you watch this video, starting at the 2:43 point, tell me who’s buggies those are that almost got burnt up?
http://vimeo.com/48411010
Over on Wildfire Today, someone recently commented on an old thread about a video entitled “Everyone goes home – stories of the Storm King survivors.” It still is on the front page in the comments. The video is about 30 minutes long, but worth your time. It was made in 2012 I believe, and sounds a hopeful note about lessons learned that Yarnell Hill blew all to hell. But it is riveting for its description of the harrowing events. And to hear the superintendent of the Pineville Hotshots describe his feelings on realizing he had lost 9 of his crew – well I already said I would not want the job. He has lived with that for 20 years, and nothing will ever make it go away.
Mike, I’m afraid there are some nuances to my comment that I did not explain very well…or at all. In addition to the general problem that this format does not lend itself to this discussion as well as a face-to-face exchange of ideas would.
There is nothing in the conclusions I stated above that makes me (or I hope anyone else) think any less of Eric Marsh or Jesse Steed as the leaders of wildland firefighters, and those who were ultimately responsible for the safety of their crew. Just as the Pilot-in-Charge (PIC) is ultimately responsible for the safety of the aircraft under their command, or as you have pointed out, the Doctor-in-Charge is ultimately responsible for the patients under their care. I think we all accept the fact that Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed were ultimately responsible for the safety of their crew, that is the obvious factor and perhaps the most important one…but my goal here is to identify as many other casual factors as I can.
What I meant to say is that I do not believe that Eric Marsh, Jesse Steed and to some extent the squad bosses, and senior crew members on their crew believed that their maneuver would place the crew in imminent danger from the flaming front of the Yarnell Hill Fire. Although I’m sure they knew there was some element of risk to their plan, I believe they thought that risk was well within the limits of an acceptable risk, given that wildland firefighting is an inherently dangerous job.
The following is more or less what I think they thought at the time they chose to go down the chute where they ultimately perished.
1. They believed the fire was still moving in a primarily southeast direction directly towards Yarnell rather than burning rapidly in a southerly direction down the valley where it would ultimately intersect with them given their direction and rate of travel.
2. They agreed, decided, chose to go, to the backside of Yarnell to help with evacuations and begin engaging in structure protection even though they knew that was not a “proper” (for the lack of a better word) mission for a hand crew on foot equipped with only hand tools to be doing, especially under those circumstances and conditions. But they allowed themselves to be ordered, talked into, encouraged, strongly suggested to, that it would be a good thing to do under the circumstances to prove their worth to the Good Citizens of Prescott and the cities leaders to reduce the chances their program and jobs would not be axed.
3. They placed to high of a priority on protecting the structures in Yarnell, especially given the fact that very few people had bothered to be “fire wise” and clear a defensible space around their own structures. I believe this was in part due to their priority mission of creating defensible space around structures in Prescott when they weren’t fighting fire. I think this view of the world and their place in it was amplified because they worked for a structural firefighting organization that apparently placed a very high value on a running into burning buildings and laying down your life for structures because you believe that would be the right thing to do as Darrell Willis has repeatedly explained. Darrell Willis’ thoughts, values, and philosophies most certainly did play a very important and probably even a dominating role in creating their culture.
4. They experienced “tunnel vision” due in part to the rapidly escalating situation, the evacuation of Yarnell, and the calls for their help. Their perception of the danger they were actually in and their “situational awareness” (as explained by Dr. Ted Putnam in the “Collapse of Decision Making on Strom King Mountain”) was not able to keep pace with their rapidly changing environment, and the exponential growth of the danger they were actually in. In other words, they thought they could safely reach the ranch based on what they believed the direction and rate of spread of the fire was, rather than what it actually was.
5. They chose to go down the chute (even though chutes have a long and tragic history with wildland firefighters because they are natural chimneys for wildfires) because they believed it was the quickest way to reach the ranch and ultimately the backside of Yarnell where they could help with evacuations and begin structure protection and thereby reach Yarnell ASAP, as they were asked to do. Even though this was most likely not the case because the brush was so thick and the road ultimately curved around to the ranch. I believe this bad decision was caused in part because of their poor briefing, and the fact that no maps, shift plan or overall strategy had been developed to fight the fire. Everyone was going in different directions without any clear supervision or management, (such as the dumb ass from Oregon State Forestry dumb ass who unilaterally overruled a ground commander and dropped on their backfire). I think to say that the fire exceeded the fire’s management teams expectations is a gross understatement. Everything everyone did that day was in reaction to the fire. The fire and chaos was in charge and running the show, and nobody ever got a handle on what was actually happening in real time.
6. I don’t think the deaths of the Granite Mountain Hotshots were caused by any single factor, this tragedy was like almost all other tragedies, and it was a culmination of compounding, cascading, and successive bad decisions by a lot of people, many of which were beyond the comprehension of Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed given their positions and situation in a dynamic and rapidly escalating situation. In short, the management of the fire was a cluster **** from day one, and the Granite Mountain Hotshots and those who loved them paid the ultimate price, not only for their mistakes, but for everyone else’s mistakes as well.
And I believe Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed were squared away wildland firefighters who deserved better management and a better organization to work for other than the Prescott Fire Department.
First, in reference in Bob’s comment above, somehow I don’t think Eric Marsh was interested in advancement in the PFD. The idea that he would even want Willis’ job is almost funny. And the idea that the powers that be would have given it to him probably is too. Remember, his widow said he was 90% hotshot, that was what he wanted to do.
Gary, I can agree with virtually everything in the above comment. And the small things I might not totally agree with are debatable. I am done making comments about the errors that Granite Mountain might have made, I’ve already made too many. I think the people that matter will figure things out, no matter how useless the SAIR was. They were good men trying to do their best. And I know there are a lot of people that miss them very much.
I agree.
I have and still Agree with the same things that Gary stated in his above items.
I have said and will say again There were many factors that caused the fatalities.
They were my brothers as all Hot Shots current and passed and I morn there loss.
Mike-You know well as a Doctor the physical demands of a 43 year old get harder with every passing year. The job Marsh was in was more and more demanding every year. Most Hot Shots have moved on by the time they are 40 and 45 begins to push the limits for most. I am sure Marsh was starting to look for his next step no matter what that was, PDF or some where else. Having been there I can say time has a way of catching up with you. Leaving a job you love is never easy and assumed pressure to do so can way heavily on you. My thoughts.
So I guess 50 isn’t the new 30. No doubt Marsh was nearing the end as far as being a hotshot. He just did not seem to be the paper pusher type.
Mike –I can guarantee you that I was ready to retire at 50.
When I hit my 40’s I no longer was line overhead. I was still healthy as to day but 16 hour shifts and hiking mountains were getting old. As my Dr. always told me I did not take very good care of my body in the past. That’s also why it is mandatory age 55 retirement for wild Land Fire Fighters, or 50 with 25 years. At 50 I had 33 years. No 50 is not the new 30 maybe for a small few.
I posted that video on my FB about 2 weeks before Yarnell. Also posted a video of our yearly shelter deployment using an airboat to simulate the wind
As I have stated before, I worked for the federal government from 1974 – 2006, starting at the bottom of the pile and working up to where I could at least see the top of the pile. Throughout this process, I had just about every kind of supervisor personnel training materials prepare you to be, or prepare you for. In addition, I was a supervisor myself from the time I made hotshot squad boss until I retired as a Supervisory Criminal Investigator working for the USDI BLM Washington Office of Law Enforcement & Security.
That being said, I strongly agree with WTKTT’s assessment of the, “reading between the lines” of Darrell Willis’ narrative. I also agree with other former and current wildland firefighting employees that supervisors can range from marking everything with a mid level grade with a few exceptional marks to marking everything with exceptional marks with a few mid level grades. So not too much should be read into the letter or number grade. That is too easy and more or less automatic depending on the supervisor. In other words, a “mid level” grade from one supervisor can mean a lot more than an “exceptional” grade from another, and it easy to check the blocks. What is highly unusual based on my experiences, is the excessive (a lot more than should be expected) content, and the detail of the narrative. That is not “easy”, or “automatic” for a supervisor to do.
And I don’t think what I am writing here is unique to the federal government or to wildland firefighters. I think what I am saying is probably more or less the same no matter what profession you are in. Supervisors HATE to do employee appraisals and employees HATE to get employee appraisals.
What I do find very unique in the appraisal Willis gave to Marsh are the detailed specifics of the narrative. There are far more specifics in that narrative than I ever got, gave, saw, or heard about in any appraisal during my career, unless that employee (or I) was being put on “notice.”
I don’t know about everybody else out there is cyber space…but if I was Marsh and got his appraisal, I would think I had one foot out the door and the other one on a banana peel (as one of my BLM supervisors told me once, actually, several top managers told me more or less the same thing more than once, most notably, “Gary, you do good work…but you leave to many bodies on the trail!”) and I would start looking for another job, or writing a grievance.
In other words, and I don’t think this is too strong of a word, I am SHOCKED at what Willis wrote about, and to Marsh. It is hard for me to read the appraisal narrative in any other way than it was the first step in separating Eric Marsh from his employment with the City of Prescott, or at the very minimum as a “shot across his bow” that he needed to start playing the game according to former Chief and current Wildlands Division Chief Darrell Willis’ rules OR ELSE. And not only that, but that Division Chief Willis himself had also been put on notice by Chief Frajio, that he had better get a much shorter leash on Marsh because the city manager, mayor, city councilors, or all of the above were right on the verge of deleting the entire division because of Eric Marsh’s endless complaining, and repeated end-runs around them to personnel bitchin’ about crew benefits, and positions or the lack thereof, and implying, if not downright threatening, he was going to use their failure to meet minimum federal hot shot standards to up the ante.
I am willing to listen to everyone who has ever had a boss, or has ever been a boss, to weigh in on this issue. Like I have already said, I think the relationship of all supervisors and employees are more or less the same. What do you think? I don’t think I am giving some unique wildland firefighter inside opinion here.
I will tell you one unique wildland firefighter inside opinion here however. As I have previously stated in comments way-way-way back there, Darrell Willis and I were at one time “friends”, in a very loose sense of the word, and acquaintances in a more accurate sense, as we had mutual friends in the business, and I have a long history and association with Prescott. As you have probably already picked up, ex-hotshot crew bosses from my generation dominate the federal wildland firefighter management ranks (although more and more are retiring each day and have been for some years now), and I know or knew a lot of them, including Tony Sciacca from my days on the fire line.
So here is my inside information, since I am already on anybody who thinks Darrell Willis is a squared away wildland firefighter, and a credit to the wildland firefighter community Grade A **** list. Darrell Willis did not just retire as the Prescott Fire Department Chief, Darrell Willis retired from the Prescott Fire Department after he got cross-ways with the City Manager and was in effect “fired.” Being re-hired after his retirement and removal as fire chief is a typical “golden parachute” that was offered in exchange for his going quietly into the good night, which would allow for a smooth and controversy free transition to a new chief. And just for the record, I think that if I knew of the specifics of his removal, I would probably side with him, since it was probably some chicken-**** politics from some chicken-**** city manager, mayor or city council person that caused his removal, not because he was doing a bad job or had done anything wrong.
But here is my point in all of this blah, blah, blah. Darrell Willis was probably hyper-sensitive to city politics, and scalp hunting city managers, mayors or city council persons, both because of his normal survival instincts (he didn’t make Chief in the first place because he was tone-deaf to city politics) which were without a doubt magnified by his own personal experiences. And as I just want to AMPLIFY my agreement in the strongest possible way with WTKTT when he or she said, “Perhaps…. but perhaps a certain fair portion of the ‘situational stressors’ that were in play that day really have always been (and are, even now) just ‘hiding in plain sight.”
SOMEONE GIVE ME AN AMEN, CAN I GET AN HALLELUJAH? When it comes to pressure being on Darrell Willis, Eric Marsh, Jesse Steed, (and probably every senior crew member on the Granite Mountain Hotshots who was on the “inside” of crew politics) the day they walked in front of the flaming front of the Yarnell Hill Fire. My God…there is the answer why they went down that death chute in an effort to get to the backside of Yarnell to help with evacuations and begin structure protection in spite of their training, experiences and common sense!
And I want to weigh in on one more point in this discussion. Any talk or thoughts that Darrell Willis was “grooming” Eric Marsh to be his replacement is 100 percent BULL****! Let me state one more time. Darrell Willis retired (under duress) as the Prescott Fire Department Chief! He was than rehired at more than $90,000 a year to manage the Wildlands Division, which meant for the most part, supervising Eric Marsh and driving around in the new or nearly new extended cab pick-up truck the City of Prescott bought with grant money from Uncle Sam, had coffee with his buddies, played city politics as necessary, and ordered free stuff for the crew from a big book the USDA-Forest Service sent him that was paid for with the money they saved by implementing the Incident Command System (see my previous lengthy and somewhat bitter comment, although not for myself, I did very well in the system thank you, I was one of the very, very, very, few who did, not because I was such a great employee, I was just in the right place at the right time more than once, and I had a habit of swinging whatever tool a supervisor handed me as hard as I could until I was told to stop, and I got luckier than most, although I have noticed in life that the “harder I fish, the luckier I get.”) and eliminating a large percentage of their own professional wildland firefighting force.
Darrell Willis is NOT going to give that job up, until they carry him out in a pine box (or he gets fired, this time for real), he can’t retire a second time, and leaving that position will be a net loss of more than $90,000 a year, and he is a relatively young man. And given his history, I find it hard to believe he was getting ready to move up the departmental ranks into a higher position. Are you kidding me? He had already hit the retirement JACK POT AND LOTTERY COMBINED! Darrell Willis had already moved from being the Emergency Services Coordinator for the city, which was his original “golden parachute” job, at a salary of more than $120,000 a year to the Wildlands Division Chief job. Probably because all he had to do in his new job for the most part, was supervise Eric Marsh and drive around in the new or nearly new extended cab pick-up truck the City of Prescott bought with grant money from Uncle Sam, have coffee with his buddies, play city politics as necessary, and ordered free stuff for the crew from a big book the USDA-Forest Service sent him that was paid for with the money they saved by implementing the Incident Command System, and eliminating a large percentage of their own professional wildland firefighting force.
And in case anybody is wondering, “Why would somebody willing move from a job making more than $120,000 a year to one making “only” more than $90,000 a year?” Well it’s simple math. As the Wildland Division Chief, not only did he have to work less, and play far fewer city politics, he made a LOT MORE MONEY! Why? Because of the “Portal to Portal” (door to door, paid for 24 hours a day, not just when you are working) pay STRUCTURAL FIREMAN get (because of their strong unions and weak city leaders) whenever they go on wildland firefighting assignments, which if you are the Wildlands Division Chief, and your only jobs are, see my previous list, you can go ALL OF THE TIME, whereas the Emergency Services Manager has to stay in Prescott and more or less take care of business and the Citizens of Prescott.
Now…if I got any of that wrong, those of you out there who are more “in the know” than I am, can write in and correct me. And if anybody doesn’t like me jumping to conclusions out there in cyber space…tough. See my previous statements that referenced the fact that I had to care what everybody thought about everything for more than 30 years (and have my facts right all of the time) and now I don’t care what anybody thinks about anything. And if anybody wants to sue me, I live in Flagstaff, Arizona, and I will be easy to find (I stand out in most crowds, except for those of retired football linemen). I will be waiting for you. What happened to the Granite Mountain Hotshots really, really, really, makes me mad…and reckless.
Oh, and one more thing as long as I am sharing. I might as well tell you the second most notable thing a top BLM manager told me, “What are you going to do now Gary, call 60 Minutes?”
Actually, what I should have said is, “And if anybody doesn’t like me shootin’ from the hip out there in cyber space…tough. I can still add, and 2 plus 2 equals 4.” This isn’t a court of law, it’ a cyber blog.
Gary,
I do think there had been a big blow-up and I do think that employee evaluation was unusual. Reading it you can sense unresolved tension.
HOWEVER, the implications of the scenario you have laid out just tears me up inside. To imply that Marsh knew it was a bad call… He was not just responsible for his own life, but the lives of 19 others, many who were basically kids. With their whole lives in front of them, with their hopes and dreams, their wives, girlfriends, mothers, children. To say that Marsh put his own job ahead of that, or even the continued existence of the crew. Suffice it to say, if that is how it went down, the great sympathy I have had for Eric Marsh would vanish. I do not think that is what happened. From everything that has been said about him, Marsh had too much integrity to let that happen. Gary, what you have alleged would fit with the known facts, although we really do not have evidence for it at this time. But God, I hope you are wrong.
Mike— We have been saying for some time that Marsh took a calculated risk. He got away in the past with bad decisions with good out comes same thing. Pressure of his position in a small city Fire force not much room to advance and a whole lot of politics. What Gary said straight out is the facts with out any dressing. There is not many other ways you can explain it. It’s the shits– but why else do you violate every thing you have been taught and go were no one else would have gone?
If Marsh was not being groomed (your financial evaluation about Willis may be spot on), there is the possibility that there could be several reasons for the comments in the evaluation:
1) Willis let Marsh take the reins, but Marsh stirred up some higher up manager, who unlike most firefighters, has “feelings” and may not have appreciated truthful, to the point, blunt discussions. (WFF are a pretty rough bunch, as an occupation. Not known for their touchy feely people skills….)
2) Maybe Willis was trying to point these things out to Marsh , so that he (Willis) could do even less managing of the crew and spend more time hob-knobbing with politicians…
WHO KNOWS??? Hint… Willis does…
Several other points I have, this format for the forum is not friendly to going way way back up the thread to post comments that actually get read…
The 3 Div Sups that were ordered came on a forecasted need (They identified that it was gonna get bigger and more fireline positions would be required) It is not unusual, to be deployed to an incident as a certain capacity (DIV, for example) but when you arrive and get tossed into the mix, that the tentative organization chart has changed and you end up being a spare body. If you have other credentials (lets say HEQG supervisor) and one of those roles needs to be filled, Plans re-assigns you. I have been launched as an FBAN, but due to weather change, ended up being a DIV, and vice versa.
The other comment that I have to make is way up the page someone said “How can a fire just blow up like that when it seems to be contained on all 4 sides?” It is quite easy actually… Early, Mid or late morning, things are quiet and fairly benign… Humidities are higher, temperatures are lower and usually winds are less. The peak of the burning period is 16:00 hours.. That is usually when temperatures peak, humidities bottom out and winds (diurnals) usually are at their peak. Especially in extremely flashy fuels (like chaparral, etc) things can change in a matter of no time. Once a critical threshold has been crossed, aggressive fire behaviour can be seen.
Here in Canada we use the 30/30 cross. Other agencies call it the black cross or crossover. When your temperature is greater tahn your relative humidity, fire behaviour can be expected to become aggressive (without the wind factored in). So, when our temp reach 30 C (86 F) and relative humidity is less than 30% agressive fire behaviour may be observerved…. So when you look at the data for that day 104 F and 10% RH, its a no brainer that things are gonna get exciting… Now add in a wind of 10 or 20 miles and hour, plus the drought situation that the area has experienced, pretty easy to figure that if 1 juniper bush candles, tossing embers over teh “two trackroad” that you are back to square one.
The fire Commanders on this incident should have known, been informed, realized that there was potential for this fire to go rock and roll crazy, and adjusted their plans, resources and tactics accordingly..
WTKTT,
In regard to the June 30th Lewis Crew blunder, you posted something about the “beginning of the ‘second Yarnell Hill fire’…” There was NO second YHF, only the one. The fire names GENERALLY keep the original name, with very few exceptions. You don’t number them based on how many escapes you had. Sitta and I both pretty accurately recognized the potential for escape based on fuels and weather. And like I posted earlier, there would have been all kinds of radio chatter if they were doing a large burnout. It would have been (be) best to have interviewed the Lewis Crew.
RTS… roger that. I am with you. I think those of us posting
here just did what this free-form PUBLIC forum is meant to do.
We looked at whatever PUBLIC evidence is available
regarding a pretty important aspect of the incident, and we
discussed something calmly, gave our opinions, and it’s up to
others to now decide what they think.
After your comments ( and other comments) on this… I am less
inclined now to believe the ‘flare up’ WAS totally man-made.
All I know is something ‘strange’ happened on Saturday.
Whether it was man-made or totally natural causes… it’s
very weird that a fire that everyone seemed to think was
‘fully contained’ for multiple HOURS… to the point where
important resources were allowed to leave the area…
but then suddenly ‘flares up’ the way it did and even the
14 guys who were up there trying to ‘catch it’ were out of
chainsaw gas an no one seemed to be able to help them…
was an unusual event and it will forever be part of the ‘story’
of what happened in Yarnell that entire weekend.
As for my referring to what happened on Saturday as the
‘second Yarnell Hill fire’… you are also right. There was never
any ‘officially’ designated ‘second fire’. That is just my own
reference to what happened on Saturday… but I believe it’s
an accurate description. Everyone thought the ‘Yarnell Hill
Fire’ was pretty much a ‘done deal’ on Saturday ( for hours )
and then all of sudden… it wasn’t. There was a ‘second fire’ that
got away from them and then became the one everyone
was trying to fight on Sunday.
I do think there are ‘lessons to be learned’ from Saturday alone
that have been largely ignored so far.
Maybe someday we will know more about Saturday.
As it turns out… I was wrong about whether any Lewis
crew people were ever interviewed by anyone.
Some very important members of the ‘Lewis’ crew that were
up there all day ( and spent the night ) WERE, in fact,
interviewed by ADOSH ( but not the SAIT. AFAICT ).
There are actually records of these interviews taking place
at the TOP of the ADOSH report… but there is no real
indication in the report itself about what any of them really
had to say other than the general ‘the fire escaped’
summary similar to the other reports. No real details.
ADOSH also did, in fact, interview this ‘Justin Smith’ person who
was, in fact, the ICT4(T) Trainee handling things on Saturday.
Maybe one day those actual interviews conducted by a
PUBLIC taxpayer supported agency ( ADOSH ) will actually
be made available to the PUBLIC.
From the top of the ADOSH report…
** Interviews conducted by ADOSH…
ICT4(T) Justin Smith, Division Supervisor, Crew
Coordinator-AS PC Perryville;
Arizona Department of Corrections Interviews – AZDOC:
Sergeant Joe Barreras, assigned to Division Alpha, ASPC-Lewis
Inmate hand crew;
Correctional Officer II Leo Vasquez, assigned to Division Alpha,
ASPC-Lewis inmate hand crew;
Jake Guadiana, Crew Coordinator, assigned to Division Alpha,
Arizona State Forestry Division, ASPC-Lewis inmate hand crew;
Sergeant Chad Blackwell, Structure Group 2 resource (Double
Bar A Ranch, Model Creek Subdivision, Peeples Valley),
ASPC-Yuma inmate hand crew;
Sergeant Parker, assigned to Incident Command Post initially,
ASPC-Florence inmate hand crew;
Sergeant Paulson, Structure Group 2 resource (Double Bar A
Ranch, Model Creek Subdivision, Peeples Valley), ASPCGlobe
inmate hand crew.
There is also definite proof in the ‘Incident Logs’ that it was
Russ Shumate himself who wanted to hire Justin Smith
as an ICT4(T) trainee for Saturday.
The logs show Shumate REQUESTING Justin be hired as
ICT4(T), then it shows that order taking place, and then him
arriving at the fire and beginning work in that capacity.
Justin himself then appears in the logs handling resource
orders and whatnot.
There is even a moment in the logs when someone from
Dispatch with initials ‘CH’ is asking for a direct confirmation
from Shumate if Justin Smith is working the fire as ICT4(T)
trainee and Shumate VERIFIES this.
Justin disappears from the logs when things started to hit the
fan and Russ Shumate started ramping up the ordering
for Sunday.
From the Incident (Dispatch) Logs for Saturday…
http://www.azsf.az.gov/system/files/documents/files/Yarnell%20Hill%20Dispatch%20Log%207-5-2013.pdf
Entry Date/Time, From, To, Details
06/28/2012 19:19:21, RUSS, KM, INACTIVE, NOT MUCH OF A
THREAT. NOT TAKING ACTION TONIGHT. GIVE THE LEWIS
CREW THAT WE’RE GOING TO HAVE THEM IN PRESCOTT
AT 0800. AT MY OFFICE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.
ORDER JUSTIN SMITH AS AN ICT4(T).
06/28/2013 19:22:52, CH, JAKE, ORDERING LEWIS CREW TO
GO TO THIS INCIDENT BY 0800 TOMORROW AND MEET AT
RUSS’S OFFICE // COPY
06/28/2013 19:27:09, KM, JUSTIN, LEFT VM (Voice message)
06/28/2013 19:30:43, KM, JUSTIN, RUSS WOULD LIKE YOU
AT HIS OFFICE AT 0800 TO GO OUT AS AN ICT4(T). I’LL EMAIL
YOUR RESOURCE ORDER TONIGHT // OK
06/28/2013 21:05:48, Russ, WR, need Lewis to be @ Peeples
Valley Gas station @ 0800 and Yuma Crew to drive up around
0500 and be here @ Peeples Valley Gas Station and both
crews be double sack lunched // copy // also need Prescott
Armory open for both crews tomorrow and need Justin and Jake
here @ 0800 // copy we will call them and advise them.
06/29/2013 07:48:35, CH, 1-4, I HAVE YOUR SPOT WEATHER
FORECAST AND I HAVE A COUPLE QUESTIONS FOR
YOU // I’LL HAVE YOU READ THE FORCAST TO JUSTIN HERE
IN A MIN. // ARE YOU GOING TO BE THE IC FOR THIS FIRE
AND JUSTING FOR THE IC TRAINEE? // YES I WILL BE IC AND
JUSTIN AS IC TRAINEE // WHAT TIME DO YOU WANT THE
ARMORY AND FOR HOW MANY? // PLAN FOR 1900 AND
FOR ABOUT 40 COULD BE MORE OR LESS.
06/29/2013 09:08:45, JUSTIN, CH, WE NEED THE AIR TO
GROUND FREQ. // IT IS A/G 16 159.3450N Tone 192.8 Tx/Rx
06/29/2013 09:46:27, JUSTIN, CH, I’M GUNNA NEED AN S
NUMBER FOR THE GOLDEN CORRAL FOR 48 PEOPLE
FOR DINNER AND ALSO AN E NUMBER FOR THE PEOPLES
VALLEY TYPE 6 ENGINE WITH LIC# G583EZ, ENGB JAKE
MODOR // OK WE WILL CREATE THOSE ORDERS
06/29/2013 09:53:00, JUSTIN, RLH, REQUEST S# FOR ICE
AT THE MOUNTAINEERS MIN MART, PEOPLES VALLEY,
WILL CALL BACK HOW MUCH AND PAYMENT METHOD.
06/29/2013 10:21:17, JUSTIN, WALTER, 34 13 21.5N X 112 44
44.4W LANDING ZONE // COPY
06/29/2013 10:48:44 AA, ALH, H-4HX DROPPED 6 HELITACK
OFF 1/4 MILE FROM RIDGE TO HIKE IN. – WILL GET LAT/LONG
FROM HELITACK FOR LZ.
06/29/2013 10:56:38, AA, ALH, THE HELISPOT LOCATION
IS 34 14.11N X 112 47.64W
06/29/2013 18:13:32, WR, IC, DO YOU NEED JUST PAUL
( MUSSER ) OR DO YOU NEED MORE OVERHEAD? // 1 DIV 3
TASK FORCE // WHAT ABOUT GETTING A STATE TYPE 2
OR 3 TEAM // I’LL CALL JIM AND DISCUSS THAT
06/29/2013 19:04:25, NT, IC, ADVISED OF HALL, MUSSER
AND JIM CARLSON HEADING THAT WAY
06/29/2013 19:20:57, GEYER, NT, GO AHEAD AND GE JOKI
AND ALSO ORDER CLOSEST DIVS AND TFLD.
Reply to Sitta post on February 10, 2014 at 8:20 am
>> Sitta wrote…
>>
>> Mop up may take place on quiet sections of a large, uncontained fire.
>> Usually, though, the mop up phase doesn’t really begin until the whole fire
>> is lined. I was under the impression that on Saturday the crews were
>> still containing the fire (building line around it), not mopping up. Do the
>> details or records exist that can more clearly tell us what was actually
>> going on?
Not really. There are some vague descriptions and clues and, of course
the photographs from Saturday.
ALL of the official reports ( and SAIT interviewees ) agree that on Saturday
morning there was no visible fire, little or no smoke, and descriptions
vary from ‘Fire was very minor’ to ‘Fire showing no activity’ and ‘Fire
was only 2-4 acres’.
They all also agree that everyone assumed the fire was ‘contained on
all four sides’ and never grew in size all day… until it jumped the road.
The ONLY report that even mentions what the DOC Lewis crew’s actual
ASSIGNMENT was that morning is the ADOSH report which says this…
“At 1100 a BLM helicopter transported seven firefighters to the top of the ridge.
One helitack crew member and six DOC Lewis Crew firefighters hiked in the
rest of the way ( for a total of 14 firefighters there at the 2-4 acre fire site ) to
construct handline, cold trail and hot spot.”
So the words ‘mop-up’ are never specifically mentioned, but the actual
source for this quote and/or who ever said that was their actual
assignment is also not mentioned in the ADOSH report, or
anywhere else.
There was no documented Incident Action Plan that day where we might
be able to read what their ‘actual’ assignments were, and no one from
the actual DOC Lewis crew was ever interviewed by any official entity.
BELOW is a ‘synopsis’ from ALL the official reports and the SAIT investigation
notes that only pertain to Saturday morning, what everyone thought the situtation
was, and then on through the moment in the afternoon when the fire suddenly
‘jumped the jeep road’.
Things to NOTE in the ‘synopsis’ below…
** A TRAINEE WAS IN CHARGE ON SATURDAY?
It was the SAIT interview with Nate Peck, ICT4 and FFT1 with Moki Helitack
NE Washington; Coleville NF assistant Engine Operator
that says ( on Sauturday morning )…
“Fire at the time was very minor. Perfect fire for an ICT5 trainee.”
…and then goes on to say that later on, after the fire escaped,
the ‘trainee’ was asking for Nate to ‘take over and cover OPS’.
** DEAN FERNANDEZ (BLM) WANTED CHOPPER / PUMPKIN SUPPORT
Dean Fernandez ( BLM rep ) was the one who saw the need for
more chopper water dumps to ‘get it over with’… and he tried
to get a ‘pumpkin’ set up since the only chopper there could
only carry 50 gallons… but it never happened. He asked Shumate,
at one point if Shumate wanted him to ‘take over the fire’ and
Shumate’s only response was “Why… am I doing something wrong?”
** JUSTIN SMITH (ASFD) WAS DIVSUP FOR THE (DOC) LEWIS CREW
Oddly enough… only the WFAR report mentions who was (supposedly)
actually in charge of that (DOC) Lewis Crew out there on Saturday.
By ‘odd’ I mean that the WFAR report was contracted by ADOSH and
the WFAR report does mention him… but the actual ADOSH report does not.
Here is exactly what the WFAR report says about ‘Justin Smith’…
“( Shortly after jumping the jeep road )… The Yarnell Hill Fire was (then)
estimated at six acres by ASFD Crew Coordinator Justin Smith who was
assigned by Shumate as the Division Supervisor for the crew on the hill.”
**
** SYNOPSIS FOR SATURDAY FROM ALL FROM OFFICIAL REPORTS
**
** From the SAIR ( page 12 )…
Saturday, 29 June 2013
ICT4 assesses the fire then reports to Dispatch that little smoke is showing and
they will drop retardant to hold the fire until crews arrive. At 0651, he requests
two Single Engine Airtankers (SEATs). They arrive mid-morning and drop fire
retardant on the south and west flanks until about noon, each making two
retardant drops.
Just before 1100, a BLM helicopter transports seven firefighters to within one
quarter mile of the ridge. The one helitack and six Department of Corrections
firefighters hike in the rest of the way to construct handline ( for a total of
14 firefighters there at the 2-4 acre fire site ).
The fire is holding on all four sides and none of the other starts from the day
before shows smoke.
At 1442, ICT4 advises Dispatch he is releasing Air Attack.
At 1540, he releases the BLM brush engine and a local Peeples Valley fire engine,
because the multiple fire starts he had expected do not materialize. ICT4 releases
the two SEATs for new assignments and the State of Arizona Aviation Officer
orders them to reposition to the Wickenburg SEAT Base.
( Two hours after releasing Air Attack… )
The fire eventually jumps the two-track road ( circa 1630 ) on the east flank
and grows to about six acres by late afternoon.
** From the ADOSH report…
At 1100 a BLM helicopter transported seven firefighters to the top of the ridge.
One helitack crew member and six DOC Lewis Crew firefighters hiked in the
rest of the way ( for a total of 14 firefighters there at the 2-4 acre fire site ) to
construct handline, cold trail and hot spot.
At approximately 1225, Shumate reported that the fire size was
(only) about two acres.
At 1442, Shumate released the Air Attack and the SEATS
due to the fire holding on all four sides.
At 1540, Shumate released the BLM brush engine and a local Peeples
Valley fire engine due to the lack of multipie fires.
At 1630 ( 2 hours after releasing the SEATs ), the fire jumped the two-track jeep road.
** From the WFAR… ( NOTE: Almost word for word same as ADOSH )
At 1100, a BLM helicopter transported seven firefighters to the top of the ridge.
The one helitack and six DOC Lewis Crew firefighters hiked in the rest of
the way into the fire ( for a total of 14 firefighters there at the 2-4 acre fire site ).
At approximately 1225, the ICT4 (Shumate) reported the fire size was
(only) about two acres.
At 1442, the ICT4 released the ATGS and the SEATs because the fire was
holding on all four sides.
At 1540, the ICT4 released the BLM brush engine and a local Peeples Valley
fire engine that were being held in the event any new fires from the lightning
on June 28 appeared.
At 1630 ( 2 hours after releasing the SEATs ), the fire jumped the two-track jeep road.
The Yarneil Hill Fire was (then) estimated at six acres by ASFD Crew Coordinator
Justin Smith who was assigned by Shumate as the Division Supervisor for the
crew on the hill. At some point near this time Shumate learned that the Lewis
Crew was out of chainsaw gas which seriousiy hindered their ability to be
effective in chaparral.
** From SAIT Interview notes ( regarding Saturday, June 29, 2013 )…
Interview with Dean Fernandez ( BLM rep )…
Saturday morning went to Weaver Mtn Helibase and went in the helo and
scouted the fire, it looked good, innocent. They landed ( at the Yarnell
Fire Station ) and picked (DOC) people up and took the crew members
out ( to the fire ). I ( Dean ) was acting as a Rep and suggested several times
to get a pumpkin set up, but it wasn’t happening… later on the fire picked up
which was a surprise. It jumped the line,
Interview with Nate Peck, ICT4 and FFT1 with Moki Helitack NE Washington;
Coleville NF assistant Engine Operator…
On the morning of the 29th we were up in Payson for severity.
Flew to Weaver Mountain helibase.
Plan was heli for overhead recon.
Fire at the time was very minor.
Making contact w/ IC in Yarnell, requests placement of firefighters on the fire.
He gets dropped off at helispot around 1000.
Informed of 3 loads of firefighters coming up and he was to stay w/ the crew to assist.
By 1030 everyone on the hill. Little to no activity on the fire.
Perfect fire for an ICT5 trainee.
About 1330/1345 picked up a little spot
Spot is building rapidly around 1445 no more shuttles.
Crew boss states that he will act as DIVS because of activity.
FL of 10-20ft hoping that jeep trail will hold the fire.
AA comes with SEATS as 1st load of Moki Helitack arrive.
Fire is just walking down the slope, very intense burning SE winds, trying to
hold SE corner.
Name of IC? Yarnell Hill IC, no name never knew the IC’s name.
(Must have been Russ) this is around 1630.
Phone call to IC, answered by IC trainee.
Still fussing about air tankers, go by title of
DIVS A to talk to AA. Size 10-20 acres. Winds still out of SE, fire backing.
Lots of radio traffic, lookout helping him w/ communication.
IC trainee show up, wants him to cover Ops.
Nate said no, keep process simple.
Stayed on the clock with crew all night. I have struggled with the IC and process.
AA on scene @ 0730, helo on @ 0800 config for back haul.
Shuttles started ( removing crew from ridge ) soon after.
Started running retardant on SE corner.
He and IC trainee to go out ( back to Yarnell ) on last load.
Heard conversation of GM hiking in, saw someone standing by sling location.
Thought he spoke w/ Eric Marsh at that time he was asking excellent questions about conditions.
Someone made the comment that he’s really on it.
Mentioned that the fire had really blown up yesterday afternoon.
Interview with Russ Shumate…
Two crews ordered for next morning.
Inmates – planned for day shift
0700 (Saturday) Back in Yarnell – no smoke showing. No smoke from FS.
AA from Tonto – Sized up fire, no smoke
To fire – 1 helitack type 4 – 2 AFS crew boss, crew boss(t) – 4 inmates
Size up – not much heat – can cold trail
About 1400 – getting creep on the west side
Can handle – moving that way
Helicopter could only get about 50 gals to the fire. Asked “do we want retardant?”
More creep moving – do we need retardant or water:
Plan to fly six helitacks/12 bladder bags to fire.
Pocket to eastside spreading possible spot hiking
Guy on spot picked up by helo
13 guys spent night on fire
Approximately 10-15 acres at sunset
Didn’t get helicopter from Prescott due to weather.
About 2-3 fires spots across the road.
Interview with Darrell Willis…
Russ said they thought fire was done deal ( on Saturday), then fire got out and
he was unsure where it was.
Heard rumor that the crew fired about on mile of line.
>> Sitta also wrote…
>>
>> It would be very easy to get an unexpected burst of activity in the
>> Yarnell fuels, even without any wind. Perhaps some duff ten feet into
>> the interior was smoldering, the embers crept into a nice pocket of
>> loose, light material right under some oak, and whoosh — suddenly
>> you have twenty foot flames. Those flare ups create their own little
>> convection currents, which can carry burning leaves across a road.
>> ( Another reason why even informal lookouts are important! )
Well… unless it can be proven that the Lewis crew really did try to do
some ‘burnoff’ of their own down to the jeep road ( and screwed it up )
then that pretty much HAS to be explanation for the beginning of the
‘second Yarnell Hill fire’…
…the one they ended up fighting on Sunday, June 30, 2013 ).
Marti Reed on February 4, 2014 at 11:16 pm said:
“I believe those of us who have contributed mucho mucho time out of out lives need to figure out how to make this relevant in order to make sure all this work isn’t wasted. And I, frankly, don’t know how to do that. But I am not evenly remotely going to connect another damn dot until we find a way to make sure our work isn’t being done in vain.”
Marti, (in case you are still reading here) THANK YOU for all you’ve done. You deserve to try to get back to work (as I have been). Your work will not go away.
I’m not really sure what to do with all of this, myself. I hope WTKTT is right (“this is not going away.”) But what it will take to motivate the agencies to make changes — I have no idea. All I can think of is to: A) nudge my legislators toward sane fire policy — I can do this, being in a western state; B) keep the discussion factual and relevant during our wildland fire training sessions; C) bring our concerns up with all my coworkers and supervisors, and network with others I find who don’t want to let this go; and D) be open to any opportunities that arise to take this further. If there does end up being any groundswell of interest, this forum (and your research, Marti) will be an excellent resource.
That said, I remain frustrated. I worry that this incident (and the SAIT) will lead our wildland fire culture in the direction of complacency instead of better practices. We will never feel as shocked by the deaths of 19 hotshots again. Will we just adjust to a new reality, and accept firefighter deaths every summer? The nation seems to have adjusted to a new normal of perpetual deployment in the Middle East, and the deaths that come with that. We go about our lives and try not to think about it too much.
How do I know we won’t just accept firefighters dying to save houses in the WUI every year, and get used to the funerals, and the heroes in the obituaries, until it’s not even newsworthy anymore? The SAIT implies that these things just happen. I know we all disagree with that conclusion here, but I’m not hearing it protested enough elsewhere.
My only comfort is that the work done here will not go away. I won’t forget what I’ve picked up here. And if there ever is a USFS or BLM research team, or some other safety oriented group with a bit of clout and a mandate, there is a lot they can learn on this forum.
Wow…Amen, I couldn’t have said it better. Thank you.
Reply to mike post on February 7, 2014 at 12:06 am said:
>> mike said…
>>
>> Obviously there was tunnel vision in play that day.
>> The ultimate tunnel vision had to be in how the behavior of that fire
>> was assessed.
>> …
>> Why the tunnel vision?
>> …
>> Was it due to external pressure from above, the pressure of the culture
>> of the PFD, or was it just a bad read?
>> …
>> Trying to identify all the stressors that lead WFF to have tunnel vision
>> may be an enormous task.
Perhaps…. but perhaps a certain fair portion of the ‘situational stressors’ that
were in play that day really have always been ( and are, even now ) just
‘hiding in plain sight’.
Example: I’m not sure a lot of people have ever really read Darrell Willis’
entire ‘Employee Evaluation Report’ on Eric Marsh, written and signed
by both men on May 3, 2013… just 57 days before they would both find
themselves working in DIVS/OPS level positions on the same fire in
their own backyard ( The Yarnell Hill Fire ).
Likewise… I don’t think a lot of people have ever really read Eric Marsh’s
own ‘Employee Self Evaluation Report’ written in response to Willis’
evaluation on the same day in May… just 57 days before Yarnell.
They are both fascinating documents and tell you a LOT about the real
employer/employee relationship between these two men and the
PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS that were DIRECTLY imposed
on Marsh just 57 days before Yarnell.
I don’t think many people have read the entire documents because they
are simply ‘photographs’ taken of the documents themselves and they
have never been ‘searchable’ PDF files or valid scanned images.
On page 2 of Willis’ evaluation… someone’s THUMB is even photographed
in the top left, just holding the document in front of a camera.
So for the sake of making these 2 documents ‘searchable’ and recorded
somewhere other than deep in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package… Below is
a ‘searchable’ TEXT version of both of those documents.
** SUMMARY OF THE DOCUMENTS
NOTE: Opinions expressed are my own. Your mileage may vary.
The ‘itemized’ checkbox section for Marsh was filled out by Willis with
mostly the ‘Exceeds standards’ checkbox choice… ( basically an ‘A’ grade ),
but out of the 34 separate line items that Willis was ‘grading’ Marsh on
Willis obviously chose to give Marsh the inferior ‘Meets standards’
choice ( basically a ‘B’ grade instead of an ‘A’ ) only 5 times.
So Willis basically gave Marsh 29 ‘A’ grades… and just 5 ‘B’ grades.
Those 5 ‘B’ grades are actually pretty ‘telling’ about what was going on
between these 2 men because they are all pretty ‘similar’ and it seems
obvious what Willis was telling Marsh he needs to ( in Willis’ opinion )
‘work on’ in the coming year.
Those (only) 5 ‘B’ grades Willis gave Marsh are the following…
Communicates effectively ( verbal and written ) – M
Analyzes decision before acting – M
Willingly cooperates with co-workers and members of management – M
Adapts to and supports change in a positive manner – M
Communication with staff is timely, clear, and continuous – M
So I think that makes it pretty clear that while Willis was NOT totally
‘dissatisfied’ with his employee Eric Marsh… he was also clearly
indicating that HE thinks Marsh has ‘communication’ issues ( with HIM
and others ) and that Marsh needs to not ‘knee-jerk’ in some of his
decision making and then refuse to listen to / cooperate with (quote)
‘members of management’.
Willis goes on to pretty much clarify that is what he meant in the checkbox
section with the following statement/directive in the ‘comments’ section….
“I would like to be involved up front on all planned events that the crew is
involved in to add my expertise to ensure that the event goes off in an
excellent manner.”
So Willis is implying that some other ( recent? ) ‘events’ that the GM crew
were involved with ( fireline events? ) did not ‘go off in an excellent manner’
( according to Willis’ definition ) and Willis believes it was because he
wasn’t ‘in the loop’ and being consulted about what they were doing.
That sounds like a pretty heavy directive.
Paraphrased…
“I am your boss and I’m unhappy with some decisions you have made
on your own so please consult with ME FIRST from now on.”
or… even simpler…
“I don’t fully trust your decision making. Talk to me first from now on
so I can ‘add MY expert input’ to (all) your decision making.”
Again… that’s pretty heavy stuff and creates an obvious level of distrust
and a clear expectation that this employee needs to be running his
future ‘decision making’ through this employer.
Willis doesn’t even stop there.
He immediately ALSO tells Marsh that he apparently doesn’t trust all of
his specific decision making with regards to STAFFING issues, either.
Willis immediately adds…
“I am requesting that you notify me anytime you need assistance from HR on
hiring issues and that all inquiries that are made to HR are run through me first.”
Again… pretty heavy ( and specific ) stuff.
Willis is telling Marsh that ALL INQUIRIES made to ‘Human Resources’,
specifically, are ALSO now to ALWAYS go through HIM FIRST.
He doesn’t want Marsh going ‘behind his back’ anymore ( as Marsh apparently
had already done at some point ) over the whole Granite Mountain full-time or
seasonal staffing issues. ( E.g – The Robert Caldwell benefits issue ).
Again… adds even another level of ‘tension’ between Willis and Marsh
just 57 days before Yarnell.
Then Willis says this which actually foreshadows part of what was GOING
to happen just 57 days later in Yarnell…
“I also would like you to begin the mentoring of Jesse Steed as your
replacement giving him opportunities and the freedom to lead the crew
and you take a more hands off approach.”
Unless there was already a ‘promise’ between these two men ( Willis and
Marsh ) that Marsh would be transitioning into either Willis’ job, or some
other capacity at PFD… then this sounds an awful lot like a ‘for the sake
of the department and the division please make sure you are replaceable’
sort of ‘gentle’ warning.
NOTE: After the incident… Willis DID say in public that he, himself, had been
‘mentoring’ Marsh as his replacement…. but there is no other real
documented evidence of that and Willis’ statement to Marsh documented
above was 57 days BEFORE the Yarnell fire. Was this ‘mentoring’
agreement ( and the implied automatic promotion ) already FULLY verbalized
AND understood between these two men on May 5, 2013, at the time this
documented exchange took place?
Willis ends his ‘comments’ with another BIG (two-part) warning to Marsh…
“Finally, I believe it is imperative for you to maintain a positive attitude
in everything you do, you have 20 people looking for leadership everyday, the
department is looking at our Division everyday and the City as a whole is
evaluating our performance, goals and service. we need to lead up front and
realize the Division’s future is in our hands.”
** Part one of this two-part warning from Willis to Marsh…
“Work on your attitude. No negativity ( as I have seen lately ).”
** Part two of this two-part warning from Willis to Marsh…
“Not only am I going to be watching YOU… the entire Department and City of
Prescott itself is closely watching BOTH of us and the actual PERFORMANCE
of this Wildland Division. The future of the whole thing depends on YOU
and ME now. Let’s PERFORM! ( …but don’t forget to run your decision
making through me, as I already requested above ).”
Again… this is just 57 days before Yarnell.
So… the 64 dollar question…
Does everything documented above, just 57 days before Yarnell, amount
to Eric Marsh being a man who felt he was now being ‘closely watched’
by his direct supervisor… AND by the entire City and Department he
worked for… and who was TOLD by his direct supervisor ( Willis ) to
‘run all your decision making through ME from now on’?
Are these ‘stressors’ that MIGHT have been fully in play on June 30, 2013,
with BOTH of these men actually working the SAME FIRE at an
operational / command level?
I think, at the very least, it documents an ‘odd’ employer/employee
relationship that had devolved into a fair level of MISTRUST… but the
direct supervisor was trying to get a handle on that with direct
requests to ‘run your decision making through me, please’.
The tragedy of the Yarnell Hill Fire is still deeply rooted in ‘decision making’,
and who did or did not PARTICIPATE in that fateful decision making that day.
Here are the ( searchable ) TEXT versions of both of those ‘photographed’
original documents in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package…
*** DARRELL WILLIS’ EMPLOYEE EVALUATION FOR ERIC MARSH
***
*** MAY 3, 2013 – 57 DAYS BEFORE THE YARNELL FIRE
Document in SAIT FOIA/FOIL package: ASF000042-INV to ASF000384-INV.pdf
Page 250 ( of 343 pages )
City of Prescott
Handwriting: 1051 230
Stamp: MAY 13, 2013
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
EMPLOYEE NAME: Eric Marsh
DEAPARTMENT: Fire/Wildland
POSITION TITLE: Superintendent
SUPERVISOR NAME: Darrell Willis
EVALUATION PERIOD: 04/10/12 – 04/10/13
EVALUATION TYPE: Annual
RATINGS E=Exceeds Standard M=Meets Standard I=Improvement Needed
* Quality and Quantity of Work
Thoroughness and accuracy of work – E
Being proactive – E
Prioritizes and meets established deadlines – E
Communicates effectively ( verbal and written ) – M
Adheres to safety programs and assigned tasks – E
* Dependability / Attendance
Demonstrates reliability and responsibility by following a job
through to completion – E
Takes responsibility for a job – E
Reports to work on all scheduled days, adheres to break and meal schedule – E
Begins work, meetings and appointments on time – E
Provides appropriate notice when requesting time off or calling in sick – E
* Core Beliefs
Acts with integrity – E
Works as a team – E
Personal commitment and loyalty – E
Solves problems – E
Takes pride in excellent results – E
High level of productivity – E
Being nice – E
* Decision Making / Initiative / Problem Solving
Performs with minimal supervision – E
Analyzes decision before acting – M
Looks for better ways to perform job – E
Appropriately utilizes resources – E
Makes practical, routine decisions – E
* Teamwork and Interpersonal Relationships
Willingly cooperates with co-workers and members of management – M
Treats others with respect and consideration – E
Demonstrates support for the City, department mission, and policies – E
Accepts constructive criticism positively – E
Adapts to and supports change in a positive manner – M
* Supervisory Positions Only
Evaluations are accurate description of employee behavior and are
completed on time – E
Communication with staff is timely, clear, and continuous – M
Monitors work of direct reports to ensure quality standards are met – E
Gives specific and constructive feedback to expand on professional
development – E
Consistently and creatively demonstrates appreciation for a job well done – E
Leads in a way that promotes a positive work environment – E
Empowers others to make decisions and suggest changes – E
* Goals / Objectives Met
All met.
* Goals / Objectives for Next Evaluation Period
1. Build capacity and succession plan for GMIHC to maintain NWCG qualifications
if any FTE ( Full Time Employee ) leaves.
2. Continue to develop relationships, teamwork and cohesiveness with all
department divisions and personnel.
3. Develop a fuels treatment plan that includes how and when fuels projects will
be completed based upon grant requirements.
4. Support fire administration and City leaders on decisions related to staffing and finances.
5. Continue to learn and implement all budgeting and financial processes.
* Summary of Performance by Evaluator
Eric, 2012 and the beginning of 2013 has been a challenging and exciting time for
the Wildland Division. You have weathered the storm and kept the Division intact.
You have done a great job with the budget this year, the crew is intact with a major
disruption in staffing just a few days prior to the seasonal firefighters starting.
This issue shows the resilience of the you and the Division to meet the challenge.
I would like you to work on some things that can use improvement this year.
I would like to be involved up front on all planned events that the crew is involved
in to add my expertise to ensure that the event goes off in an excellent manner.
I am requesting that you notify me anytime you need assistance
from HR on hiring issues and that all inquiries that are made to HR are run through
me first. I also would like you to begin the mentoring of Jesse Steed as your
replacement giving him opportunities and the freedom to lead the crew and you
take a more hands off approach. I would also like you to put together a succession
plan that addresses the succession of all FTEs within the crew. Eric, one area
that I sense some frustration in is the area of staffing of two lost positions. Chief
Fraijo, you and I have done everything we can to address this issue, we have spent
a lot of time and energy trying to fill the positions, it is now time to let the system
work, realize that we have done our best and make the best of the situation.
I appreciate how you have reached out to the other Divisions within the
department and are trying to integrate the Wildland Division into the department
as a whole, this is going to be a long process, please continue leading out in
this area. Finally, I believe it is imperative for you to maintain a positive attitude
in everything you do, you have 20 people looking for leadership everyday, the
department is looking at our Division everyday and the City as a whole is
evaluating our performance, goals and service. we need to lead up front and
realize the Division’s future is in our hands. Thank you for another exceptional
year.
* Signatures
Employee Signature and Date
Eric Marsh – 05/03/13
Supervisor Signature and Date
Darrell Willis – 05/03/13
Department Head Signature and Date
Dan Fraijo – 05/09/13
Employee signature indicates that this appraisal has been reviewed and
discussed and does not necessarily indicate agreement with the contents.
*** ERIC MARSH’S OWN EMPLOYEE SELF APPRAISAL DOCUMENT
***
*** MAY 3, 2013 – 57 DAYS BEFORE THE YARNELL FIRE
Document in SAIT FOIA/FOIL package: ASF000042-INV to ASF000384-INV.pdf
Page 252 ( of 343 pages )
City of Prescott
EMPLOYEE SELF APPRAISAL
EMPLOYEE NAME: Eric Marsh
DEPARTMENT: Fire
POSITION TITLE: Superintendent
EVALUATION TYPE: Annual
* Summary of workplace accomplishments performed over the year
Successful recruitment and training for the 2012 and 2013 season. Safe and
successful season. Accomplished a lot of crew member training objectives.
Met projected targets for the fuels program/grants. Continued to provide
succession training to crewmembers. Continued my own succession training.
Provided the City/Department with training and manpower to meet multiple objectives.
* Greatest workplace challenges over the last year
It is challenging to run a nationally recognized program with minimum standards
and requirements that I am unable to meet. It is frustrating when I know that I have
the answers to anyone’s questions about the program but can’t communicate with
the decision makers to engage in an educational dialogue. I believe things are
starting to change, however I still have some big questions that need answering
about staffing.
* Provide an assessment of your success in reaching the goals set at
* the beginning of the evaluation period.
I have continued my training with the Wildland Division budget and other
administrative duties. I was able to oversee a successful fuels program
that got more crew members involved in ownership of the program.
* Do you have any suggestions for the Department / City to consider for
* streamlining processes or improving efficiency?
I feel that encouraging by-in of the current direction the department is going will
foster a supportive and productive work environment. Supervisor training for
effective performance evaluations would be nice.
* Additional Employee Comments
I am encouraged by many things that are taking place organizationally.
It is always easier to weather the storm if there is support and shared vision.
* Signatures
Employee Signature and Date
Eric Marsh – 05/03/13
Supervisor Signature and Date
Darrell Willis – 05/05/13
I would be careful about reading too much into this document. Different bosses handle these things differently, and a document where everything is marked excellent is usually worthless. I have no doubt there was some tension, but I think it was likely around staff and benefits issues. Marsh I suspect had taken these matters into his own hands, and probably pissed some people off, and Willis had to smooth it over. My gut tells me this was not about fireline issues that Willis was asking Marsh to run by him.
The “M” rating that might stand out is “analyzes decision before acting”. Hard to know what Willis was referring to here. Also hard to know how much thought Marsh put into that decision that day. Was it a rash decision, or did he think about it, but came to the wrong conclusions? We do hear him discussing it with Steed apparently, so maybe it was the latter.
I agree, with only 3 choices. Excellent, Meets or Improvement, there is a huge range of actual assessment.
Even if Marsh had every single one of his tick boxes as a “meets requirements”, that would not be a red flag..
That’s true… but even with no obvious ‘red flags’
in that evaluation ( Williis was generally pleased
with Marsh, fer sure ) there is still, I think an
obvious ‘message’ that Willis was trying to convey
to Marsh.
It’s not that Willis only chose to give Marsh a
‘B’ grade out of the 34 possible ‘A’ grades…
It’s the fact that those 5 ‘B’ grades were all
‘of a kind’ and had shared implications.
Attitude, decision making, respect for management.
Backed up by Willis’ direct comments about
those same things… I think there was a clear
‘message’ being sent to Marsh…
…just 57 days before the Yarnell incident.
mike… totally agree. This was generally an ‘excellent’
employee review… but I don’t think I am ‘reading too much
into it’. What I see there is a not-so-subtle message
coming OUT of the document.
I think it’s pretty obvious Willis was using this once-a-year
opportunity to send Marsh a pretty clear ‘message’, also
knowing that Chief Dan Fraijo would be reading it.
Willis even addresses Chief Fraijo directly in his
comment section ( and not Marsh ) since Willis KNEW
that the Chief would be reading what he was saying
to Marsh. Willis turned it into a ‘three-way’ conversation.
I’m also going to disagree that Willis’ direct
request / directive to Marsh to ‘run your decision making
through me from now on’ was all about the obvious
‘behind the back’ incident with regards to benefits for
the full-time employees. ( Ashcraft, etc. ).
My reasoning there is that Willis directly related that
‘directive’ to something that Willis says resulted in
‘less than excellent performance because I wasn’t
in the loop’.
I’m not sure some background frap about Marsh
contacting Human Resources directly over a
benefits issue would have generated this ‘excellent
performance’ concern that Willis was talking about.
That ‘excellent performance’ part of Willis’ directive
seems to suggest he was more concerned about
something that happened ‘in the field’ that he felt
didn’t result in the ‘excellent performance’ he ( Willis )
was ‘expecting’ from the entire GM outfit, or something.
So you may be right… all the ‘run things through me
from now on’ MAY have been all administrative stuff…
…but I’m left with a nagging feeling about that
‘excellent performance’ thing meaning that Willis wanted
to be ‘included in decisions from now on’ that were
going to be taking place while the crew was actually
‘on the job’ somewhere (like Yarnell… only 57 days later?).
Although I wish there were great insights to be revealed in employee evaluations, I’d suggest you take the scores with a grain of salt. I went through a string of supervisors who just gave everyone straight 3’s, because it was easier and quicker. I was fairly shocked the first time I had an evaluation with anything else.
Also, supervisors and hires are supposed to go through the expectations at the beginning of each employment period, then the evaluation at the end. In my experience, this rarely happens (I’ve had the “expectations” review perhaps twice, and have had to bug supervisors to give me my evaluation before leaving). Don’t trust any signature dates on an evaluation form. 😉
However, the narrative is interesting. I’m impressed that Willis took the time to write it, and to include such specific recommendations and future goals. Two themes that resonate in both Willis and Marsh’s texts are Marsh’s frustration with lack of support from above (by the “decision makers”) and keeping the crew intact and qualified. If Prescott is hoping to have another hotshot crew, I’d want to make sure these issues were addressed.
It also remains VERY interesting that Marsh, himself, did
NOT say it was ‘difficult’ to meet the ‘minimum’ standards
for his organization…
…Marsh specifically says his ‘challenge’ was that he
was UNABLE to meet those ‘minimum standards’.
That remains pretty much an admission, in writing, that
Eric Marsh KNEW that Granite Mountain was ‘faking it’,
(in some way)… even just 57 days before Yarnell.
Yes… I know… all of that was ( supposedly ) looked at
and all the ‘qualifications’ were ( supposedly ) met
( on paper, anyway ) …but there is still ( and always
will be ) that statement from Marsh himself…
Eric Marsh – May 3, 2013 ( 57 days before Yarnell )…
“It is challenging to run a nationally recognized program
with minimum standards and requirements that I am
UNABLE to meet.”
Investigations Basics 101: Never ignore a credible whistleblower. NEVER.
Marsh was whistleblowing in this performance evaluation. I have no doubt about that.
I think that employee evaluation was a
‘two way warning’. Willis was trying to
‘warn’ Marsh that if it didn’t cool it with all
the calls to Human Resources behind
Willis’ back… and include Willis in more
of the ‘decision making’… there was
gonna be trouble…
…but Marsh countered with his ‘challenge’…
that he was being asked to maintain a
group that had national ‘minimum’ standards
that he was UNABLE to meet… and if
that didn’t resolve soon… well… there
was gonna be trouble coming from his
direction a well.
It was all very friendly… but the messages
( in both directions ) were clearly there…
…just 57 days before Yarnell.
Good points, both of you. I was overlooking them.
Elizabeth—574 Delta could have been the converted crop duster that the now use as a small Air Tanker I saw it in 1 of the early pictures that GM took. It may be the one that was dropping on there line firing early in the day. It would probably be in the early IA orders and a close air port Air Tanker contract Like Prescott ? Maybe not the Id number you are looking for.
WTKTT— The positions above that you refer to as Hired are actualey resource ordered overhead. The only hired people on fires are contractors like equipment, Fire camp cooking units There are some contract crews for fire camp jobs.
Also the FS people you speak of would have been in pay status when they left there home base and stayed on pay until the fire finance put them off duty or off shift. If they were on the Fire Line as it sounds they were on duty.
They would also be qualified for lower assignments if they were Division Bosses,
Strike team Leaders—( Cats, Engines, Crews or a combination ).
Hope that helps it dose not sound like they had a specific assignment.
Mr. Powers… thanks.
Yes… it sounds like Hulburd, Clawson and Yowell just sort of
got ‘caught in the confusion’ between the Type 2 team and the
ordering of the Type 1 team. When Roy Hall asked Bea Day
to just ‘get him some people’ from Prescott early on Sunday,
even he didn’t know that he would be ordering a Type 1 team
just a few hours later.
By the time these fellas got there… not only had the Type 1
ordering started… things were just simply going sideways.
I still believe they were all ‘on the clock’, however, from the
time they arrived in Yarnell… through the time they were on
Shrine Road trying to ‘tie in’ with Sciacca and accidentally
capturing GM’s last radio transmissions… right on through
their participation in the actual ground rescue effort.
Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell were all hired ( according to the
ROSS ordering report ) as DIVS… but whether any or all of
them were ever given any actual DIVS assignments when
they arrived in Yarnell is still unknown.
I still wonder what Tony Sciacca’s own SAIR interview notes
mean when he said he was there on Shrine road and ‘tied in’
with Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell.
‘Tied in’ for what?
Had Sciacca himself already been given an official assignment
and since he was also PNF… Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell
were told to just go ‘tie in with him’?
To do what?
These are all still questions that need to be answered.
All we know right now ( finally ) is that PNF personnel Clawson,
Hulburd and Yowell WERE there… they WERE doing a LOT of
things ( in some official capacity ), they were in a position to
hear ( and witness themselves ) some pretty important things…
…but not ONE of them has ever been interviewed by any
official agency tasked with investigating what happened
that day in Yarnell. Very strange.
Also very strange is that the ROSS public record for that day
still says all of these men ( AND Darrell Willis ) remained
‘assigned to the Yarnell fire’ for the full 12 days… but I really
don’t think that is the case. Whether that was actually reflected
in any final invoicing still remains to be seen.
Question: If there is an ‘incident within an incident’ like this…
would personnel who are then re-assigned to that incident
still be considered on ‘Active duty’ for the length of the primary
incident itself… even if ( as is the case this time ) their duties
really became ‘off site’ things like making funeral arrangements
and all the other things that go with such an ‘incident
within an incident’?
When does an ‘Incident within an Incident’ such as this one actually
END… as far as the official reporting goes? When all the bodies have
been removed… or only when any personnel originally assigned to
the secondary incident have completed ALL related tasks?
What I am saying is… maybe ALL of these men really did
deserve to be listed as being on ‘active duty’ for the
entire ‘Yarnell Fire’ if they then became actively involved with
all those other things that needed to be done ‘off site’ as
related to this particular ‘Incident within the Incident’.
Or… maybe it’s just a mix-up in the ROSS system as to
who was actually on the Yarnell Hill fire for how long.
More to come on all this, I suppose.
As far as Willis I would bet he was sent home to deal with the personnel grief the fatalities and the families of his unit and did not work on the fire again. That is a normal process.
12 days on that fire would be a long period sounds like a stretch for out of area resources.
Sonny,
You posted a ways up there about being a ‘tour guide’ for the YHF. I will take you up on that if you’re interested. Myself and a few other WFF will be in Yarnell on Thursday, February 13th. We’re meeting at the Ranch House restaurant, cafe at 0900 (9:00 am).
I would be honored and most appreciative.
Let me know. Thanks.
Sonny,
DISREGARD the above post regarding February 13th. The other folks backed out. Another time maybe.
ok. I just now read this. Best way to reach me is snail mail for fast reply. P.O. Box 42 Yarnell Arizona 85362.
I am not online much. I have not been to the library to check here. I briefly skimmed for my name. Saw this. With Joy’s current health, I need a heads up that I can reply to you all and without her I cannot get to email area or phone. That is why I posted my mailing address. I am glad to see you postponed. I would of been too late. 3-4 hours too late.
WTKTT,
They could have worked in any position even though ordered as DIVS, hence the Misc. Overhead, like task Force Leaders, Strike Team Ldrs, Dozer Boss, etc.
Don’t know anything about ‘the list.’
You mean… like ‘Safety Officer(s)’?
Roy Hall’s own interview says Bea told him these guys were
‘on the move’ ( headed to Yarnell from Prescott ) circa 1:40 PM,
so they could have been in Yarnell as early as 2:00 PM or so.
Their vehicles ( all THREE of them ) were photographed up
at the ICP and parked ( and UTVs absent from trailers ) at
1515 ( 3:15 PM ). So counting the time it would have taken
to unload the UTVs… we KNOW they were all there by at
least 1510 ( 3:10 PM ).
Marty Cole, the only officially hired ‘Safety Officer’, was still sitting
in Prescott until 3:30 PM or so. He wasn’t even going to head
down there until he saw the official work order show up and
never even arrived that day until just before the deployment.
So it seems to me that… since the fire had already
transitioned to a Type 2 ( long )… and there was still no
required ‘Safety Officer’ on duty… that any one of these
guys hired as DIVS could have been fulfilling that role on
the fire until Marty Cole actually showed up… yes?
Maybe that IS what happened.
Maybe there WAS at least a ‘designated Safety Officer’
on duty long before the deployment.
Unless more documentation is uncovered about what the
heck was really going on at that ICP that afternoon… or
someone finally gets around to interviewing…
Jayson Clawson
Aaron Hulburd
KC (Casey) ‘Bucky’ Yowell
…it’s all conjecture.
I still find it unbelievable that neither the SAIT or ADOSH
even bothered to interview any of these guys… when they
are the ones that captured GM’s final moments and were
also the ones out there looking for them… and eventually
standing right there at the deployment site and confirming
all 19 deaths to fire command.
I wonder what else any of them might have heard that
day while up at the ICP… or at any other time?
Maybe the Prescott lawyers blocked all three of these guys
from even talking to the SAIT.
The SAIT obviously KNEW about them… unless Hulburd
just sent that Helmet-Cam video to them anonymously,
or something weird like that.
Actually… that even begs another question.
Aaron Hulburd was there for hours and hours.
Are we supposed to really believe that those few moments
in the Shrine Parking is the ONLY time that day he was
recording anything with his Helmet-Cam?
I wonder if it’s possible he had his Helmet-Cam running
at any time brefor or after the only video we have seen or
even (possibly) during the ‘ground rescue’ mission itself?
WTKTT,
NOT Safety Officers. None of them is Red Carded as a Safety Officer. They are all Red Carded in the Operations realm.
And regarding the Lewis Crew blunder. I still contend it was a leadership and quality control issue. Scrub oak brush is EXTREMELY volatile , especially brush that hasn’t burned in almost 50 years. It has heavy dead leaf understory and a great deal of dead component which acts as kindling. And could easily exhibit fire behavior as you described just based on reduced relative humidity and a little wind along with alignment being fully exposed to solar heating.
A burnout that you refer to would have drawn a lot of attention and chatter on the radio.
Reply to RTS post on February 9, 2014 at 8:51 pm
>> RTS said…
>> NOT Safety Officers. None of them is Red
>> Carded as a Safety Officer. They are all Red
>> Carded in the Operations realm.
Ah… okay… thanks.
As Mark Twain has said… “We are all ignorant…
just about different things.”
My ignorance here was that I was simply assuming
that anyone who is fully qualified to be an OPS
level Line Division Supervisor would ALSO
( automatically ) have the horsepower to also
function in the capacity of ‘Safety Officer’, if needed.
That just seemed to make sense to me.
I guess there’s yet another set of classes ( and
‘tests’ ) just for that position designation.
So even if anyone realized that a ‘Safety Officer’
was sorely lacking at some point that afternoon,
these ‘under the radar’ DIVS hires from Prescott
National Forest were NOT an option and
they still had to wait until Marty Cole got there
because he was the one ‘carded’ for that
and ‘ordered up’. Got it.
>> RTS also wrote…
>> And regarding the Lewis Crew blunder. I still
>> contend it was a leadership and quality control
>> issue. Scrub oak brush is EXTREMELY volatile,
>> especially brush that hasn’t burned in almost 50
>> years. It has heavy dead leaf understory and a
>> great deal of dead component which acts as
>> kindling. And could easily exhibit fire behavior
>> as you described just based on reduced
>> relative humidity and a little wind along with
>> alignment being fully exposed to solar heating.
>> A burnout that you refer to would have drawn a
>> lot of attention and chatter on the radio.
Fair enough. Thanks again ( ongoing thanks ).
You may be right.
They may have thought they were ‘done’, with
no ‘flare-ups’ visible anywhere… and then a minute
later they turned around and there were 40 foot
flames jumping over a 12 foot wide road over
on the east flank with little to no wind beforehand.
It’s possible, I guess.
So it might be safe to say that one of the PRIMARY
‘learning lessons’ to take away from this entire
incident would be…
Given a similar situation and similar fuel type…
just because you have been doing ‘mop-up’
operations with a crew of 13 men for almost
SIX HOURS on a small 2-4 acre area and no
fire growth whatsoever for all that time… don’t
you dare think you are DONE and send any
message to that effect to fire management.
They might accidentally release resources that
you are going to sorely need all of sudden.
If you report the fire as being OUT and/or
‘fully contained on all four sides’… make sure
you are TOTALLY RIGHT about that before
reporting any such thing to management.
WantsToKnowTheTruth on February 10, 2014 at 1:08 am said:
“If you report the fire as being OUT and/or
‘fully contained on all four sides’… make sure
you are TOTALLY RIGHT about that before
reporting any such thing to management.”
YES.
And precise vocabulary is important, too.
from NWCG’s glossary:
______________________________
Contained – The status of a wildfire suppression action signifying that a control line has been completed around the fire, and any associated spot fires, which can reasonably be expected to stop the fire’s spread.
Control Line – An inclusive term for all constructed or natural barriers and treated fire edges used to control a fire.
Controlled – The completion of control line around a fire, any spot fires therefrom, and any interior islands to be saved; burned out any unburned area adjacent to the fire side of the control lines; and cool down all hot spots that are immediate threats to the control line, until the lines can reasonably be expected to hold under the foreseeable conditions.
Mop Up – Extinguishing or removing burning material near control lines, felling snags, and trenching logs to prevent rolling after an area has burned, to make a fire safe, or to reduce residual smoke.
_______________________________
We also have a third state, when we actually call a fire “out” (usually after it’s been controlled and monitored for while, unless it was a single tree in sparse vegetation).
In the real world, it can be difficult to tell exactly when a fire is controlled, especially if it’s a large and dirty burn (a dirty burn has rough edges and pockets of unburned fuel). In my experience, ICs are pretty cautious about calling a fire controlled, and will walk the perimeter of the fire themselves before declaring it “contained” or “controlled”. It looks bad on everyone when a fire rekindles and escapes containment. A crew boss talking to the IC might have been a little fuzzier in their description, however (“we’ve got good line around it,” “it’s about wrapped up,” or “it’s pretty much contained,” for example).
Mop up may take place on quiet sections of a large, uncontained fire. Usually, though, the mop up phase doesn’t really begin until the whole fire is lined. I was under the impression that on Saturday the crews were still containing the fire (building line around it), not mopping up. Do the details or records exist that can more clearly tell us what was actually going on?
It would be very easy to get an unexpected burst of activity in the Yarnell fuels, even without any wind. Perhaps some duff ten feet into the interior was smoldering, the embers crept into a nice pocket of loose, light material right under some oak, and whoosh — suddenly you have twenty foot flames. Those flare ups create their own little convection currents, which can carry burning leaves across a road. (Another reason why even informal lookouts are important!)
WTKTT,
Good job on finally tracking on my post below.
Robert the Second
on February 2, 2014 at 3:25 pm said:
WTKTT,
Correct. The guys in the helmet cam video are from the PNF and worked on the fire as Task Force Leaders and other misc. fireline overhead.
FYI on ROSS orders:
A – Aircraft
C – Crew
E – Equipment (engines, dozers, etc.)
O – Overhead
S – Supplies
M – Medical
And I’m probably missing some.
Please recall the SAIT predetermined conclusion(s), selective interviews, misplaced evidence and statements only located or ‘found’ when called out on this issue
RTS… so you thought that just got ‘lost in the noise’, eh?
Can you elaborate any more on what else you seem to
know such as your statement…
>> (They) worked on the fire as Task Force Leaders and
>> other misc. fireline overhead.
Were they actually given DIVS assignments when they
showed up… like they were ‘hired’ to be… or did they get
other assignments?
What does ‘misc. fireline overhead’ mean?
Were they making peanut butter sandwiches?
RTS… followup…
Roy Hill’s own SAIT interview notes say that Bea Day
DID send him ‘a list of people that were moving without
O ( Overhead ) numbers’.
That ‘list’ ( document? ) has never showed up anywhere.
The SAIT never bothered to track this document down
even after Roy Hill admitted it existed.
Do you know who ELSE was on that list of people being
hired that day ‘off the radar’?
Sorry… brain fart… it’s ‘Roy Hall’, not ‘Roy Hill’.
Argh…moving people without resource orders…that is just so wrong. Honestly, it should take all of five to thirty minutes to let dispatch contact these people, work up a resource order, and fax it to their office. Usually, if there’s any delay in dispatch, it’s because the resources to be ordered aren’t answering their phones or email. It makes sense for an IC to call up their resources personally first (give them a heads up), but it’s stupid for those resources to take off without the resource order in their hands.
Such a mess.
I’m fond of the phrase: “Go slow to go fast.”
Who was flying “574 Delta,” and what was “574 Delta”? I don’t see it on the aviation resources list. Anyone?….
Where is this reference to ‘574 Delta’?
In a document?… or no?
Is it something in one of the AIR STUDY videos that no one
has public access to (yet)?
is there a listing for 574D? Phonetic Alphabet is used for any letters.
**
** THE REAL STORY OF THE HELMET-CAM VIDEO
As it turns out… there’s a complete ‘story within a story’ here that hasn’t been told
yet… and it has to do with exactly WHO took that now-infamous Helmet-Cam
video out there on the Shrine road on June 30, 2013… who was with him… and
what they all did AFTER that.
I apologize in advance for the LENGTH of this post… but there’s a big story to
tell here and then a lot of evidence to back it up that needed to accompany
the ‘story’ itself.
The ‘SHORT STORY’ section below is simply the ‘story’ itself.
The ‘LONG STORY’ section below has all the evidence and details.
The other part of this story ( the mysterious part ) is that NONE of this
was documented in ANY of the official reports… yet all the evidence
to support this story IS, in fact, contained within the actual interviews that
the SAIT conducted during their ( so called ) ‘investigation’.
NONE of the men who were actually there on the Shrine road taking this
crucial ‘Helmet-Cam’ video were EVER interviewed directly by the SAIT
even though ( as you will see below ) they continued to play a crucial
role in the incident following the video and following the deployment.
Okay… here we go…
It was long suspected that this Helmet-Cam video was taken by the
‘Globe Type 2’ crew somehow finding themselves on the Shrine road circa
the time of deployment.
That is NOT the case.
There are 3 vehicles seen in at various points in the Helmet-Cam video.
TWO of the vehicles were towing trailers with UTVs in them.
There are also only 3 individuals seen in the entire Helmet-Cam video.
Each of these 3 individuals were driving their own vehicles that day.
ALL THREE of these individuals were ‘special-hires’ from earlier in the day when
Roy Hall was operating ‘under the radar’ and still just ordering resources outside
of the ROSS reporting system as part of the Type 2 short-team assembly. That
was before Roy Hall actually ordered the full Type 1 team and he was just calling
Bea Day on the phone and asking her to ‘get him people’.
ALL THREE of these individuals in the Helmet-Cam video were simply
‘off-the-radar’ hires for the Type 2 (short) team that came from the Prescott
National Forest (PNF).
They are…
Aaron Hulburd – The actual Helmet-Cam video camera operator.
Jayson Clawson – The fella in the white helmet seen in the video.
KC (Casey) ‘Bucky’ Yowell – The fella in the beard we see in the road with radio.
The ‘story within the story’ here is that these are ALSO the same three people
who would soon accompany Blue Ridge Superintendent Brian Frisby and Blue
Ridge Captain Trueheart (Trew) Brown on the actual ‘ground rescue’ mission to
try and find the Granite Mountain Hotshots after the deployment.
** THE SHORT STORY
Sometime after Roy Hall arrived in Yarnell, and before the point where it
became obvious a Type 1 team was needed for Yarnell… Type 2 (short)
team IC Hall just kept calling Bea Day and asking her to ‘get him people’
that he thought he was going to need that day. Hall has already said
in his SAIT interview that he didn’t trust the ROSS ( Resource Ordering
and Status System ) system and that he didn’t want to deal with all
that ‘computer stuff’. Hall also said he was telling Bea Day to pull people
from Prescott, wherever possible, because it was ‘close by’.
In Roy Hall’s YIN notes… he himself states that he started this
‘off the radar’ ordering of people just after the 7:00 AM briefing at the
Yarnell Hill Fire station that morning.
That’s when Bea Day ordered up people like Tony Sciacca and
Marty Cole ( Safety Officer ) from Prescott.
What has NOT been fully documented is that Roy Hall also told Bea
Day to get him some ‘OPS and DIVS people’ from Prescott… and
that’s when she also ordered up the following Prescott people…
Aaron Hulburd, Jayson Clawson and KC (Casey) ‘Bucky’ Yowell.
Aaron, Jayson and Bucky got to Yarnell BEFORE Siacca and Cole.
These three traveled together in a 3 vehicle convoy from Prescott and
then pretty much ‘stayed together’ all of Sunday afternoon.
It is this 3 vehicle group that we clearly see parked on the side of the
road circa 1500 ( 3:00 PM ) in that video taken at that time by a crew
that was leaving the ICP up at the Model Creek School.
There is evidence in the YIN notes, however, that they arrived at the
ICP as early as 2:00 PM that afternoon.
When Tony Sciacca arrived in Yarnell until 1615 ( 4:16 PM ) or so.
According to his own SAIT interview… Sciacca never actually went
to the ICP. He says he went straight to the Shrine Road area,
parked his vehicle, and then ‘followed it back on foot’. It is unclear
how far back he went or whether he made it all the way to the Youth
Camp area where the Blue Ridge vehicles were still staged ( but
in the process of evacuating )… but he says he was there on
Shrine road in that timeframe ( 1615 ).
That is ALSO when Sciacca says he ‘got a call from Jayson Clawson’
( who was up at the ICP ) and then he ‘tied in with THEM’ ( meaning
Sciacca stayed on Shrine Road and all THREE of THEM ( Clawson,
Hulburd and Yowell ) came down to meet him.
There are also YIN notes that support this because at that time there
were already doing Helicopter bucket drops up at the ICP and there
was concern from Clawson and others that their pickups were no
longer safe… so that’s another reason all THREE of them left the
ICP at that time and came south to ‘tie in’ with Sciacca on Shrine Road.
So that is how these three PNF hires ( Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell )
actually ended up in the parking lot of the St. Joseph Shrine in this
timeframe. They were simply evacuating their pickups, trailers and
their two UTVs from the side of the road up at the ICP ( where they
are seen parked in the other video ) and were down there to ‘tie in’ with
Tony Sciacca ( according to Tony’s SAIT interview ).
That is how they were right there in that St. Joseph Shrine parking lot
in time for Aaron Hulburd to shoot the Helmet-Cam video circa 1639.
NOTE: Tony Sciacca is not seen in the Helmet-Cam video so its unclear
where he went or whether he did ‘tie in’ with these other three PNF hires
there, and had just left before the Helmet-Cam video began. It would
be Tony Sciacca’s interview notes that also go on to confirm that it
was Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell that would (quote) “Go looking for
Granite mountain on the two razors (UTVs)”.
At this point… we can now see exactly what Hulburd, Clawson and
Yowell did on the Shrine road.
Aaron Hulburd started shooting the Helmet-Cam video just before 1639
( unless there is more to that video that we still haven’t seen ).
When the video starts… Hulburd is the farthest WEST of the 3 men.
His Helmet Camera pans to the EAST for just a moment and that’s when
we see Clawson and Yowell just standing in the road at the back of
their own trucks parked just EAST of where Hulburd is now filming.
Hulburd keeps his Helmet Camera running as all three of the men
and evacuate the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot and head to a safer spot
about 1/4 mile EAST on Shrine road, where they stop again.
What has happened at that point in the video is that Yowell has stopped
his white pickup and trailer ( with UTV ) FIRST at this new location. Clawson
has stopped further EAST of Yowell ( with his aquamarine pickup and trailer
with UTV )… and when Hulburd catches up with them he passes Yowell’s white
pickup and trailer ( with UTV ) and stops BETWEEN the other two vehicles
with their trailers and UTVs.
Hulburd climbs out of his truck at that point and the moment he does is
when we get the clearest picture of Jayson Clawson, who is wearing the
WHITE helmet and walks right by Hulburd as he is exiting his pickup.
Jayson Clawson doesn’t say anything to Aaron Hulburd as he walks
by. He is obviously concerned about the radio traffic and Clawson is
walking WEST to get to the back of Yowell’s truck and trailer.
Hulburd turns his Helmet-Cam to the WEST as Clawson walks by him
and we see Yowell exit his pickup and follow Clawson to the back of
his trailer.
A few moments later… Yowell walks back EAST towards Hulburd, who
is still filming with his Helmet-Cam… and that’s when we hear Yowell
say “We need to clone a mobile so we can hear what’s going on”.
Hulburd then opens the door of his own pickup to retrieve a radio
and after he does… that is when we see him REMOVE the Helmet-Cam.
As Hulburd removes the Helmet-Cam… there are a few frames where
he takes his own ‘portrait’ and he is clearly seen looking into the camera.
Hulburd then (apparently) places the Helmet-Cam onto the top of the
pickup’s cab roof and it remains there for the remainder of the video.
A few moments after Hulburd places the Helmet-Cam onto the top of
the roof is when we get that full-frontal image of KC (Casey) ‘Bucky’ Yowell
standing in the road with his own portable radio.
Jason Clawson ( with the white helmet ) is apparently still to the WEST
at the back of Yowell’s trailer and he doesn’t return to the other two
men before the video ends.
AFTER THE VIDEO ENDS…
It is still unclear how long Hulburd, Clawson and Yowell stayed there on
Shrine road after the Helmet-Cam video ends but other evidence in the YIN
notes proves that all THREE of them did eventually end up down at the
Ranch House Restaurant parking lot with everyone else circa 1700 ( 5:00 PM ).
At some point after 1700… the ground rescue operation that was going to
look for Granite Mountain was organized and was comprised of the following…
Blue Ridge Superintendent Brian Frisby
Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart ( Trew ) Brown ( with his GPS unit ).
PNF hire Aaron Hulburd
PNF hire Jason Clawson
PNF hire KC (Casey) ‘Bucky’ Yowell
There were THREE UTVs in the ‘ground rescue’ party…
1) The Blue Ridge UTV ( with Frisby and Brown )
2) Jayson Clawson’s UTV ( He was probably by himself )
3) KC (Casey) ‘Bucky’ Yowell’s UTV ( with him and Aaron Hulburd in it )
This actually matches ALL the notes in the Blue Ridge Hotshots
SAIT interview when they said things like “the other 3 of the 5 who
were on site were the PNF hires for the type 2 team” and “Clawson
confirmed 19 expired” and “Bucky and Aaron were pretty quiet”.
( See LONG STORY section below for all these actual YIN quotes ).
The YIN notes also say that Clawson and Yowell DROVE their vehicles
back to the Shrine area which is where they unloaded the other two
UTVs and then ‘broke through’ to the west via the Shrine road area
in order to search for Granite Mountain.
It was probably Frisby and Brown who ‘led the way’ since they must
have simply taken a left at the Youth Camp, then carefully followed
that cutover road where all the dozer work had been over to the
Sesame area… and then decided it was safe to proceed north
in the Sesame area to the Sesame Trail road itself and then
head west towards the old-grader and, eventually, on up to the anchor
point where GM had been working. Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell had
NOT been down in that area at all that day so they must have been
following Frisby and Brown in their UTV who were simply trying to retrace
the route they took around NOON that day for that initial face-to-face
meeting with Marsh.
The reason the ground rescue team was charging out to that exact location
at that time is because the Ranger 58 DPS helicopter had ALREADY
found those ‘yellow packs’ out near the anchor point ( which turned out to
be just leftover bladder bags ) and Ranger 58 was already identifying that
location as the probable deployment site.
Ranger 58 ended up ‘hovering’ over those ‘yellow packs’ they were seeing
out at the anchor point until the THREE UTVs arrived because they knew
they were headed to that area but Ranger 58 had no way to communicate
with them directly.
NOTE: According to all of the DPS people onboard the Ranger 58 helicopter
( both pilots and DPS medic Eric Tarr ) there were, in fact, THREE UTVs that
were ‘down on the ground looking for Granite Mountain’.
When Ranger 58 was sure the THREE UTVs had located the ‘yellow packs’
that they had been hovering over… Ranger 58 continued searching and it was
shortly after that when DPS medic Eric Tarr recalled hearing something about
a ‘ranch’… and then Ranger 58 flew a direct search line towards the Boulder
Springs Ranch and found the actual shelters deployed on the ground.
Ranger 58 called in those coordinates, which were relayed to the 5 firefighters
in the 3 UTV ground search party. They headed south in the UTVs towards
the same saddle where GM originally left the two-track road.
It was still BR Captain Trueheart Brown who was the first to RUN down from
the saddle to the deployment site. DPS medic Eric Tarr had been dropped
off 500 yards from the site in a small clearing just 100 yards north of the
ranch before this time and Eric Tarr was already at the deployment site
before the ground rescue team reached the saddle. DPS medic Tarr’s own
post-incident report says he was there on site when he ‘saw’ the ground rescue
team ( in their UTVs ) arrive up on the saddle… and he ‘waved them down’.
BR Captain Brown made the descent ( on foot ) from the saddle down to the
deployment site in just 4 minutes. It is unclear how long it took the others
to also descend ( on foot ) but within a few minutes all FIVE of them
( Frisby, Brown, Hulburd, Clawson and Yowell ) were all there at the deployment
site along with DPS medic Eric Tarr.
The YIN notes actually confirm all this. ( See LONG STORY section below ).
It was Brown who initially counted 18 but it was Jason Clawson who was the
one who did his own on-site count and ‘confirmed 19’ over the fire command
frequencies.
This is when the Blue Ridge YIN notes also mention things like “Clawson
confirmed 19 fatalities… Aaron and Bucky were pretty quiet”.
All FIVE of the firefighters then walked east to the Boulder Springs Ranch, and
DPS medic Eric Tarr followed them there after he finished putting pink flagging
tape on the burned tree stumps on the north side of the deployment site.
After reaching the Boulder Springs Ranch and talking to the owners for a
few minutes… all SIX of them then walked BACK to the deployment site.
We know that BR Captain Brown then took 10 minutes to walk from the
deployment site back up to the saddle to his UTV… and at least two of the
other 4 firefighters must have as well since that’s when all three UTVs were
driven back to town… but it’s unclear whether Frisby or Clawson ( or both
of them ) stayed there at the deployment site at that time. It’s actually likely
that NONE of the FIVE members of the ground team stayed at the deployment
site and ALL of them simply walked back up to the saddle, got back in the
THREE UTVs, and headed back to Yarnell the way they came ( Sesame trail
to Cutover road to Shrine road… then back out to Highway 89 ).
There is no real evidence where ANY of the FIVE ground rescue people went
after that. The Blue Ridge notes mention ‘heading up to the ICP’ after the
ground rescue mission but there is nothing about where the PNF hires Hulburd,
Clawson and Yowell went following that ground rescue mission.
** THE LONG STORY
**
** THE VEHICLES
The real key to identifying these men in the Helmet-Cam video was
first identifying all the VEHICLES that are clearly seen in the video.
A lot of ‘official markings’ including license plate numbers are clearly seen in
the Helmet-Cam video itself… but it was when this same group of THREE
vehicles was also found in that other video parked on the side of the road
at 1515 up at the ICP that identification became really simple.
The TITLE of that video is…
VID 20130630 151521 240 – Yarnell Hill Fire video provided by AZSF crew
The crew that took the video is NOT the crew that takes the Helmet-Cam
video. This video simply accidentally captures the vehicles of the crew
that WILL take the Helmet-Cam video ( Calwson, Hulburd and Yowell ).
At exactly +0:36 seconds into the video… it accidentally capture the
entire ‘Helmet Cam Video’ crew VEHICLES ( all 3 of them ) parked there
on the side of the road up by the ICP.
They are the EXACT same vehicles that are GOING to be seen in the
Helmet-Cam video shot at the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot one hour and
twenty three minutes from now… trailers and all.
Only the vehicles are there. No crew. So they all must have been INSIDE
the Incident Command Post at the moment THIS video was shot OR
‘bombing around’ in their UTVs since they are not in their trailers at 1515.
In the video… vehicles are passed by in this order…
1) First seen is the regular-size aquamarine standard pickup ( minimal
access-cab style with hard-enclosed bed ) with the white UTV trailer.
This one appears later in the Helmet-Cam video just beyond the
2 firefighters ( Clawson – White helmet, Yowell – Black helmet )
seen when the Helmet-Cam operator ( Hulburd ) pans just
east in the Shrine parking lot for a moment. The white UTV trailer
ride-out is DOWN in this video and the UTV is not there so they might
not have been in the ICP at this point. They might have been out
‘bombing around’ Model Creek in there UTV’s up NEAR the IC
in this 1515 timeframe. Standard USFS Forestry ‘Shield’ logo
is on the door. White stripes on side. Says ‘Fire’ in the stripes
and Vehicle ID ( In big white letters on front ) is DV-93.
DV stands for ‘Division Chief’.
The 9 in 93 means ‘Prescott National Forest (PNF)’.
The ‘3’ in 93 means ‘PNF Ranger District 3’.
That would be Jayson Clawson.
Matches his job description AND his ‘Unit code’ ordering designation
in the ‘WildCAD’ system at the Prescott Interagency Dispatch Center
(AZ-PDC) Resource Status Availability page… which looks like this…
ID, Resource, Status, Location
DIV-93, Jason Clawson – PNF, DO OutSvc, District Office (Bradshaw)
There is also a moment when Clawson walks by Hulburd in the Helmet-Cam
video itself and once I had a name to search I found photos online that
verify it is, in fact, him.
2) Next ( at +0:37 in this video ) comes the first white extended cab
pickup truck that will be seen in the Helmet Cam video. This one is
has the ‘access cab’ configuration ( big side window but no double
doors ) and ALSO has a UTV trailer attached. Same standard
USFS Forestry ‘Shield’ logo on passenger door.
The markings on the side door clearly say…
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
US GOVERNMENT
( SHIELD LOGO – TOP: FOREST SERVICE )
( SHIELD LOGO – MIDDLE: U (Picture of Tree) S )
( SHIELD LOGO – BOTTOM: DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE )
EQUIPMENT NUMBER: 2038
This is KC (Casey) ‘Bucky’ Yowell’s vehicle.
Yowell is the one most clearly seen in the Helmet-Cam video itself
standing in the middle of the road with his portable radio in his hand.
Other pictures found online with a simple Google search for the
words ‘Casey’ and ‘Prescott National Forest’ match exactly.
His ‘Unit code’ ordering designation in the ‘WildCAD’ system at the
(AZ-PDC) Prescott Interagency Dispatch Center Resource Status Availability
page looks like this…
ID, Resource, Status, Location
CAPT 2, KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell, Out of Svc, District Office (Chino)
3) Next VEHICLE… ( at +0:38 in the video )
This one is same exact white extended cab pickup configuration
as (2) but this one has forest green double stripes on the side.
This is also the one that has the flat-style emergency lights rack
mounted on the cab roof. The other white pickup does not have this.
This one also has the black-metal ‘deer chucker’ mounted on the front
whereas the other white pickup has no ‘deer chucker’.
Green stripes on side have the word ‘Fire’ inside them right over
the rear wheel cowlings. Same standard USFS Forestry ‘Shield’ logo on
passenger door. Vehicle ID ( In Forest green letters on front ) is
AZ-PNF (Prescott National Forest ).
This is Aaron Hulburd’s vehicle.
He is clearly seen in the Helmet-Cam video in a full frontal close-up
after he takes the Helmet-Cam off and goes to place it on top of
the cab of this vehicle.
Other pictures found online with a simple Google search for the
words ‘Hulburd’ and ‘Prescott National Forest’ match exactly.
His ‘Unit code’ ordering designation in the ‘WildCAD’ system at the
(AZ-PDC) Prescott Interagency Dispatch Center Resource Status Availability
page looks like this…
ID, Resource, Status, Location
FUELS 9, Aaron Hulburd – PNF, Out of Svc, Prescott Fire Center
** THE ROSS ORDERING SYSTEM LOGS SHOWING
** PRESCOTT NATIONAL FOREST HIRES FOR JUNE 30, 2013…
The ‘official’ Arizona Forestry link that supposedly has links to ALL public Logs
and Resource reports regarding the Yarnell Hill Fire has NOTHING that says
anything about Roy Hall’s ‘off the radar’ hires of Clawson, Hulburd or Yowell.
THIS is the indepenent (PUBLIC) link for the resource report that lists Jayson
Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC (Casey) ‘Bucky’ Yowell. This is the ROSS
system that Roy Hall said he didn’t want to deal with, but his requests for
people ( through Bea Day ) are showinig up here. At some point… Bea Day
must have input these ‘PNF resource orders’ FOR Hall since Hall is on record
saying he “didn’t want to deal with all that computer stuff”.
ROSS = Resource Ordering and Status System Reports
http://fam.nwcg.gov/gacc/swcc/predictive/intelligence/daily/ddsswcc/cognos/incidents/incident_resources_Yarnell_Hill.pdf
Full cut/paste from page 1 of the ROSS resource document above
START OF ROSS REPORT DATA
Incident GACC: Southwest Area Coordination Center
Incident Dispatch: Arizona Interagency Dispatch Center
These are the HEADERS for the individual report column data shown
below, separated by COMMAS.
Clawson, Hulburd, WILLIS, and Yowell were all hired June 30 as DIVS.
Incident Name,
Incident Number,
Req Number Prefix,
Req Number,
Assignment Name.
Fill Code,
Qual Status,
Res Prov Unit,
Res GACC,
Mob Date,
Res Status,
Days Assigned
YARNELL HILL AZA1S-130688, O, O-163, Clawson, Jason W (AZ-PDC), DIVS, Q AZPNF, NMSWC, 6/30/13, At Incident 12 days
YARNELL HILL AZA1S-130688, O, O-161, Hulburd, Aaron (AZ-PDC), DIVS, Q, AZPNF, NMSWC, 6/30/13, At Incident 12 days
YARNELL HILL AZA1S-130688, O, O-18, WILLIS, DARRELL (AZ-ADC), DIVS, Q, AZPRC, NMSWC, 6/29/13, At Incident 12 days
YARNELL HILL AZA1S-130688, O, O-160, Yowell, Kc (AZ-PDC), DIVS, Q, AZPNF, NMSWC, 6/30/13, At Incident 12 days
END OF ROSS REPORT DATA
SIDENOTE: This online ROSS report for the Yarnell HIll Fire shows
Willis, Hulburd, Clawson and Yowell as all having been working the
Yarnell Hill Fire for the full 12 days. I don’t believe this is actually the
case for ANY of them.
** SAIR Investigation notes that mention Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell…
YIN page 51
Interview with Tony Sciacca – Line Safety Office – N. end (1 hr), E. end (1hr)
9:10 a.m. July 12 – Interviewers: Randy, Jimmy Rocha, Jay Kurth
1600-1615 While driving to Yarnell, there was a lot of people and traffic.
I felt we needed to close the road. The intensity of the flank was building.
The wind was building. I thought all houses were were evacuated and I
parked on Shrine rd and followed it back. There was a big wind at 20-25 mph
and the column was laying over deep. There was a line of fire from Shrine to 89.
Got a call from J. Claus on ( Jason Clawson ) and tied in with them.
NOTE: This seems to suggest that Tony Sciacca got to the Shrine road
area around 1615 and ‘parked’ there somewhere and then ‘followed it
back’ on foot. Not known where. It then suggests that Clawson and the
others ( Aaaron Hulburd and KC Yowell ) weren’t there on Shrine road
yet. He ( Sciacca ) supposedly got a call from Clawson and ‘tied in
with them’. So could that be why they all showed up on Shrine road
at all… because that’s where Sciacca was and they were just trying
to ‘tie in’ with him? Where did Sciacca go? ( He’s not in the Helmet-Cam
video )?
Sciacca’s interview notes go on to say…
Jayson Clawson, Yowls went looking for Granit Mountain on the two razors.
NOTE: That’s just a transciber’s error. ‘Yowls’ must mean KC Yowell.
Clawson and Yowell were the ones pulling trailers with UTVs.
YIN page 8
Interview with Blue Ridge Hotshots ( Frisby, Brown, Fueller, Ball )
Interviewed by Godot, Jay, Jimmie, Tim, Jim, and Mike 07/10/2013
Around 1500 they want to pull the dozer out to go north for structure protection.
On the nth end they hear confusion and this is before the column starts to rise.
There seeing black smoke, it’s dark, fl are impressive, spotting to the nth the
fire is running towards ICP. Jason Clawson says, “another western day” they say
they have an hour before the trigger point to start evacuating. BR knows they
don’t have an hr.
NOTE: So BR notes put Jason Clawson up at the ICP circa 1500. This
matches the time their trucks are seen parked up there in the video.
YIN page 10 ( Still interview with Blue Ridge )
Tied in with the crew at the restaurant everyone understood what had happened
a few guys snapping photos of the fire not because of the deployment Brian said
put them away. Started gathering a task force of medical people, paramedics,
drivers, medical equipment, but there was no real access. People coming in/out
all over. B & T met w/ Ball 2 T6 engines and a WT. they were told to go in and
do something. The fire was pushing hard it was passed Ball called Travis and
said let no one else in. Propane tanks going off, houses burning, power lines
drooping. The task force was to wk off of Tac 1 and to stand by until they got
access. Then Holbert, Dowl, and Clawson drove back to youth camp and they
punched through.
NOTE: Holbert, Dowl and Clawson really means Hulburd, Yowell and Clawson.
This is confirmed in the next note a few paragraphs later. ( See below ).
‘Bucky’ is nickname for KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell and ‘Aaaron’ means ‘Aaron Hulburd’.
DPS ship was flying around near GM, then he went to the grater and BR couldn’t
talk to the ship. The ship went to where the bladder bags were and BR hiked to
them, they relayed to B33 that wasn’t the site. Then there was traffic about
another site and the ship gave the lat/long and Trew copied it down. Trew started
running down the ridge, and I mean running. He saw where the ship set down
and then bailed off. He says it was all slicked off. There was confusion because
DPS told him 18. At the ranch house restaurant Brendan gave Trew the manifest
and Trew had it and counted 19. Medic said 18, Trew counted 19, Clawson got
on scene and confirmed 19 and then Clawson left to the home owner. Bucky and
Aaron were all pretty quiet. 5 went down then the DPS officer. 6 all together. They
all walked to the house. The other 3 besides Brian and Trew were Prescott NF guys
who were ordered w/ the T2 team they were sent down to help.
NOTE: This suggests that there were FIVE people out there searching.
Frisby and Brown in one UTV
Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell in the other two UTVs.
Probably Clawson by himself and Hulburd and Yowell in the other one.
NOTE: When it says that Brendan gave ‘Trew’ the manifest this means
he gave it to Brown BEFORE they left on the rescue trip.
Brown got down there first but soon thereafter… Jason Clawson was the
one who was ‘on scene’ and confirmed 19 dead, and then they are ALL seen
walking to the homeowner ( the ranch ) with the Blue Ridge GPS unit.
ALSO NOTE: ‘Bucky’ is nickname for KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell and ‘Aaron’
means ‘Aaron Hulburd’.
NOTE: This all matches now. ‘5 went down then the DPS Officer’.
The FIVE would be Frisby, Brown, Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell.
When it says the ‘other 3 besides Brian and Trew were Prescott
NF guys’ this matches Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell who Bea Day
‘ordered up’ for Roy Hall as part of the Type/2 team with no ‘O’
numbers for them in the ROSS ordering system ( yet ).
Page 29 of YIN
Interview with Roy Hall – 7/8/2013 – 10:30 a.m.
Interviewers: Jay Kurth, John Phipps, Mike Dudley, Jimmy Rocha
At the 7 a.m. briefing – Leader intent. I asked “where are the aircraft that were
ordered? because there was a long list . Defer to dispatch center. There were
a boat load ordered. The comment from the Safety Officer was “Because
orders got placed out of region and you violated the ordering system. I called
Prescott and ordered Tony Sciacca and Marty Cole (safety officers).
NOTE: This doesn’t mention Clawson, Hulbert and Yowell but since this is when
Hall says he ‘ordered’ Sciacca and Cole from Prescott ( because Prescott was
close, as Roy will say later ) then it also might be the time he supposedly
told Bea Day to ‘get me some OPS people’ as well and that’s when Bea Day
also put in the requests for Clawson, Hulbert and Yowell.
13:40 There is concern from the Yarnell side. There is a push on the east end
south of Moddle Creek. Bea Day called and said several ops people were on
the road including Jayson Clawson. Bea Day sent a list of members that
moved with no O numbers.
NOTE: So Clawson had been ‘ordered up’ as part of the T/2 team just as the
BR notes said and Clawson was ‘on his way’ to Yarnell by 1340 ( 1:40 PM ).
That means he could have been there as early as 1400 ( 2:00 PM ) or so.
NOTE: ‘O’ numbers means the ‘O’ number from the ROSS ( Resource
Ordering and Status System ) computer system that Hall said he hated using.
Bea Day was ordering these resources from the Prescott National Forest
outside of the ROSS system so there was, at that time, No ‘O’ number for
them. Willis, Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell eventually would end up with the
following’ ‘O’ numbers when they were finally recorded into the ROSS
system…
ROSS Request numbers for Prescott people…
O-18 WILLIS, DARREL (AZ-PDC) Fill code: DIVS Arrived: June 29, 2013
O-160 Yowell, Kc (AZ-PDC) Fill code: DIVS Arrived: June 30, 2013
O-161 Hullburd, Aaaron (AZ-PDC) Fill code: DIVS Arrived: June 30, 2013
O-163 Clawson, Jason W (AZ-PDC) Fill code: DIVS
SIDENOTE: Where is this ‘list of members that moved with no O numbers’ that
Hall says Bea Day sent him? Was that an email? What? Where did it go?
Who has it now?
YIN page 36
Interview with Rance Marquez – DIVS Z
July 11, 2013 – 0900
Interviewers: Jimmy Rocha, Jay Kurth, Tim Foley, John Phipps
1615 – Came on ATV’s Casey, Jayson Clausen and Bea were at the ICP and
were worried that the pickups would burn.
NOTE: ‘Casey’ must mean KC ( KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell ). ‘Clausen’ obviously
means ‘Jason Clawson’. Not sure if this reference to ‘Bea’ actually means
Bea Day or not. This would appear to mean that Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell
were still all up at the ICP circa 1615 and that’s when they ‘came on ATVs’ and
loaded them up and moved all three of their trucks and trailers to ‘meet up’ with
Sciacca who was now ‘parked’ down on the Shrine Road. See Sciacca’s
YIN interview notes.
YIN page 17
Interview with Marty Cole
Safety Officer ( who didn’t arrive until just before deployment )
July 12, 2013 – 11:40 PM
Interviewers: Randy Okon, Jimmy Rocha, Jay Kurth
About 16:40 Granite 7 called. I didn’t know who it was. Heard TA try to get intel.
I left there and went to the restaurant. I saw Blue Ridge and found out that
Granite Mountain had deployed. Blue Ridge had Brendon. I put his gear in my
truck and said I would take care of him.
17:22 A team was organized with Cougan Caruthers as medical. We
ordered 4 helos and several ambulances were on standby.
17:30-18:00 (guess) The fire was coming to the town. I off loaded Brandon
and went to the Ranch House. I told Todd that the exit was going to be
compromised. Told Todd that there were houses on fire and the fire had
crossed the road. Everyone was trying to establish communication with
Granite Mountain. I drove back through the smoke column that was lying
across the road. There was an engine sitting in the road with fire around it
doing nothing. Aaron, Jayson and Buckie were going in to look for Granite
Mountain. DPS had found packs but there weren’t theirs. While I was sitting
along the highway, I heard Jayson had called Todd and said 19 found….
no EMS needed. Went to town and tied in with Daryl and Todd. Everyone was
in shock. I left at 14:00 the next day.
NOTE: More confirmation that it was Aaron Hulburd, Jayson Clawson and
KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell that went with Brian Frisby and Trew Brown to look for
GM in those 3 UTVs and ALL of them ended up at the deployment site.
** END OF SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN ) pertaining to
** Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell.
SAIR
There is absolutely NO mention of Jayson Clawson, Aaron Hulburd or
KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell anywhere in the official SAIT report.
ADOSH
There is absolutely NO mention of Jayson Clawson, Aaron Hulburd or
KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell anywhere in the official ADOSH report.
WFAR
There is absolutely NO mention of Jayson Clawson, Aaron Hulburd or
KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell anywhere in the official Wildland Fire Associates
Report ( WFAR ).
WTKTT, in your last three paragraphs, you state (using “all caps”) that neither the SAIR, nor the ADOSH report, nor the WRA materials discuss Bucky, Jayson, and Aaron in any depth. This, however, goes back to “relevance.” These reports cannot mention every single small detail. Mind you, if Bucky, Jayson, and Aaron had shown up at 10 a.m., I WOULD consider that relevant, b/c they could have jumped in and helped organize to prevent the chaotic breakdown that later ensued. However, if they did not appear until after, say, noon, it was probably too late to stem the chaos. I mention this not to criticize you, but, rather, because the fact that you are using all caps suggests that you are intending to convey to the reader that the failure to mention these three men is somehow a meaningful failing on the part of those official materials. I do not believe that it is.
(Kudos to you for identifying the three men, however. Good job.)
Reply to Elizabeth post on February 8, 2014 at 6:24 am
>> Elizabeth wrote…
>>
>> WTKTT, in your last three paragraphs, you state
>> (using “all caps”) that neither the SAIR, nor the
>> ADOSH report, nor the WRA materials discuss
>> Bucky, Jayson, and Aaron in any depth.
Yes. ( Except it’s WFAR and not WRA ).
They are simply facts. Capital letters were used because,
well… in the King’s English… capital letters are SUPPOSED
to be used for acronyms.
Would you rather I had used ‘sair’, ‘adosh’ and ‘wfar’?
>> This, however, goes back to “relevance.” These reports
>> cannot mention every single small detail.
Small detail? Really?
THREE ‘under-the-rader’ hires by Roy Hall who were
‘on the clock’ at the ICP, who were ALL hired as ‘DIVS’,
who end up filming Granite Mountain’s last moment, and
then end up being the ones helping discover them and
confirm their deaths over the command channels…
…and they are NOWHERE listed as having been part
of the command structure AT ALL.. nor is the obvious
public ROSS resource report showing their hires
anywhere in the SAIT documents?
Seriously?
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>>
>> Mind you, if Bucky, Jayson, and Aaron had shown
>> up at 10 a.m., I WOULD consider that relevant, b/c
>> they could have jumped in and helped organize to
>> prevent the chaotic breakdown that later ensued.
>> However, if they did not appear until after, say, noon,
>> it was probably too late to stem the chaos.
Elizabeth… with all due respect… do you even read
your posts before you send them?
How you can possible say ( in the same sentence )
that a 10:00 AM appearance of three off-the-radar
Division Chief hires would be ‘relevant’ but ‘a little
later than that’ would NOT be?
See above. There IS evidence they were there at the
ICP ( participating in an unknown command level
capacity ) as early as 2:00 PM.
I don’t understand the importance YOU are placing on
a simple 2 hour window between 10:00 AM ( relevant )
and NOON ( not relevant ). Can you provide more
detail for your reasoning there?
You also seem to forget that based on what happened
that day… what people who were present at the
command level and participating in that fiasco called
the Yarnell Hill Fire did NOT do ( but SHOULD have )
is just as relevant as what they DID do ( if anything ).
The key is ‘having the details’.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> I mention this not to criticize you, but, rather, because
>> the fact that you are using all caps suggests that you
>> are intending to convey to the reader that the failure to
>> mention these three men is somehow a meaningful
>> failing on the part of those official materials.
Wow. See above.
That’s an awful knee-jerk reaction and a lot of imagineering
for you to do based on the ‘fact’ that someone just used
capital letters for acronyms when to have done anything
else would have been grammatically incorrect.
The statements above are just FACTS and I felt it
relevant to point them out.
People can read whatever they want to into that
( as you obviously just did ).
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> I do not believe that it is.
Fair enough…
… but that’s because… once again… YOU are trying to tell
other people what YOU believe is relevant with regards
to what happened in Yarnell on June 30, 2013… and what
YOU believe is not ( relevant ).
That’s fine. You’ve stated your only interest in this
investigation any number of times and you are entitled
to pursue only what interests you… but as I told you
up above… PLEASE don’t criticize the rest of us for
being interested in ALL the details just because
YOU are not.
Speaking of RELEVANCE…
I’m going to ask you again for the TWELFTH time…
Do you have any plans to post a public copy of that
AIR STUDY video that (supposedly) has the captured
radio traffic between OPS2 Paul Musser and DIVSA
Eric Marsh?…
…or are you making your own ‘relevance’ decision
about that as well?
Please don’t misconstrue my simple question as
even trying to be antagonistic in any way.
The material you obtained via FOIA/FOIL is your own.
You can do whatever you want with it.
All I want to know is what your PLANS are for a
particular piece of that material.
If you are NEVER going to post that particular AIR STUDY
video it would simply be nice to know.
WTKTT, I was not criticizing your capitalization of “ADOSH” (for example). I was criticizing your capitalization of the word “NO” in the sentence “There is absolutely NO mention of Jayson Clawson, Aaron Hulburd or KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell anywhere in the official ADOSH report.” I apologize for the confusion.
The fact that you capitalized the word “no” suggests that you are trying to emphasize the word “no,” to convey your belief that the ADOSH report (and the other two reports) *should* have mentioned Clawson, Hulburd, and Yowell. I was trying to express the fact that I do not feel as strongly as you do about the failure of the ADOSH and other reports to mention Clawson, Hulburd, and Yowell. I apologize for the confusion.
If you are entitled to have your view that everything is relevant, I am allowed to have the view that NOT everything is relevant, and I am allowed to share that view here, on this thread.
(Also, where are you getting the view that Clawson, Hulburd, and Yowell were PAID (you said “on the clock”) for the time that they spent on the fire from 2 p.m. until whenever? Yes, they are in the “ROSS,” but that doesn’t mean that they were paid for an entire day’s work, right? Or have you independently “FOIA/FOIL’d” those records?)
Reply to Elizabeth post
on February 8, 2014 at 5:58 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> WTKTT, I was not criticizing your
>> capitalization of “ADOSH” (for example).
>> I was criticizing your capitalization of
>> the word “NO” in the sentence “
Well… what you actually said was…
:: I mention this not to criticize you
Okay. whatever.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> I apologize for the confusion.
NO ( yes… emphasis is mine ).
I apologize. I thought you really were
taking umbrage at someone simply
capitalizing standard acronyms.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> If you are entitled to have your view that
>> everything is relevant, I am allowed to
>> have the view that NOT everything is
>> relevant, and I am allowed to share that
>> view here, on this thread.
Of course you are… but you’ve stated
your position clearly any number of times.
If it doesn’t directly relate to the only thing
YOU want to know ( the WHY )… then it’s
‘irrelevant’ to you.
We get it.
You don’t have to keep repeating it.
Just skip to the next message if you
find something is irrelevant to YOU.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> (Also, where are you getting the view
>> that Clawson, Hulburd, and Yowell were
>> PAID (you said “on the clock”) for the
>> time that they spent on the fire from
>> 2 p.m. until whenever?
Are you suggesting they agreed to respond
to Roy Hill’s request via Bea Day for
‘OPS people’, agreed to be DIVS resources
for a Type 2 ( at that time ) fire command,
then hitched up their trailers, loaded up their
UTVs, and schlepped all the way to Yarnell
just out of the kindness of their heart?
It is not even LEGAL for them to do that
( for insurance reasons ).
My assumption is that they were ‘on the
clock’ and getting paid… even if it turned
out they were not going to part of the
Type 1 team after the next transition.
Also… do you really think 3 men would
have been allowed to accompany Frisby
and Brown on a dangerous rescue
mission into a still-burning area if they
were NOT, at least, officially on the
payroll that day?
If a bunch of non-paid volunteers
were allowed by management to put
their own lives in danger like that on
that afternoon… the insurance policy
violation implications alone would require
their own ‘investigation’.
So yea… I’m sure they were ‘on the clock’.
For how much money… and for how long?
Dunno.
If the SAIT had even bothered to interview
any of these men perhaps we would
know more about that.
>> Yes, they are in the “ROSS,
>> but that doesn’t mean
>> that they were paid for an entire day’s
>> work, right?
According to the records in the ROSS,
they ( Willis, Hulburd, Clawson and Yowell )
were ‘Assigned’ to the Yarnell fire for
the full TWELVE days ( and NOT just one ).
Does that mean the taxpayer-funded
ROSS system is total horse manure…
or did these men actually end up getting
PAID for 12 full days of work on the
Yarnell Fire?
>> Or have you independently
>> “FOIA/FOIL’d” those records?)
I have no actual detailed expense reports
for the Yarnell Fire… or anything from
Prescott or the Prescott National Forest
that might show how much they
might have been making off these
‘hires’, either. I wish I did.
Do you? Does ANYONE?
So yes… until I see detailed records…
I am assuming they wouldn’t have
even been there unless they were SURE
they WERE going to get paid.
See Marty Cole’s SAIT interviews and his
own unit log for that day.
The reason he didn’t even arrive in Yarnell
until just before the deployment was
because he was delaying his departure
until he was SURE the ‘work order’ went
through and that if he headed down there
at all… he WOULD be getting paid.
In his own notes… the very first thing he
did when arriving at the ICP was to
check in with the ‘Financial Officer’ ( as
he should ) to make sure everything was
in order and he would be getting paid.
I am assuming that was standard procedure
that day and Clawson, Hulburd and Yowells
did the same thing ( make sure they were
going to be paid ).
I really would like to know if they actually
were paid for ’12 days on the Yarnell Fire’
like the ROSS record says they were…
because none of them WERE actually
there for that amount of time.
** QUESTIONS YOU DIDN’T ANSWER
Can you elaborate on your ‘2 hour window’
for it ‘being relevant’ whether Clawson,
Hulburd and Yowell’ were there? That
still confuses me and you dodged
that question. I really would just like to
know what you were thinking there.
Once again… for the THIRTEENTH time…
Do you have any plans to post a public
copy of that AIR STUDY video that
(supposedly) has the captured radio traffic
between OPS2 Paul Musser and DIVSA
Eric Marsh?
NO is a valid answer… but I would
appreciate any answer at all just so
I don’t have to keep asking you about it.
Followup regarding Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell…
In some cases… even information that comes across
as ‘sketchy’ or ‘incomplete’ in the SAIT investigators notes is
actually made clearer if you look at other information they
had available to them.
This case of the details of the actual ‘ground rescue mission’
is one of those times.
Marty Cole of Prescott was the ‘Safety Officer’ that was ordered
up early afternoon for Yarnell but didn’t end up arriving there until
just shortly before the actual deployment because he delayed
his departure for Yarnell until he saw the actual order come
through to him in writing from the Prescott Dispatch Center.
Marty Cole was interviewed by the SAIT, but even some of
those notes from his interview are vague.
As it turns out… the SAIT actually had Marty’s own hand-written
unit log notes from that day in their possession as well, which
have entries that are much clearer than anything recorded
by any SAIT person during his interview.
Marty hand-wrote this UNIT LOG at 2200 ( 10:00 PM ) on
the night of June 30, 2013.
SOME of Marty’s SAIT interview notes have SOME of the
same information… but there are ‘bits and pieces’ of
information that never made it into the SAIT documents
and things in the SAIT interview that aren’t in his log.
Unlike his SAIT interview, however, in his handwritten
UNIT LOG Marty Cole absolutely verifies that Jawson Clawson,
Aaron Hulburd, and KC (Casey) ‘Bucky’ Yowells were THERE in
Yarnell at the time of the deployment and they WERE part of
the ground rescue team that day.
His exact hand-written note ( with his own spelling mistakes )
was as follows…
“Arron Holberg, Jasson Clawson, KC Yowell made access
into the fire area looking for the crew.”
That hand-written document from Marty Cole was part of the
FOIA/FOIL package inside the document labelled…
C01 – ASF000417-INV to 420-INV.PDF
It is here in Mr. Dougherty’s Dropbox under the
Documentation > Safety Folder…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/O66jbXw3Yr/Safety/C01%20-%20ASF000417-INV%20to%20420-INV.PDF
It is hand-written and the document is just a scanned copy
of the original and is not ‘searchable’ so ( for future reference )
here is the TEXT version of the FULL transcript of Marty’s Cole’s
UNIT LOG from June 30, 2013 ( spelling mistakes and all )…
START OF MARTY COLE HANDWRITTEN UNIT LOG
UNIT LOG
1. Incident Name: Yarnell Hills
2. Date Prepared: Jun 3013
3. Time Prepared: 2200
4. Unit Name / Designators: Safety
5. Unit Leader ( Name and Position ): Cole
6. Operation Period: Day
7. Activiity Log ( Continue on Reverse )
Time – Major Events
1330
Genn Jokie from the AZ state type III team called me and asked
if I would come to the fire in Yarnell to help out with safety. I said
I would and waited for the order from Prescott NF Dispatch.
1345
Tony Sciacca called me and said he was enroute to Yarnell.
I told him I would be there as soon as I got the order.
1430
Received order and travel to Yarnell. Drove through large rain
storm Williamson Valley to Prescott. Got fuel in Prescott, left
Prescott via Iron Springs Rd. encountered large amount of rain
west of Prescott. Before entering into Skull Valley observed
large column over Yarnell area. Also encountered large wind
30 to 40 mph just before Skull Valley. Attempted to make
contact with Tony Sicacca and Darrell Willis but only got
answering machine. Called Glen Jokie he said he would
forward info about the winds to IC Hall at ICP.
Arrived at ICP in Peoples Valley. Checkin in with finance
and talked to medical unit. Asked in camp if there was
anyone would could clone a radio. No one could.
Proceded to the fire area to get someone on the fire to
clone radio. Going from Peoples Valley to Yarnell observed
Extreme fire behavior moving from the North to the South.
Saw one of the AZ State truck along the highway asked
for a clone. Rain Drops were encountered at this time.
When I aproched him alot of Radio traffic, he asked me
to stand by while he listen to the traffic.
Listening to the traffic I heard a excited voice Granite
Mountain 7 calling to I believe Air Attack.
Air Attack tried to get him to calm down. I heard Todd
Able call Air Attack to find out what the problem was.
Few minutes went by and I heard Eric Marsh GM sup
call Air Attack and said they had been cut off from their
escape route and were preparing to deploy fire shelters
and would call back when everyone was in shelters.
No further communication was heard. Deployment
occurd in division A.
Incident within a Incident was established, Todd Able
being Grant Mt. IC.
Cougan Cruthers – Medical Group
Steve Emery – Traige Group
Gary Cordes – Treatment Group
Granit Mt Air Attack was established.
DPS Ranger 58 Recon.
Packs were seen 34 13.70W, 112 4750 N.
Arron Holberg, Jasson Clawson, KC Yowell made access
into the fire area looking for the crew.
Search party found all victims.
Multiple homes destroyed in Yarnell. Extreme fire behavior.
Fire crossed 89 made multiple runs on town.
* All times are approximate
END OF MARTY COLE HANDWRITTEN UNIT LOG
Wow, this is really EXCELLENT work, WTKTT. This really fills in some info I’ve been wondering about (such as who took the helmet-cam video, who the PNF guys were, and why they’re so obscured in the dispatch records).
This does bring up questions for me (which, I supposed, only Roy Hall could have answered?):
* Just what were the PNF three ordered for? I thought they were supposed to be filling crew/squad boss requirements for the Lewis type II team. I suppose I may have assumed this because they didn’t have separate order numbers (I can’t remember exactly why I came to this conclusion). Sounds like maybe not?
* Is the ROSS system (or dispatch) actually screwed up in AZ, or was Hall just too lazy/busy to use it? It may seem like a minor detail, but I find it extremely important. I know dispatch was having issues with WildCAD, but that is an entirely different system. I haven’t heard of any real problems with ROSS in the last few years, and it’s absolutely vital that ICs and dispatch trust each other to use it (for accountability, communication, and safety reasons). The fact that Marty Cole was waiting for confirmation of his order was responsible on his part (showing up at a fire without your resource order is generally called “self dispatching,” and frowned upon). But it also makes me wonder if he specifically mentioned waiting for confirmation because ROSS is undermined on a regular basis. I see this as a HUGE potential safety issue that would need resolution.
Again, this is awesome work. I’m really impressed with how you pulled all this together into a cohesive narrative.
NEW– Just watched McDonough on Boise Ch. 7 NBC News announce he is in Boise and working for National Association of Wild land Fire Fighters Was hired a month ago as a Employee in Public Relations.
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 6, 2014 at 6:14 pm
Vicki Minor ( Executive Director of the Wildland Firefighter
Foundation ) and her son Burk Minor seem to be ‘good people’.
Vicki saw a need for her organization some years ago and
she went about creating it.
NOTE: In case anyone was wondering ( I was )… there is
apparently NO real connection between Vicki and Burk Minor’s
Boise, Idaho based ‘Wildland Firefighter Foundation’ and the
Brentwood, Missouri based ‘Wildland Firefighting Associates’
company that was contracted by ADOSH to assist in their
investigation of the Yarnell Hill Fire.
They are both ‘private’ companies… but there doesn’t appear
to be any shared staff or Board Directors.
Brendan himself received support/help from Vicki’s organization
in the days/weeks following the Yarnell incident.
Here’s the Prescott area ABC channel’s print story ( with
a video that has an audio track of the telephone interview
with Brendan McDonough about his new job ).
ABC15 – 02/06/2014
Brendan McDonough update:
Survivor of deadly Yarnell wildfire takes new job
http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news/region_northern_az/prescott/brendan-mcdonough-update-survivor-of-deadly-yarnell-wildfire-takes-new-job
From the article…
PRESCOTT, AZ – The only member of an Arizona firefighting crew to survive a deadly 2013 wildfire has a new job in which he says he hopes to help others with post-traumatic stress disorder.
McDonough’s last day as a Prescott employee was Jan. 24, city spokesman Pete Wertheim said.
Acting Prescott Fire Chief Eric Kriwer said McDonough resigned and was in good standing when he left his city job.
McDonough recently started working for the Boise, Idaho-based Wildland Firefighter Foundation. ( Vicki and Burk Minor ).
** END OF ARTICLE
Here’s a transcript of the ABC telephone interview…
Brendan McDononugh ( on the telephone )…
I was in a dark spot then ( after the incident ).
I really… um… I didn’t really know what to do.
I’ve had multiple times where I’ve just cried and cried…
and… um… I missed ’em so much.
My two and a half year old daughter (that) needs her father,
and I knew I couldn’t let myself to get to a certain point
because she needed me.
Video Narrator: So he got help… reaching out to the
Wildland Firefighter Foundation… a non-profit group that
supports families in the wildland firefighter community.
Brendan: The amount of hearing that I got when I came up
to the Wildland Firefighter Foundation… in the few days
I was here… took so much weight off my shoulders.
The tragedy is always gonna be there… and I’m always
gonna miss ’em… but I’m… you know… feel like I’m now able
to continue on with my life.
With the (fire) season that we’re expecting… I don’t want to be
the person to say it… but there’s gonna be more deaths.
I wanted to… to be able to help… because I felt how good
I was… and I’m just sitting there and I’m like… wow… how many
other people like me are out there that haven’t gotten help…
that haven’t talked to somebody.
Video Narrator: A part of McDonough’s role will be traveling
around the country raising awareness about the importance of
supporting firefighters.
Thanks for the info I messed up on the name. You corrected all of that. McDonough sounded very positive hopefully this will be a good fit for him.
Good for him. He definitely has the experience to be a “been there, done that” ambassador for this organization. I wish him the best, and hope his efforts assist others, that require help.
I can’t say I blame him for not sticking around to stay on the fireline. That would be incredibly difficult for even the strongest willed person..
Best of Luck Brendan!!!!!!
Observer said, “Yes, Marsh and Steed led those men down that hill. Yes, ultimately they bear responsibility. But, I feel that there is more to the story. From the mismanagement of the fire early on to the ultimate conflagration that took the lives of the 19 men and burned homes in the Yarnell area-God didn’t have plan (despite what Willis said) and I believe that a whole lot of folks didn’t have a plan either. Or had a very bad plan.”
AMEN
I have said stuff along these lines before, but sometimes things get a bit overlooked in all the noise.
Yes, the 10 & 18 ARE the gold standard, BEFORE and AFTER any need for an investigation, BUT, a new avenue needs to be addressed, both in training and investigations. That specifically is that, the WFF community needs to take a hard look at how external factors may cause well-trained firefighters to get tunnel vision and ignore those very standards. As many of you know, there were MANY external factors that day, which taken individually may not have amounted to the level of an external causation for tunnel vision, but which compounded may have contributed in such a way that promoted the incident. These types of factors WILL occur again to put stressors on a crew, and being trained to identify them as hazards as well, may save lives.
Obviously there was tunnel vision in play that day. The ultimate tunnel vision had to be in how the behavior of that fire was assessed. Standing on the ridge, looking at the fire and contemplating moving, one would have had to convince themselves the fire was not going to cross their planned route. Otherwise the idea of moving would have been insane. Marsh must have locked onto an assumed fire behavior (i.e. moving southeast) and not thought it was going to change. Not wise given the weather and the potential for wind shifts, but it just had to be his thought process.
Why the tunnel vision? Was it due to external pressure from above, the pressure of the culture of the PFD, or was it just a bad read? According to RTS, the clues for a shift were there in the smoke column. Probably we will never really know.
Trying to identify all the stressors that lead WFF to have tunnel vision may be an enormous task. And people who have tunnel vision often fail to recognize it while it is occurring. Maybe it still will be better to make the rules such an ingrained part of the culture, that no matter the stressors present, no matter the tunnel vision, the need to follow the rules will serve to protect as a last defense. Right now it seems some have deemphasized the rules. And most of the time when you break them you get away with it. Hence you come back to “bad decisions with good outcomes”, which some (RTS) have maintained was behind this disaster.
Also they lost control of the outcome of the move when they did not evaluate and use LCES. I’ve been tired I’ve worked 50 days strait, I’ve worked long shifts 24-36 hours. The one thing you train and train for is you put Safety First in your brain and use it with every move and decision you make.
If you start bending the rules or ignoring them you percentage of survival decreases. Bad decisions with good outcomes. Is Bad Safety planning tunnel vision by one person can be corrected by another if you have open dialog with in a crew structure. The Foremen and Asst. can and should give input.
Reply to Robert the Second post on February 4, 2014 at 2:48 pm
** SATURDAY… CONTINUED…
>> RTS said…
>>
>> …the fire behavior indicated on photos and videos indicated black smoke
>> at 0900 and 60′ to 100′ flame lengths at 1000 to 1030. This was indicative
>> of rock-and-roll fire behavior for the day for those that were paid attention.
>>
>> Fire Order Number 3 – Base all actions on CURRENT an EXPECTED
>> fire behavior.
>>
>> I’m gonna say that the Lewis Crew abided by that and didn’t burn a mile of
>> line and then lose it as the rumor mill goes.
RTS… thanks… but just to clarify…
We’re talking about 0900, 1000 and 1030 on SATURDAY, right?
I don’t automatically see the ‘photos’ you are referring to with anything
near 60′ to 100′ flame lengths… until maybe MUCH later on Saturday,
just before dusk or so AFTER the thing had ‘jumped the Jeep Trail’.
There was (apparently) no ‘rock and roll’ at all Saturday until AFTER it
jumped the jeep trail.
From 10:30 AM to 4:30 PM ( SIX long hours ) it was more like ‘slow jazz’.
The ‘Fernandez’ photos and his ‘fly-around’ of the fire at 10:00 AM
Saturday ( before the first half of the Lewis crew was let down there )
show basically no fire actvity at all. Just a little smoke… and not even
much of that to speak of.
Do you recall which Dropbox folder the 0900-1030 photos are that you
are referring to?
UPDATE: I did actually find a small piece of detail about what (supposedly)
happened Saturday afternoon that I hadn’t seen before. It was a one-liner
in the short ‘preliminary report’ about the Yarnell Hill Fire that the SAIT
released just a few days after they started their investigation.
That ‘initial’ SAIT report was just a quick ‘summary’ of what happened from
Friday through Sunday… but it did have this one specific thing in there about
Saturday that did NOT make it into any of the final report(s).
That ‘initial report’ from the newly-assembled SAIT had this brief
one-line explanation for the moment when the fire ‘jumped the jeep trail’…
“At about 4:30 p.m. a small unburned island on the east side of the
fire flamed up and spotted across the two track jeep road on the
east side (called a “slopover”).”
Up until that moment ( 4:30 PM ) the fire had STAYED at an estimated
size (all day) of no more than 2-4 acres… even since the first full evaluation
on the ground by the Lewis crew circa 10:30 AM.
So, according to the SAIT itself, 4:30 PM is when the ‘second Yarnell fire’
got started. It was this specific ‘slopover’ from some sudden ‘flare up’
in some (supposed) ‘small pocket’ near the jeep trail… with only light winds.
Hmmmm…
Actually… here’s the whole ‘fire size and time estimate’ entries for
Saturday morning and afternoon from that initial SAIT report…
Saturday, June 29, 2013
Early morning helicopter reconnaissance ( 10:00 AM – Fernandez photos )
showed the Yarnell Hill Fire the only active fire of the four lightning ignitions
sighted yesterday. The helicopter reconnaissance estimated the fire at
eight acres with very little fire activity showing. Later, ground estimates put
the fire at two to four acres.
A six man squad from Lewis Crew and one BLM helitack crewman were flown
into the fire by the BLM light helicopter. Firefighters made progress hot-
spotting the few active areas and mopped up (extinguishing burning material)
along the two track jeep road.
The west side of the fire was in very large rock bluffs and considered too
steep to treat with aerial retardant.
The east side of the fire was a two-track jeep road that fire had not crossed.
NWS-Flag issued a weather alert at approximately 3:00 p.m., noting a
thunderstorm moving south from Kingman which was delivered from
the I.C. by radio to firefighters.
The storm cell dissipated BEFORE reaching the fire.
A spot weather forecast for 4760’ elevation called for dry (11% relative
humidity), hot (105 degrees) LIGHT winds (6-7 m.p.h.), slight chance of
thunderstorms with very little chance of moisture.
At about 4:30 p.m. a small unburned island on the east side of the fire
flamed up and spotted across the two track jeep road on the east
side (called a “slopover”).
The I.C. requested SEATs and an Air Attack return to the fire.
A total of 13 firefighters on the hill were committed to digging fireline to stop
the growth of the slopover.
At 5:30 p.m. the I.C. reported the slopover at approximately two acres,
making the entire fire an estimated six + acres total.
( Original 2-4 acre size for SIX HOURS, since 10:30 AM, now 6+ acres ).
At 7:38 PM ( 3 hours after the ‘slopover’ event at 4:30 ) the fire was estimated
at 100 acres and was moving laterally along the ridge to the north, with active
burning in isolated areas of dense fuel pockets.
( 94 acre growth in 3 hours whereas no growth at all above original 2-4 acre
size all day during the SIX hours between 10:30 and 4:30 ).
SUMMARY
So from 10:30 AM to 4:30 PM ( A span of SIX HOURS ), the Lewis crew
was (supposedly) doing nothing but ‘mop-up’ operations on a 2-4 acre
(contained) area with (quote) “very little fire activity”, even starting at 10:30 AM.
Suddenly, at 4:30 PM ( with only LIGHT winds )… something happens.
Some little ‘pocket’ supposedly ‘flares up’ ( with light winds ) on the east
flank right near the jeep trail and ‘spots over’ the jeep trail… getting out of
control before 13 guys ( who are now out of chainsaw gas ) can do
anything about it… and no fixed-wing or helicopter support available
at that time.
Something still doesn’t sound quite right about this ‘moment’ when
(apparently) the ‘second Yarnell Hill fire’ actually got started.
I mean… seriously?… 13 guys have SIX hours to do nothing but ‘mop up’
on just 2-4 acres… and something is ‘missed’ during those SIX long hours
that was big enough to ‘flare up’ and suddenly jump a 10-12 foot firebreak
without them being able to get a handle on it?
I have planted ( on foot ) every inch of an entire 4 acres with corn seed in
less than 6 hours… and that is just ONE person… and also includes
stopping for lunch.
I did, in fact, check that entire ‘jeep trail’ with Google maps distance measuring
tools and it’s not like it’s some tiny little overgrown rarely-traveled two-track.
It was more like a real ‘road’, as dirt trails go.
It narrowed down to 7 or 8 feet wide in just a few spots but the entire thing
averaged about 12 feet wide, with no ‘center growth’. Some places were
much wider and qualified as bona-fide ‘clearings’.
Google satellite images checked were taken on April 9, 2013, only about 80
days before the Yarnell Hill Fire.
Whatever it was that suddenly ‘flared up’ ( that no one seemed to have
been able to or even bothered to ‘mop up’ or put out for SIX HOURS
prior to that?? ) must have been quite a ‘flare up’ to have jumped that
fairly wide fire-break road so quickly.
I think it’s STILL possible that was an attempt to ‘burn off’ that little ‘pocket’
on the east flank down to the jeep trail and then call it a day… but the day
then took another (unexpected) turn.. and the rest is now history…
…but I suppose only more interviews with people who were actually
out there on Saturday could prove that one way or the other.
It’s pretty obvious from the SAIT ‘preliminary report’ on the fire that they
did, in fact, talk to someone who was actually OUT there on Saturday
where the fire actually was… but ( oddly enough ) their own SAIT interview
notes released in the FOIA/FOIL package contain no interview notes
whatsoever with anyone from the Lewis crew.
BTW: Here is the SAIT document in the Dropbox being referred to above…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/t0nEwg9ajn/Information%20Managment/B01-B09%20-%20ASF000009-INV%20to%2041-INV.pdf
Correction for some time/acreage values above.
The fire did NOT grow 94 acres in 3 hours.
The ‘slopover’ only grew to 2 acres in the FIRST hour, then
it took TWO hours for it to grow another 94 acres.
Paragraph above should have read like this…
At 5:30 p.m. the I.C. reported the slopover at approximately
two acres, making the entire fire an estimated six + acres total.
( Original 2-4 acre size for SIX HOURS, since 9:30 AM, now 6+ acres. Only a growth of 2 acres in the FIRST hour after slopover ).
At 7:38 PM ( 3 hours after the ‘slopover’ event at 4:30 ) the fire
was estimated at 100 acres and was moving laterally along the
ridge to the north, with active burning in isolated areas of dense
fuel pockets.
( 94 acre additional growth in 2 hours whereas no growth at
all above original 2-4 acre size all day during the SIX hours
between 9:30 and 4:30 and only a 2 acre growth for the
entire FIRST hour following the ‘slopover’ event ).
I have not written here previously. However, I read this site daily. I am amazed and impressed by the work done by many of you. I suspect I am one of many that have not written but visit often.
I didn’t know any of the GMIHS. I do live in AZ and this tragedy struck me in a deep way. I ordered books on prior WFF fatalities. I researched the topic on the internet. I waited for the Yarnell Hill investigations with great anticipation. I also figured that no matter what those revealed, there would be some group of folks that would cry foul. It happens everytime. And yes, it happened again. However, in this case, there is a LOT more than the SAIT revealed. That is why your work is so important.
Yes, Marsh and Steed led those men down that hill. Yes, ultimately they bear responsibility. But, I feel that there is more to the story. From the mismanagement of the fire early on to the ultimate conflagration that took the lives of the 19 men and burned homes in the Yarnell area-God didn’t have plan (despite what Willis said) and I believe that a whole lot of folks didn’t have a plan either. Or had a very bad plan.
At any rate, thank you for your interest and hard work in this endeavor. I know it isn’t pleasant and I can almost feel the pain and anger in the “old” hotshots who post here. I can “hear” the anger and sadness in others, such as Marti, WTKTT, Robert 2, Elizabeth etc.
I hope that one day, prayerfully soon, those that know things will come forward, if for no other reason than to end some of the speculation that has to be painful for the families and friends of the hotshots.
I hope that one day someone can create a map of the GMIHS movement that day in relation to the fire movement (you all have it figured out, but I can’t get my arms around it-I’m geographically challenged.)
Again, I’m sorry for the loss of these men. I’m sorry for the hurt that their families and the WFF community feel. I feel bad for those of you who have worked so hard here only to have your motives questioned. You have taken time from your life, and it some cases it seems, pocketbooks to do the job that the taxpayers spent money on, but failed to get from the investigations. John Dougherty deserves great credit for sharing this site in such a free and open way.
God Bless You all. I hope you find some answers. I know I will keep reading. There is more to this than simply “Stuff happens.”
Reply to Observer post on February 5, 2014 at 6:25 pm
>> Observer wrote…
>>
>> From the mismanagement of the fire early on to the ultimate
>> conflagration that took the lives of the 19 men and burned
>> homes in the Yarnell area-God didn’t have plan (despite what
>> Willis said) and I believe that a whole lot of folks didn’t have
>> a plan either. Or had a very bad plan.
I think God still wants to know everything that happened ( or
did NOT happen but SHOULD have ) on that Friday, Saturday
and Sunday… just as much as the rest of us do.
>> Observer also wrote.
>>
>> I hope that one day someone can create a map of the GMIHS
>> movement that day in relation to the fire movement (you all
>> have it figured out, but I can’t get my arms around it-I’m
>> geographically challenged.)
Stay tuned. That’s coming soon.
There is, in fact something that we know exists that would
certainly help with that, if it was not too badly damaged in
the burnover.
Robert Caldwell was wearing a Garmin Oregon 450 handheld
GPS unit that day. It would have recorded ALL movements.
That GPS unit belonged to the Prescott Fire Department.
It must have survived the burnover in at least a recognizable form.
It was never submitted as evidence to ANYONE.
There’s a story right there all by itself that still needs to be told.
>> Observer also wrote
>> I hope you find some answers.
We already have ( some, anyway… but there’s more to know ).
>> I know I will keep reading.
>> There is more to this than simply “Stuff happens.”
You bet. That’s obvious at this point.
There are also MANY fatherless children now, and possibly
countless grandchildren, who are going to want to know
as much as possible about why they had to grow up WITHOUT
a father or a grandfather around.
We ( the adults in the room ) at least owe it THEM to make
sure that information is available.
This event is historic.
History has a way of making sure the TRUTH comes out.
just skimming through for questions—short on time.
Thank you for speaking this online—I needed to see it.
I have been dealing with personal life shifting events and loss.
I think this site is very important to so many including us.
There is a grieving process as you stated in your words for all of us watching or writing—Nineteen men gone and there is more to be told. Thank you for this comment.
We all here do not seek notierity yet it is nice to have a sweet person like you to make the time as you did and we appreciated it.
One of my biggest questions since the fire and who I wish I could learn who did the final retardant drops for 6-30-13 why they choose to drop at the least residential area versus common sense since I was on top of the Weaver Mountain mountains and I saw that fire move parallel towards the Glen Ilah community bordering the Shrine/Yarnell area—why didn’t you drop the final retardant from the Ranch House border going towards Sesame towards Shrine with the final drop—even if you never knew where the 19 men were or not-logically speaking from the mountain top looking down that would have been the only option versus the less residential area. I will forever be disappointed in your final drop unless you can educate me WHY you did it the way you did it. Save agricultural land and etc or many homes???
Marti… obviously THANK YOU for your time and your skills.
Amazing work.
Totally understand about the ‘time’ thing, however.
If anyone thinks any of this kind of diligent evidence examination is easy…
…think again.
This thing isn’t going away.
It is the greatest blunder in the history of Wildland Firefighting followed
by one of the most worthless and obfuscating investigations in that
same agency’s history.
This is going to be talked about ( and examined ) for a LOOOONG time.
As for whether anyone really seems to be paying attention…
At the bottom of this page is a ‘hit counter’.
Here are the statistics for just the last 24 hours…
02/04/14 – 01:50 PM – 57,361 hits
02/04/14 – 03:09 PM – 57,492 hits
02/04/14 – 03:13 PM – 57,507 hits
02/04/14 – 09:52 PM – 59,246 hits
02/05/14 – 12:36 AM – 59,596 hits
02/05/14 – 01:50 PM – 62,342 hits
That’s pretty much 5,000 hits in just 24 hours ( 4,981 ).
The world IS watching.
Also remember ( always )…
When you have eliminated the impossible…
Whatever remains… however improbable… must be the TRUTH.
Accepting the improbable is, oftentimes, not even the hard part.
Where the ‘rubber meets the road’ is the work of eliminating the impossible.
Namaste
Followup…
>> marti wrote…
>>
>> And why in the world was Globe Type 2 Inmate Crew’s
>> Overhead, as you have id’d, at the Shrine Area when they
>> were? WTF??? What in the world was gong on with that????
Well… as it turns out… I was never certain that’s who they
were and a little more examination of the evidence has
proved it was NOT them.
The ‘Helmet-Cam’ people were actually 3 of the ‘off the radar’
hires that Roy Hall directed Bea Day to ‘accomplish’ that
afternoon. They are all ‘special hires’ from the Prescott
National Forest.
The camera operator was Aaron Hulburd ( PNF )
The fella in the white helmet is Jayson Clawson ( PNF )
The fella with the beard and no mustache that we
see standing in the road with his portable radio
is another PNF hire with first name ‘Casey’.
More about this very soon.
Marti… If you have to get back to your “real job”, as you are losing income by dedicating your efforts to this project, so be it.
You have done an awesome job of helping to uncover details that would have easily gone unnoticed. It is not without appreciation by those on this site, as well, I am sure by the families of the lost and most of all John Dougherty.
Who do we tell and where does it go from here?
I suspect that as it sits right now John is taking some pretty detailed notes, as well as penning some pretty harsh questions that will go up the chain of command. We have to have faith in Johns abilities and integrity, that he will not let this be swept under the carpet, which I highly doubt the passionate posters (WTKTT, Bob Powers, etc)
I have not been following the board much lately, it has gotten too technical for me (locations of photos and metadata, etc etc) BUT I did watch the Globe crews tribute video and it brought me to the following conclusions: (You may or may not agree).
1) The initial Fire was mismanaged. The responding agency failed to connect the dots of what they had (observed fire behaviour) and WHAT the potential was (Expected Fire Behaviour), and then resourced to that prediction.
2) When the original plan fell apart, they should have pulled EVERYONE back to defendable lines (I have no experience in it, but it does not appear to me that you can build guard in the chapparal brush type without working off an existing anchor (ie. the highway).
3) With Plan A off the rails, in one hand and the forecast in the other, it should have been a no brainer… BACK OFF, Set up Structural Triage and wait for it to come (or attempt aerial igntions in front of it to contain).
4) What was at risk once Plan A derailed?? Thousands of acres of crap brush that is not worth a penny, so let it burn. Prep the houses. Not like they were trying to save high value old growth timber or what have you.
5) The I/C and/or OPS SHOULD have called a full retreat of all resources. They should have had this in the back of their mind, first thing in the morning, to decide when the line in the sand would trigger Plan B or C. You don’t keep going with Plan A, after it is an absolute failure, thinking the plan will still work.
6) The SAIT did not do a truthful, respectful, decent investigation of the factors that led up to this tragedy. It was so poorly constructed that a bunch of internet posters like the group we have here, figured out more than their Special Team of Investigators.
7) The ODSH report shed more light, started to point out the failures of the command structure and management of the fire, which MAY HAVE ultimately lead to the demise of the crew.
8) The crew itself is responsible for their safety and should have told who ever gave tehm the order to go to teh Ranch House to “pound sand” be it from a supervisor in the Command Structure, or within the Crew itself.
AND THE BIG ONE:
If the truth is not researched and a true fact finding come out of this event, in order to prevent a recurrence………..
“IT WILL HAPPEN AGAIN”……..
Respectfully submitted,
RIP GMHS, I hope your deaths are not in vain…
The SAIR was never intended to really find out what happened and serve as a basis for lessons learned. It was simply done because it had to be done, and they wanted to create as little legal risk and controversy as possible. I think it was always intended that discussions in the WFF community and the staff ride process would be where lessons were learned. I suspect this is how lessons are usually arrived at, not imposed from some report, but learned by studying on the part of the crews and outside fire experts.
It will be interesting to see what lessons do come from Yarnell Hill. I certainly have no insight or expertise. I do wonder if the “rules” will be looked on in a new light. From following this story, it seems as if there has been a school of thought within the WFF leadership that has viewed the rules as a bit of a relic, really not in tune with modern firefighting. Almost as if they were guidelines. Even the co-leader of the SAIT expressed this thought. There may also be the belief that the rules have been taught, and tragedies have still occurred, so they are not sufficient to preventing disasters. I think there may be a great deal of fallacy in these thought processes. There can be a lot of wisdom in time-honored principles, and while there are always new ways of doing things, all new things are not always better. Moreover, just because teaching the rules did not prevent disasters, the problem does not appear to be the rules, but the fact that people did not follow them. That should not lead you to abandon the rules, but rather to make them even more a part of the culture.
Just following a couple of the rules violated that day might well have kept them alive. No lookout, no eyes on the fire, no escape route – any one of those might have saved them. Whether a new emphasis on following safety rules is one of the lessons learned remains to be seen, it certainly has seemed to be a theme almost everywhere WFF have commented.
Reply to mike post on February 6, 2014 at 12:04 am
>> mike said…
>>
>> The SAIR was never intended to really find out
>> what happened and serve as a basis for lessons
>> learned.
Really?
Coulda fooled me ( and the taxpayers of Arizona )…
… and the Governor of Arizona, too.
To: Janice K. Brewer
Governor of Arizona
From: Scott Hunt
Arizona State Forester
Arizona State Forestry Division
Office of the State Forester
1110 W. Washington St., Suite 100
Phonenix, AZ 85007
(602) 771-1400
Serious Accident Investigation Team
Delegation of Authority
On the afternoon of June 30, 2013, nineteen members
of the Granite Mountain Type 1 Hotshot Crew from
Prescott, Arizona were killed while fighting the Yarnell
Hill Fire.
As the State Forester of Arizona, I authorize Jim Karel’s
Serious Accident Investigation Team to conduct the
accident review of the Yarnell Hill Fire. This delegation is
to perform the serious accident review of the Yarnell
Hill Fire with the final objective of providing a FACTUAL
and MANAGEMENT report for ACCIDENT PREVENTION.
Signed by…
Scott Hunter – 7-3-13
Jim Karels, Team Leader, SAIT – 7-3-13
Mike Dudley, Deuputy Team Leader, SAIT – 7-3-13
Original letter…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/_ectd3JhvW/Correspondence/A01-A04%20-%20ASF000001-INV%20to%208-INV.pdf
>> mike also said…
>>
>> I think it was always intended that discussions in the
>> WFF community and the staff ride process would be
>> where lessons were learned. I suspect this is how
>> lessons are usually arrived at, not imposed from some
>> report, but learned by studying on the part of the crews
>> and outside fire experts.
You may be right.
That might have always been the only intention and even
the letters to the Governor of Arizona were complete
horse manure.
…but that sort of makes what is going on here ( and
other public places ) even more important, yes?
To even accomplish what you just suggested… it is
still necessary to know WHAT REALLY HAPPENED.
If The SAIR is no more than a feel good investigation in this new day and age then the Wild Land Fire Fighting community has truly lost its way.
We might as well just wait for the OSHA report and deal with those findings.
The old investigations included.
Safety equipment failures what needed change.
Fire overhead plans and implementation.
Fire line safety implementation.
Adequate overhead and crews and equipment.
Fire weather forecasts and critical fire behavior annalists.
Site specific annalists of deployment site
(BY WILDLAND FIRE INVESTIGATION TEAM)
These are not accusation statements but scientific information searches to help future Fire Suppression.
None of the above were actually done but left to Fire Fighters to wade thru with no direction.
Reality check this was a State Fire. USFS and BLM Regions will not do anything unless pushed by the ground pounders. IT IS NOT THERE PROBLEM IT IS NOT THERE FIRE.
and guess what they are staying out of it. No more investigation of their employees. Ground pounders will search the report find there Safety training info and move on.
Overhead, Safety and Equipment will be internal info at Staff levels we will never hear about.
Federal Government—-
It wasn’t their Crew, their Fire or their accident.
They invented the new investigation cover up and it is what it is.
REST IN PEACE GMHS
>> Ground pounders will search the report
>> find there Safety training info and move on.
I wish there had even been enough
information in the high-dollar SAIR report
for them to actually do that. I really do.
As disjointed as even this one particular
public discussion forum has been at
times… we are closer to having the
information they need to do that HERE
than anything done by the very people that
hire them and are SUPPOSED to be
interested in their welfare.
The Information is sill there as all of us fire fighters have said. Between the lines are the violations of the 10 Standard Orders and the 18 situations that shout watch out.
The SAIR just did not openly state them as causes. Allowing Fire Fighters to sift them out of all the worthless chatter in the SAIT. They are there we have stated them over and over. The rest is all the causative actions that pushed the accident to its final conclusion. There is enough blame to go around outside the Crew. This Fire should be identified from start to finish as what you do not do if you want a successful suppression effort…..
WTKTT –
I too want to know exactly what happened that day. Why else do you think I am still here? I am afraid there are a lot of people in positions of influence that want to keep everything as ambiguous and muddled as possible.
mike… I did read and appreciate your
ENTIRE post. You are a wise man… and
I KNOW you are here (posting) for the same
reasons most of us are… but I also DID
have to take issue with your statement
regarding the SAIR.
It WAS supposed to find out what happened.
It WAS supposed to publish FACTUAL results.
It WAS supposed to tell the WFF community how to avoid making the same mistakes.
That IS what those people were (highly)
paid to do with taxpayer dollars.
It did NONE of those things… and ( to me )
that’s just as much a ‘part of the story’
of this horrible incident now as everything
else is.
By the way… I agree with you once
again on your post just above… but
ALL of those ‘people’ you mention?…
…they are ALL ‘public servants’.
I wonder which word in their title they
don’t seem to understand? The ‘public’
part… or the ‘servant’ part? Or BOTH?
Everyone keeps acting like the Forestry
Service is Exxon Mobile, or something,
just trying to protect their internal trade
secrets and their own existence.
It’s NOT ( a private company ).
These people ALL work for you and me.
It’s time someone reminded them of that.
You are dreaming now………..
I feel there are probably more than “public servants” who are afraid of what the truth might be and are not unhappy with the muddled and ambiguous state of affairs. Read any of the Facebook pages dedicated to the 19. The willingness to know the truth may depend on what the truth is.
I’m absolutely sure there are
a lot of people who really do
just want to believe it was
all simply radio problems that
killed 19 good men.
Nobody did anything wrong.
When do we get MORE
money so we can fix the
radios and stuff? End story.
I’m also absolutely sure there
are a lot of other people who
still want to know the REAL
reasons why 19 good men
died that day.
Mr. Mark Twain again…
“A good lie will have traveled half way around the world while the truth is putting on her boots.”
Marti First I want to thank you and others for all they have done here.
The only way to change the current system is to get Regional Foresters and Fire Control to sit down and force change. That’s how its happened in the past.
Can it happen in this day and age? Only if we still have Fire savvy staff people willing to address Fire Safety and research and go the extra mile. The pressure will have to come from the ground up and the media or it won’t happen.
The USFS and BLM are the ones that will enact change. They need to appoint a research group on Wild land Fire, safety and suppression. With out that leadership nothing will happen. Every Forest and BLM Fire Organization needs to push the need up to the national office or it wont happen.
I am most seriously wondering, at this point, what do we do with this?
To be honest, I can no longer afford to essentially spend $2k a month (the loss of my income as a photographer, which has been the case since the beginning of December) to do this. I REALLY have to get back to my work and my life.
And yet, I really believe we have uncovered the evidence to show that there has never been anything approaching a true investigation of this disaster, which not only cost the lives of 19 people, but almost the lives of a number of others. AND without which, there are NO lessons to be learned from it for WFFs other than from speculation based, not on facts, but on the speculations of the SAIT and the ADOSH. Which just isn’t good enough.
There are a number of people I would like to inform of our work and what we have uncovered here. But as I read through just even Chapter 4, the noise to signal ratio is higher than I think they will want to plow through. Which is natural, given what we have been having to do here. But how do we get people who need to know, to know?
I really don’t know what to do at this point. I can’t afford to continue trying to connect dots if doing that has no actual impact on anything.
And WTKTT, thank you for appreciating my work. This last batch was a totally frustrating biyatch without another set of eyes on it to catch my mistakes on it earlier. It cost me a ton of time. Something bigger than just us needs to be doing this.
And I really agree with you that the issue of whether or not Brendan was willing/able to talk during that hour or so at the Ranch House is really critical. I can’t believe he didn’t say anything about what he must have known about where they had decided to go (given the possible–at that time–importance of finding them quickly). But maybe he didn’t. Which raises the question of “If he didn’t, why?”
That’s why those pictures Ball took wandering around Glen Illah have always haunted me so much, regardless of whatever vehicle he was using to take them (and I’m frankly 50/50 on whether by Quad he meant a map–all things considered–or a UTV–all things considered).
I really believe, given how many photos he took of what I think may have been what he was trying to discern might have been possible ways out towards the Boulder Springs Ranch (but I haven’t confirmed since the Googlle Earth street views are not available in those locations) that seem to have been blocked by gates, are a visual narrative of his trying to find a way to Boulder Springs Ranch. I have no idea what was going on inside his head, but for some reason it seems he thought that was somehow the route to somewhere important in some way. Why did he think that? I don’t know.
What happened to the dozer? I don’t know. What does it mean that it was staged? I don’t know. But it was somehow the reason Ball spent a friggin hour hoofing it down on foot to the Yarnell Fire Department to get a Quad (whether that means a UTV–which doesn’t make sense in that context–or a map, which I don’t know what that means either).
And why in the world was Globe Type 2 Inmate Crew’s Overhead, as you have id’d, at the Shrine Area when they were? WTF??? What in the world was gong on with that????
And yes, what in the world happened Saturday????
But, given all these questions and mysteries, my question is, where do we go from here? And where do i go from here? I seriously can’t afford to keep working on connecting dots that need to be connected by a real investigation. And I’m not going to do that. I’m not going to connect another damn fricken dot. I’m a photographer who needs to get back to being a photographer.
I believe those of us who have contributed mucho mucho time out of out lives need to figure out how to make this relevant in order to make sure all this work isn’t wasted. And I, frankly, don’t know how to do that. But I am not evenly remotely going to connect another damn dot until we find a way to make sure our work isn’t being done in vain.
Namaste to all of your who are still here.
WTKTT,
Regarding the SAIT, I’m sure you noticed the “F” word in one of their statements when they referred to “the factual and management report.” FACTUAL? I don’t think so. As ‘they’ often like to say, “There’s a grain of truth in …”
Does anyone know why the official website for the SWCC Dispatch
Center where all available crew statuses are shown is still showing
‘Granite Mountain’ as on an ‘Out-of-Area Rotation’…
…but their ‘current status’ is also listed as…
RA ( Returned from Assignment ).
Is this some kind of ‘memorial’ for Granite Mountain… or is the SWCC
website just totally screwed up?
Look at the bottom of this page at the SWCC Dispatch center…
http://gacc.nifc.gov/swcc/dispatch_logistics/crews/sit300/sit300.htm
WTKTT,
It could be some kind of memorial to them. Last year they had Rest in Peace.
Call them and ask (505) 842-FIRE (3473)
Memorials are fine.
…but the weirdness that’s on that SWCC Dispatch
Resource page just looks like…. well… a screw up.
I wish the Prescott Fire Department had some
kind of memorial on the actual ‘Station 7’ home page
for Granite Mountain.
They still don’t.
It’s still just the way it was on June 29, 2013.
http://www.cityofprescott.net/services/fire/stations/77.php
Reply to Robert the Second post on February 3, 2014 at 8:04 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> WTKTT,
>>
>> Regarding the ” ‘management report’ ” – it’s a Federal concept, so not
>> sure if the State requires it. It depends what AZ State put in their SAIT
>> request and/or Delegation of Authority from AZ State Forestry.
>>
>> And even if ‘they’ did complete one, they usually fall under one or more
>> exemptions, so ‘they’ can keep them within the Agency’s control. So,
>> they would be really difficult to get ahold of, and you’d have to appeal
>> the exemption (s) and go to court to get them released. Even then, the
>> document would most likely be heavily redacted.
RTS… thanks again!
I should have seen the following before I asked the question but I didn’t
realize that the existence of the (supposedly) ‘Federally Required’
detailed management report is now one of the most ̵